# PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED

### Notes

Thanks to Sam Church and Devin Lai (Aff) and Alex Huang and Eleanor Barrett (Neg) for their work on this file!

Please email [khirn10@gmail.com](mailto:khirn10@gmail.com) with any questions or concerns

## 1AC

### 1AC – Arms ADV

#### Contention one is ARMS.

#### War in Ukraine highlighted key shortfalls in US-NATO precision munition supplies – only increasing supplies prevents inevitable conflict

Mahnken 22 – Thomas G. Mahnken is president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a senior research professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. (Thomas G. Mahnken, "The US needs a new approach to producing weapons. Just look at Ukraine.," Defense News, 4-26-2022, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/2022/04/26/the-us-needs-a-new-approach-to-producing-weapons-just-look-at-ukraine/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

The war in Ukraine has offered vivid testimony of the effectiveness, and the high usage rate, of modern precision weapons. Ukraine has so far been fortunate to receive a massive supply of such munitions from the United States, Britain and other NATO states.

Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has told Congress the West has delivered 60,000 antitank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons to Kyiv. Weapons such as the Javelin anti-tank guided weapon and Stinger surface-to-air missile played an important role in halting Moscow’s initial offensive and forced the Russian leadership to scale back its expansive objectives. However, it has become increasingly apparent such weapons are neither cheap nor available in unlimited numbers. Indeed, the United States has reportedly provided Kyiv one-third of its overall stockpile of Javelins.

Unless things change, and soon, the United States may be far less fortunate in a future conflict. Put bluntly, although the United States and its allies have been able to resupply Ukraine, the United States cannot count on similar help should the roles be reversed. U.S. allies’ stocks of precision weapons are limited, and they may have an urgent need for these munitions in a future coalition conflict.

The United States will also need large numbers of longer-range weapons like the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) that are not as widely available as the Javelin and Stinger are today. It is thus imperative for the United States and its allies to both increase their munitions capacity and adopt innovative approaches to munitions production.

The war in Ukraine is but the most recent reminder that 21st century warfare is munitions intensive. As NATO found out in its 2011 air campaign over Libya, and as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates discovered in their war against the Houthis in Yemen, military operations against even relatively unsophisticated adversaries can require the use of large quantities of precision weapons. As recently as 2015, the U.S. Air Force ran dangerously low on Hellfire air-launched missiles in its campaign against ISIS.

The effectiveness of precision weaponry against invading Russian forces has been impressive but has also highlighted the fact that the current U.S. munitions infrastructure is not robust enough to support a high-intensity, protracted conflict against a major adversary such as Russia or China. In fact, in 2019 the Congressionally-mandated National Defense Strategy panel warned of the inadequacy of the current munitions base and highlighted the need to expand and sustain it.

Similarly, the requirement for greater investment in munitions is a recurring finding of wargames and strategic choices exercises that the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has conducted over the course of years. The current U.S. munitions production base lacks capacity, and manufacturing methods are not always tailored to the needs of 21st century warfare. For example, it reportedly takes 18-24 months to manufacture a production run of Stinger missiles. Too often, the capacity of the industrial base rests on second-tier suppliers with even more limited capacity and supply chains that are vulnerable to disruption.

The United States should consider its munitions requirements in coordination with key allies and partners. The United States needs to do more to meet its own munitions needs but may also need to supply allies with large numbers of munitions as well. It is in America’s interest to have sufficient munitions capacity to be able to supply frontline states without having to draw down its own stocks to perilously low levels. Some U.S. allies, such as Australia, are making considerable investments to build up their own munitions industry, but more needs to be done.

The Defense Department needs to analyze U.S. and allied munitions requirements for 21st century warfare, both for Ukraine and beyond. The ongoing war with Russia offers a valuable set of data, but a war against China may have very different requirements: the need for many long-range weapons, for example, as well as for lots of anti-ship missiles. How many munitions do we and our allies require, and of what type? To what extent must our current production capacity be expanded to meet that demand? How many munitions and of what types need to be stockpiled, and what sort of surge production capacity is needed on top of that? Would it make sense to stockpile certain long-lead-time components, such as seekers, and if so, where?

Transforming the U.S. munitions base will take time and investment and would benefit from innovative approaches to yield greater capability and capacity while reducing unit cost. The need to expand the munitions base offers an excellent opportunity to bring new firms into the defense industrial base. The task of fielding modern precision weapons is much more achievable than, say, building a next-generation combat aircraft, and new entrants can bring innovative design and manufacturing approaches to the table, such as modular or multi-mission designs. The Defense Department should also consider innovative approaches to precision weapons, such as the adoption of loitering munitions and guided projectiles that can be purchased in large numbers at low cost for both offensive and defensive missions.

The war in Ukraine has highlighted lethality of modern precision weapons on the battlefield, but also the fragility of the current munitions base. The United States cannot enter the next war with inadequate stocks of precision munitions, nor would it be acceptable to cut off allies from resupply in order to husband limited stockpiles for its own defense. Rather, the United States needs to work with its close allies to both increase their collective munitions stockpiles and production capacity while also adopting innovative approaches to munitions production

#### Allies agree that now is key to prepare for the next conflict

Clark 22 – Maiya Clark is a Senior Research Associate at the Center for National Defense. (Maiya Clark, "The War in Ukraine Continues; Can the U.S. Defense-Industrial Base Keep Up?," Heritage Foundation, 4-30-2022, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/the-war-ukraine-continues-can-the-us-defense-industrial-base-keep, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

The conflict has, however, given rise to silver linings. Many of our allies are waking up to the need to boost their defense spending.

Germany has decided to buy F-35s from the U.S. and pledged an increased defense budget, exceeding NATO’s 2%-of-GDP target. Poland has moved to increase its defense spending as well, with the goal of reaching 3% of GDP by 2023.

To some degree, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has served as a stress test for the West’s defense industrial base. From that has come a growing recognition that, for too long, America has underestimated the amount of munitions and platforms required in modern warfare.

Due to the complexity and time required to manufacture today’s precision weapons, we must start thinking now, before a war breaks out, about whether America has enough weaponry to sustain a conflict.

#### The AI arms race with Russia is only escalating – applying that tech to PGMs is the next frontier.

Suciu 20 – Peter Suciu is a defense writer and journalist for the National Interest. (Peter Suciu, "Coming Soon: AI-Powered Jam-Resistant Munitions," National Interest, 12-5-2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/coming-soon-ai-powered-jam-resistant-munitions-173858, Accessed 6-18-2022, LASA-SC)

Since antiquity once a weapon was developed there were soon methods to counter it. Just as the shield and armor were meant to protect a soldier from swords and spears, today there are now countermeasures designed to stop smart munitions, which were first developed during the Second World War.

While the United States has continued to develop even smarter bombs, including laser- and GPS-guided bombs, the latest efforts include those that could select targets automatically when dropped from an aircraft. Such smart munitions could maneuver in flight after being launched, but efforts have continued to counter such measures and this has included the use of jamming technology.

In what is part of a seemingly never-ending “arms race,” Russia is now reportedly developing software that is designed for use in precision munitions of defensive and offensive weapons. According to a report in TASS last week, Tecmash Group, which is part of the state tech corporation Rostec, has developed new analytical software that utilizes artificial intelligence (AI) for smart munitions that could make the weapons resistant to electric warfare systems including counter-measures.

“The next-generation munitions with the function of artificial intelligence are the most effective means of destruction in a present-day battle,” Rostec Industrial Director Bekkhan Ozdoev said via a statement provided by the company's press office.

“One of the developers’ key tasks was to make the ‘smart’ core invulnerable to electronic warfare systems,” Ozdoev added. "The new software outshines Russian and foreign versions in terms of the munition's protection and renders the operation of electronic warfare systems ineffective.

The system was developed by the Novosibirsk Research Institute of Electronic Devices, which specializes in creating short-range avionics systems for munitions. Its new software could provide increased capabilities for precision munitions used by both defensive and offensive platforms. It also utilizes a new system of radio-electronic protection, which increases the accuracy of striking targets in a jamming environment. According to the press office, it allows receiving detailed information on the targets under active jamming with changing intensity.

This is just the most recent tech “upgrade” of smart munitions that Moscow has focused on. Last year, the Russian military announced the development of an improved smart bomb and the aircraft that carried the weapon. The SVP-24 was described as a system that could transform unguided conventional bombs into precision-guided weapons, similar to the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).

#### The US and NATO need to step up smart PGMs to ensure Russia does not.

Allen 22 – Director, AI Governance Project and Senior Fellow, Strategic Technologies Program. (Gregory, "Russia Probably Has Not Used AI-Enabled Weapons in Ukraine, but That Could Change," CSIS, 5-26-2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-probably-has-not-used-ai-enabled-weapons-ukraine-could-change, Accessed 6-19-2022, LASA-SC)

In March, WIRED ran a story with the headline “Russia's Killer Drone in Ukraine Raises Fears About AI in Warfare,” with the subtitle, “The maker of the lethal drone claims that it can identify targets using artificial intelligence.” The story focused on the KUB-BLA, a small kamikaze drone aircraft that smashes itself into enemy targets and detonates an onboard explosive. The KUB-BLA is made by ZALA Aero, a subsidiary of the Russian weapons manufacturer Kalashnikov (best known as the maker of the AK-47), which itself is partly owned by Rostec, a part of Russia’s government-owned defense-industrial complex.

The WIRED story understandably attracted a lot of attention, but those who only read the sensational headline missed the article’s critical caveat: “It is unclear if the drone may have been operated in this [an AI-enabled autonomous] way in Ukraine.” Other outlets re-reported the WIRED story, but irresponsibly did so without the caveat.

WIRED’s assessment that Kalashnikov claims the KUB-BLA “boasts the ability to identify targets using artificial intelligence” is based on two main pieces of evidence: a Kalashnikov press release about ZALA Aero’s “Artificial Intelligence Visual Identification (AIVI)” capabilities for its unmanned aircraft, and the original Kalashnikov press release announcing the KUB-BLA in 2019.

However, these two pieces of evidence are less than they seem.

The Russian-language AIVI press release never mentions the KUB-BLA or military applications. Instead, it describes a ZALA Aero machine-learning AI drone product line that is marketed to industrial and agricultural sectors. Incorporating modern machine-learning AI into military applications is significantly more difficult than in industrial or agricultural applications. Modern machine-learning AI using deep neural networks offers the opportunity for incredible gains in performance, but that performance depends on having lots of training data during development. Moreover, that training data needs to closely resemble operational conditions.

In general, it is much easier to get such training data from commercial customers than from an enemy military, especially if friendly weapons systems and sensors do not often come within range of enemy ones. The most mature military AI applications are ones like satellite reconnaissance: even in peacetime, satellites get to take a lot of pictures of Russian and Chinese military forces, and those pictures can be digitally labeled by human experts to turn them into training data. Training data is what machine learning AI systems learn from. The combination of a learning algorithm and training data is how AI systems learn to recognize what is in the image. But training data is generally application-specific. Satellite image recognition training data only helps build satellite image recognition AI. One cannot magically use labeled satellite image data to train an AI for a robotic drone’s targeting computer (at least not with today’s technology).

Getting enough of the right sort of training data to incorporate modern AI into, say, a robotic tank’s targeting computer, is a much tougher technical challenge. It is not impossible in principle, but in practice, there are far fewer opportunities to collect the right sort of training data.

This is not to say Russia has not tried. In the past, Rostec and Kalashnikov executives have not been shy about their attempts to develop weapons that successfully combine modern AI and combat autonomy, so it would be odd if they had succeeded in doing so with the KUB-BLA and not disclosed it in their marketing materials. Kalashnikov has been heavily promoting the KUB-BLA for both Russian and international customers.

What does Kalashnikov say about the KUB-BLA specifically? The 2019 KUB-BLA announcement states that the system has two means of delivering the drone and its explosive warhead to target coordinates: “The target coordinates are specified manually or acquired from [the sensor] payload targeting image.”

The vague latter description is what led many to assume KUB-BLA was using AI. However, “payload targeting image” is consistent with how many other precision-guided munitions and drone loitering munitions work, including ones that do not use any advanced AI capabilities. A Rostec executive specifically described the KUB-BLA as a Russian “domestic analogue” to the Israeli-built Orbiter 1K drone, which looks nearly identical. The Orbiter 1K comes with a ground control station where human operators monitor the video coming from the drone’s sensor and select targets directly from the video feed.

In other words, a human has already selected the target prior to the drone attacking it, and the drone is only autonomously maintaining target lock and navigating to the target, not autonomously selecting and deciding to engage targets. Autonomy over decisions to “select and engage targets” is the specific standard in U.S. Department of Defense policy as to what qualifies as an “autonomous weapon system.” Fire and forget munitions—which is the standard term used to describe not only the Orbiter 1K, but also heat-seeking missiles like the Javelin and Stinger—do not qualify as autonomous weapons. Those heat-seeking missiles do not use modern deep neural network machine learning, but they do use thermal image processing algorithms that were once considered state of the art. They, and many more systems like them, have been in use for decades by dozens of militaries around the world.

It is possible that the KUB-BLA received some kind of lethal AI-targeting upgrade prior to being used in Ukraine, but that is doubtful. Neither WIRED nor anyone else has provided evidence that this is the case. If the weapon did have those capabilities, it is unlikely that Kalashnikov would fail to mention them. The company has bragged about KUB-BLA’s recent use in Ukraine, and in the past Kalashnikov has openly talked about seeking to develop a “fully automated combat module” based on AI deep neural network technology.

In sum, there is little reason to believe that Russia is using AI-enabled autonomous weapons in Ukraine, yet. That is the good news. The bad news is that, if Russia’s unlawful war in Ukraine drags on, Russia has the intent and likely has the means to deploy autonomous weapons, with or without advanced AI.

Regarding means, a recent report by Russian news outlet RIA Novosti interviewed an unnamed Russian military source that is worth quoting (via Microsoft’s automatic translation) at length:

Russian reconnaissance and reconnaissance-strike UAVs will receive a digital catalog with electronic [optical and infrared] images of military equipment adopted in NATO countries. This will allow them to automatically identify it on the battlefield and create a map of the location of enemy positions directly onboard the device, which will be broadcast to the command post. . . . It is formed due to neural network training algorithms, which makes it possible to accurately determine the samples of equipment in a wide variety of environmental conditions, including with a short exposure (the technique is visible for several seconds or less), as well as when only part of the sample falls into the field of view of the drone—when, for example, only part of any combat vehicle is visible from cover.

As mentioned above, collecting adequate training data remains a significant hurdle for many military AI development projects. While the invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster in many ways for the Russian military, NATO has provided weapons and equipment to Ukraine that offers the best opportunity yet to collect operational training data for new AI models and more diverse military AI applications. The anonymous quote suggests that Russia’s military is taking this opportunity seriously.

Of course, domestic opposition to the war has caused an exodus of tech workers from Russia, and the sanctions levied against Russia have left it with major shortages of the semiconductor chips needed to make advanced AI systems. These are major challenges, but advanced AI is not required to endow weapons with all types of lethal autonomous capabilities, only a willingness to delegate decisions and freedom to military machines. The Israeli-built Harpy autonomous weapon, which can loiter in the air over a battlefield for hours while searching for enemy radar emissions to attack, dates back to the late 1980s. In addition to the KUB-BLA, Kalashnikov makes another drone called the Lancet, which the aforementioned Rostec executive describes as a Russian analogue to the more modern Harpy-2 (aka Harop). Kalashnikov claims the following about the Lancet:

[The Lancet] is a smart multipurpose weapon, capable of autonomously finding and hitting a target. The weapon system consists of precision strike component, reconnaissance, navigation and communications modules. It creates its own navigation field and does not require ground or sea-based infrastructure.

Kalashnikov is clearly marketing the Lancet as a capable autonomous weapon but also one that can be remotely controlled depending on user preference. The Russian military has already used the Lancet for combat operations in Syria in its remotely controlled mode, but observers have not yet confirmed that the Lancet is being used in Ukraine. Once it shows up, Russia will likely be tempted to turn on Lancet’s autonomous weapon functionality—that is, if the system’s performance matches Kalashnikov’s advertising.

Remotely piloted drones have demonstrated effectiveness in the war in Ukraine that exceeded most analysts’ expectations before the war, when drones were often viewed as useful in counterinsurgency operations, but not a high-end conflict against a technologically sophisticated adversary like Russia. In military technology competition, however, each successful move leads to a countermove. Many analysts feel that the weak point in current drone weapons is their reliance on a high-bandwidth communications link to their human remote controllers. If the war in Ukraine drags on for many more months or years, expect both sides to more widely deploy jammers and other electronic warfare systems to counter drones. Elimination or reduction of remote piloting options will naturally lead Russia to desire greater autonomy in their drone weapons.

Regarding intent, Russia has consistently played the role of stubborn obstructionist through years of UN expert discussions about developing new international norms or codes of conduct for the development and use of autonomous weapons. Most countries around the world are being cautious with the introduction of military AI. Much of the AI ethics and autonomous weapons debate has been heavily focused on whether or not using AI increases the risk of technical accidents and harm to civilians. But Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine is a tragic reminder that, while unintentional harm to civilians is a real tragedy, there is also the unsolved problem of intentional harm to civilians. The Russian military has routinely attacked not only residential neighborhoods, but hospitals and humanitarian organizations.

Finally, Russia’s human soldiers in Ukraine have suffered heavy losses and reportedly deserted in large numbers. Faced with such frustrations, there’s little reason to doubt Russian president Vladimir Putin would use lethal autonomous weapons if he thought it would provide a military edge.

The United States and its allies need to start thinking about how to ensure that he does not.

#### **Increased PGMs are vital to continued European stability**

Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312\_(Deterrence\_Defense\_Baltic)\_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

There are many lessons to be learned from the Ukrainian operations against Russia to date that appear directly applicable to the defense of Estonia and the other Baltic states based on preliminary reports from the fighting in Ukraine. Further lessons will be confirmed over time as analysis and reporting on the conflict continues and solidifies. The successful Ukrainian employment of precision strike capabilities in a highly “asymmetric” operational approach based heavily on the employment of large numbers of small, short- and some medium-range, lethal precision strike weapons in the ground, air, and sea domains could suggest particularly important lessons highly relevant to the defense of other nations, including Baltic and other NATO states. The Ukrainian military has been able to inflict a remarkably high level of attrition on Russian forces by employing large quantities of small, mostly short-range, lethal precision-guided weapons (PGW) that it received from NATO allies and other states.39 These have included very large quantities of anti-tank/vehicle weapons such as Javelins and NLAWs. General Milley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Staff, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) that as of early April 2022, the U.S. and allies had provided 60,000 anti-tank weapons and 25,000 anti-aircraft weapons to Ukraine.40 These systems have been particularly useful because of favorable terrain and their ease of use.41 Armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS), notably the Turkish TB-2, have proven singularly effective in detecting and destroying Russian tanks and other vehicles and equipment.42 Those aircraft are also able to perform in other roles such as reconnaissance and targeting for ground troops. Similarly, thousands of SHORADS such as Stingers, Starstreaks (UK), and other “Man-Portable Air Defense Systems” (MANPADS) not only inflicted attrition but as importantly “highly unpredictable ground-mobile SAMs complicate the tactical threat picture even more for Russia,” while being highly survivable compared with larger static air defense systems.43 Other types of weapons and supplies such as machine guns and assault rifles, ammunition, and body armor and other protective gear offered by NATO allies and others clearly have been of great utility as well, but it is the PGWs and the ways they have been employed by the Ukrainians that have underpinned the exceptional battlefield results seen to date. The battlefield experience in Ukraine provides but the most recent evidence of the key role of PGWs in modern warfare. It has highlighted the deadly effectiveness and high usage rate of modern precision weapons, particularly shorter-range weapons that are able to operate without a near-real-time targeting network.44 Indeed, the ability to detect and strike targets in near-real-time without the need for sophisticated real-time targeting networks may be the defining characteristic of a shorter-range PGW.45 This has important implications for addressing serious concerns about the resilience of command, control, communications, computer, and ISR (C4ISR) capabilities under attack in wartime.46

#### The Baltics need NATO support through PGMs – the alternative is Russian aggression

White 22 – Sarah White is a reporter for Real Clear Defense. (Sarah White, "The Baltic States Need Advanced NATO Weapons to Compensate for Their Geographical Disadvantages," RealClearDefense, 5-6-2022, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/05/06/the\_baltic\_states\_need\_advanced\_nato\_weapons\_to\_compensate\_for\_their\_geographical\_disadvantages\_831021.html, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

Now that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has passed the 60-day mark, the focus on the possibility that Russia might invade the Baltics next has lessened, but the risk may be no less heightened than in the war’s early days. The three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—are all at a geographical disadvantage to Russian aggression, and, as members of NATO, carry the highest possible stakes in the event of an attack.

Many neighboring countries are re-evaluating their own defense policies in the event that Russian aggression reaches their borders. Even Germany, which had a default policy of non-aggression after the Second World War, has committed to buying the F-35 fighter jet from the U.S., anticipating the need to defend itself. Finland and Sweden, which had a policy of neutrality when it came to joining NATO, are now seriously considering membership.

In response to Finland and Sweden's statements, the Kremlin threatened to reposition nuclear weapons in the Baltic region. While the threat may be empty, and not one that is going to stop Finland and Sweden from joining NATO, it is still a reminder that the Baltic countries are in the crosshairs of hostile rhetoric between Russia and the alliance, not to mention actual war.

There are several reasons why the Baltic states are uniquely vulnerable to Russian invasion. The prime reason why they might be the Kremlin’s next target is that each of them, particularly Estonia and Latvia, has an ethnic Russian minority population. Moscow’s justification for prior invasions, including the ongoing one in Ukraine, is that ethnic Russians have to be “liberated” from oppressive non-Russian governments.

However, geography plays a significant role in adding to the Baltics’ vulnerability. More so than Finland, which shares an 800-mile border with Russia, and countries such as Poland, which borders Russian ally Belarus, are relatively disconnected from allies by geography.

As of now, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania do not have allies in close proximity in the Baltic region. The three countries are essentially trapped between Russia and the Baltic Sea with few NATO allies close by. In terms of logistics, this means that it will be difficult to send troops and supplies to the Baltic states on short notice in the event of a Russian attack. Estonia and Lithuania share a border with Russia; potentially worse is the fact that Latvia is hemmed in by Kaliningrad, the heavily armed Russian enclave loaded with nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles.

Finland and Sweden, the two countries that would be able to deliver military support most quickly, are not NATO members yet and have not been since the alliance was established. Thus, until they decide to join, if that does indeed happen, the Baltic countries will remain stuck with the status quo.

Those geographical disadvantages could end in the whole region being squeezed like a vise if the Russian military becomes more sophisticated in the time between the current invasion of Ukraine and a future invasion of one of the Baltic countries. However, that scenario is looking less likely than it did prior to February 24th, as the Russian army has shown that it is not the invulnerable fighting force the world once thought it to be, suffering casualties in troops and in equipment at the hands of the Ukrainian army that are becoming increasingly hard to explain away at home. The sinking of the warship Moskva is one such example.

To make up for that geographical disadvantage, the Baltic countries should probably be reinforced with additional military support from NATO allies as soon as possible, whether in the form of extra troops or weapons systems. As of January, there was already some discussion of this within NATO. As Russian forces were observed massing on the Ukrainian border, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas told Reuters that her government was currently “discussing with our allies to increase their presence here to act as a deterrent" and voiced worries in Tallinn that the Baltics were a "NATO peninsula."

However, those discussions have largely appeared to take a backseat as the Russian invasion progresses, more is learned about Russian atrocities against civilians, and millions leave Ukraine for safety abroad. About 2,700 additional U.S. troops, as well as extra NATO forces, have been distributed across the three countries, but Baltic leaders have been pushing for a more substantial solution.

In March, NATO’s summit in Brussels did not produce a permanent agreement that would fortify any of the Baltic countries and create a credible deterrent. Rihards Kols, chair of the Latvian parliament's foreign affairs committee, stated afterward that “We welcome these reinforcements, but it’s not enough — absolutely not enough.”

Another reason the Baltics could look like an easy next target for the Kremlin is because of their small size; Lithuania, the largest of the three, has a population of only 3.7 million. Moscow may very well assume that its advantage in numbers would allow it to overwhelm any local defenses in an invasion. But additional weapons systems as deterrents in the Baltics are more likely to make Russia think twice before repeating its invasion of Ukraine in one of the three countries.

At least temporarily, Russia could be deterred if NATO delivered the same systems to the Baltics that are already scheduled for delivery to Poland: the F-35 fighter, the Patriot missile system, and the M1 Abrams tank. Likewise, given that the U.S. has sent 100 surplus towed 155mm howitzers to Ukraine, mobile 155mms would be a realistic, quickly deliverable option for Baltic defense. Other systems such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), Iron Dome missile defense system, and Predator missiles should also be considered.

This would require bypassing two obstacles. First, the process of approving the sale and the schedule of delivering the systems would have to be massively accelerated. Poland, which ordered the F-35 in 2020, only began to receive them this year, and has yet to receive the other systems. Second, the U.S. and the Baltic countries would have to agree to a plan that ameliorates the cost to the three countries’ governments. The current system of rotating troop deployments and other reinforcements from NATO exists because Tallinn, Vilnius, and Riga do not have the budget to purchase systems like the F-35 on their own. And in addition to making the decision to deliver these weapons systems, the logistical challenges of delivering them have to simultaneously be addressed.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania may need military support now more than ever, as all three have depleted their own weapons reserves in order to aid Ukraine. There is no more opportune moment than the present to prepare for a second onslaught of Russian aggression in Europe, and there is no place where NATO’s credibility is more at risk than in the Baltic countries.

#### Otherwise, Russia escalates – it spillsover

Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312\_(Deterrence\_Defense\_Baltic)\_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

Estonia and the Baltics will remain vulnerable to a broad spectrum of Russian threats. Chapter 1 noted the range of Russian threats from the sub-conventional level to a full invasion and occupation. The proximity of the Baltic states to Russia and the disparities between NATO and Russian forces in the region leave the Baltic states vulnerable in a variety of potential scenarios. Accordingly, NATO’s security posture in the Baltic region must move from a focus on forward presence to persistent forward defense, which entails having sufficient combat-ready forces positioned and ready to “fight tonight” to deter and, if necessary, to stop or greatly slow a Russian invasion. NATO and Europe as a whole do not have the option of returning to the pre-2022 European security status quo. The most likely persistent threats are those on the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum, where Russia could employ various “gray zone,” or sub-conventional, measures to attempt to intimidate or coerce Baltic states. Potential operations may try to use the Orthodox religion, Soviet nostalgia, or education and citizenship issues to manipulate Russian-ethnic populations living in strategically relevant areas of the Baltics such as Tallinn, Paldiski, Narva, Riga, or Daugavpils.96 Other scenarios below the threshold of open conflict include the weaponization of migrants, exploitation of natural or man-made disasters, or promotion of social unrest in the Baltics. Russia, however, could also try to provoke repeated reserve mobilizations in the Baltics through limited incursions or provocations in order to impose economic costs, mobilization exhaustion, or create tensions within NATO while also desensitizing indications and warning about possible future Russian operations. Mobilizing in response to any Russian provocation, however small, might risk Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania wearing out the current sense of urgency within the Alliance and could jeopardize the perceived legitimacy of their claims on other Alliance members. Even after recent events in Ukraine, it remains to be seen if and for how long the supposedly greatly heightened threat perceptions in western European NATO members persist.97 The Baltic states themselves, with limited assistance from NATO, are best positioned to counter these sub-conventional threats because they typically require civil and government rather than military responses. Further along the conflict spectrum to conventional military operations, limited air and missile strikes or “pulsed” ground incursions would put the onus on NATO to react or escalate.98 Limited attacks or incursions could create tensions within the alliance between members who want to rapidly escalate and hit back, and members who would prefer other, less risky response measures. These types of attacks would place a premium on air and missile defense capabilities, which the Baltic states do not possess in substantial numbers. Given the potentially high costs of these scenarios to NATO and their relatively low cost to Russia, the Alliance should work to significantly improve the Baltic states’ ability to defend against such Russian provocations. A key question for NATO to consider is the threshold at which point Estonia, the other Baltic states, and/or the Alliance would strike Russian territory in retaliation. A conventional ground invasion to seize and occupy one or more Baltic states is possible. Although it has been the least likely scenario, it is the most dangerous one, and one that NATO must be adequately prepared for. This scenario is especially salient now, given that Russia has actually undertaken exactly such an action against Ukraine. In the event of a similar future invasion, the Baltic states must be able to withstand preliminary Russian attacks and heavily attrite Russian forces as they enter NATO territory and sustain the fight as other NATO forces assemble and move to reinforce the region. Fundamentally, the credibility of the Alliance, both as a military organization and with regard to the Baltic region, rests on its ability to counter Russian threats by reinforcing units and assets, moving its forces rapidly to decisive combat areas, and executing successful conventional military operations to defeat such a Russian invasion. The NATO Alliance must also be prepared to counter these Russian threats in the face of increased nuclear saber-rattling from Russia.

#### **Conflict in the Baltics goes nuclear.**

Brands 19 (Brands, Hal. “How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics.” Bloomberg, 11-07-2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-11-07/nuclear-war-in-the-baltics-russia-could-force-one>. Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Most recently, he is the co-author of "The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order.")

Would the U.S. fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states back in 2004. Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense. There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers. During the Cold War, NATO was outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces, and it would have had great difficulty stopping a Soviet attack with conventional weapons. From the moment it was formed, NATO relied on the threat of nuclear escalation — whether rapid and spasmodic, or gradual and controlled — to maintain deterrence. American thinkers developed elaborate models and theories of deterrence. U.S. and NATO forces regularly carried out exercises simulating the resort to nuclear weapons to make this strategy credible. After the Cold War ended, the U.S. and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Tensions with Russia receded and nuclear strategy came to seem like a relic of a bygone era. Yet today, with Russia rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear statecraft is returning. The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have the capability to prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in two to three days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO could respond by mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would require striking targets — such as air defense systems — located within Russia itself, as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines. Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. They are particularly alarmed at the possibility of NATO using its unmatched military capabilities to conduct conventional strikes within Russian borders. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the Russians are serious about it. A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead, through deliberate choice or miscalculation, to a general nuclear war involving intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and apocalyptic destruction?

#### Ramping up PGM supply is necessary to regain momentum in UKRAINE – current efforts to restock fail.

Morris and Cancian 22 – Frank Morris is a reporter for NPR and has supervised the reporters in KCUR's newsroom since 1999. Mark Cancian works for the Center for Strategic and International Studies. ("Javelin missiles are in short supply and restocking them won't be easy," NPR.org, 5-27-2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/05/27/1101701890/javelin-missiles-are-in-short-supply-and-restocking-them-won-t-be-easy, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*audio descriptions excluded from transcript\*\*

One of the best weapons Ukraine has in its war with Russia is Javelin missiles. But supplies are low, and restocking them will not be easy. Frank Morris of our member station KCUR explains why.

FRANK MORRIS, BYLINE: Every conflict has its iconic weapons - tanks in World War II, helicopters in the Vietnam War. And Mark Cancian with the Center for Strategic and International Studies says the war in Ukraine has distinguished an American-made, shoulder-fired, precision-guided anti-tank missile - the Javelin.

MARK CANCIAN: We've seen pictures of Saint Javelin. We've heard Javelin songs.

MORRIS: That's right. T-shirts, murals, even songs, venerating a missile.

MORRIS: This video shows familiar images of Ukrainian soldiers firing Javelins, Russian tanks exploding and burned-out wrecks smoldering. But Cancian says the U.S. has stopped shipping the celebrated missile.

CANCIAN: What you've seen is that in recent aid packages, there aren't any Javelins, and I think that's because the stockpile is getting low.

MORRIS: Cancian figures the U.S. has sent up to 7,000 Javelins to Ukraine, about a third of its stockpile.

CANCIAN: The production problem for Javelins is that we've sent a lot of them, and we are producing them at a very high rate. We've been producing them at about 800 a year, more or less.

MORRIS: Javelins are assembled in a plant in Troy, Ala., out of parts and materials sourced from around the country. Production is picking up, but it's going to be expensive, as President Joe Biden conceded when he visited the plant earlier this month.

PRESIDENT JOE BIDEN: And to make sure the United States and our allies can replenish our own stocks of weapons to replace what we've sent to Ukraine - as I said from the beginning, this fight is not going to be cheap.

MORRIS: Last week, Biden signed a new $40 billion aid package for Ukraine. The Pentagon has ordered another $309 million worth of replacement Javelins. But Mark Cancian says filling that order is going to be challenging because the assembly plant in Alabama can't speed up until all its suppliers - plants that produce the chemicals, 200 computer chips and other highly specialized parts required in every Javelin - speed up first.

#### Otherwise, the tide turns in favor of Russia

Santora and Cohen 22 – Marc Santora is the International News Editor based in London, focusing on breaking news events. He was previously the Bureau Chief for East and Central Europe based in Warsaw. He has also reported extensively from Iraq and Africa. Roger Cohen is the Paris bureau chief of The Times. He was a columnist from 2009 to 2020. He has worked for The Times for more than 30 years and has served as a foreign correspondent and foreign editor. Raised in South Africa and Britain, he is a naturalized American. (Marc Santora and Roger Cohen, "Momentum in Ukraine Is Shifting in Russia’s Favor," No Publication, 6-11-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/11/world/europe/russia-momentum-ukraine.html, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

A war in Ukraine that began with a Russian debacle as its forces tried and failed to take Kyiv has seemingly begun to turn, with Russia now picking off regional targets, Ukraine lacking the weaponry it needs and Western support for the war effort fraying in the face of rising gas prices and galloping inflation.

On the 108th day of President Vladimir V. Putin’s unprovoked war, driven by his conviction that Ukraine is territory unjustly taken from the Russian Empire, Russia appeared no closer to victory. But its forces did appear to be making slow, methodical and bloody progress toward control of eastern Ukraine.

On Saturday, Ukraine’s agile president, Volodymyr Zelensky, once again promised victory. “We are definitely going to prevail in this war that Russia has started,” he told a conference in Singapore in a video appearance. “It is on the battlefields in Ukraine that the future rules of this world are being decided.”

Yet, the heady early days of the war — when the Ukrainian underdog held off a deluded and inept aggressor and Mr. Putin’s indiscriminate bombardment united the West in outrage — have begun to fade. In their place is a war that is evolving into what analysts increasingly say will be a long slog, placing growing pressure on the governments and economies of Western countries and others throughout the world.

Nowhere is that slog more evident than in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Despite urgent pleas to the West for more heavy weapons, Ukrainian forces appear to lack what it takes to confront Russian use of artillery for scorched-earth shelling of towns and villages. While Ukraine is holding Russia back in the major regional city of Sievierodonetsk, it is suffering heavy losses — at least 100 fatalities a day, though their full extent is not yet known — and desperately needs more weapons and ammunition.

Russia also appears to be making headway in establishing control in towns it has captured, including the leveled Black Sea port of Mariupol. It has set out to convince and coerce the remaining population that its future lies in what Mr. Putin views as his restored empire. Citizens there and in cities like Kherson and Melitopol face a bleak choice: If they want to work, they must first obtain a Russian passport, a blandishment offered to secure a semblance of loyalty to Moscow.

#### Unless stopped, Putin will escalate – extinction

Dokoupil 22 – Tony Dokoupil is an American broadcast journalist and author, known for his work as a co-anchor of CBS Mornings. He was also a news correspondent for CBS News and MSNBC. (Tony Dokoupil, "Conflict in Ukraine triggers fear of nuclear warfare," CBS, 4-29-2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/conflict-nuclear-warfare-ukraine-russia/, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

The threat of a global nuclear war doesn't feel as distant as it did a few weeks ago. A recent CBS News poll found that 70% of adults are worried Russia's invasion of Ukraine could lead to fighting with nuclear weapons.

Many are curious as to what a nuclear war would look like — so Alex Wellerstein, a historian and professor at the Stevens Institute of Technology, developed a website called "NUKEMAP." It can simulate a detonation anywhere in the world.

As in real life, the simulation begins with just the push of a button. CBS News' Tony Dokoupil and Wellerstein simulated a scenario of what Times Square would look like if it was hit with a bomb like the one that struck Hiroshima.

"There's a sort of zone that's about here, and... which is pretty hopeless, no matter what," Wellerstein said as he pointed to a large section of midtown Manhattan in the simulation.

When larger, more modern bombs were simulated, the website showed a single blast could cause heavy damage throughout the entire metropolitan region and kill millions.

Winds can also carry radioactive particles even further.

"These are areas where, if you're not taking shelter several hours after the bomb, you could get enough radiation to die," Welllerstein said when referring to cities downwind of New York in the simulation. "You could get enough radiation to get significantly sick."

There was a time when Americans were prepared for that kind of attack. In the 1950s and 60s, school children practiced "duck and cover" drills to help survive a blast, and a public campaign educated Americans on surviving the fallout. Office of Civil Defense teams also spent hundreds of millions of dollars building and stockpiling fallout shelters all across the U.S., but a visit to the basement of a public library in Passaic, New Jersey, reveals this threat has fallen into the very back of our minds.

In a space that was designed to shelter up to 90 people, decades of dust has settled over the medicine and food — which has long since expired — in the basement. Building supervisor Gary Salvatoriello told CBS News there are no plans for replenishment. Instead, the one-time fallout shelter, like so many others, has turned back into an everyday storage space.

George Washington University professor Sharon Squassoni said she's been warning about the risk of nuclear conflict for years.

"The lessons of the Cold War seem to have been forgotten," she said.

The number of nuclear weapons has decreased dramatically since the Cold War. But Russia and the U.S. each have more than 1,500 weapons deployed and ready to fire. Squassoni said she fears that could happen eventually, either by accident or an intentional attack.

"We know from Russian doctrine that they have a plan or they've been thinking about using nuclear weapons to escalate the war, to stop it or deescalate it," she said.

The big question is: what would happen after an initial attack?

"The world would recoil in horror. And I'm sure there would be a lot of voices demanding for some kind of similar action. But do you really want to trigger the third world war? A third nuclear war?" Squassoni said.

"I don't think that Vladimir Putin wants to tangle with NATO," she added. "I don't think he wants to tangle with the U.S. But I also think that we've been misreading him for quite a while.

The truth is there is very little standing in the way of an all-out nuclear war.

"The only thing that really stands is that... it is not really in the interests of our enemies to have that happen to them either," Wellerstein said.

Even though nuclear weapons haven't been used in battle since 1945, Wellerstein said the threat they post never really went away.

"We have a long list of stuff to worry about. But I think they should be on the list. I'm not saying they should be the top of the list all the time. But I think if they were on the list, you might get a somewhat different world as a result," he said. "Future problems are brewing, I guarantee it."

#### Arms cooperation with Turkey rebuilds relations

Jovanovski 22 – Kristina Jovanovski is a reporter for The Media Line. (Kristina Jovanovski, "US hopes arms deal with Turkey will deter Russia, analysts say," The Jerusalem Post, 05-15-2022, https://www.jpost.com/international/article-706793, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

US President Joe Biden sought approval from congressional leaders to sell missiles, radars and electronics to Turkey for its F-16 fighter jets, the Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday.

Turkey will spend more than $500 million on the arms deal if it goes through, Bloombergreported.

Ünlühisarcıkli said the fighter jets are central to defending Turkey’s territory since amissile defense system would be very expensive.

There were fears of an escalation in 2015 when a Turkish F-16 jet shot down a Russian fighter jet that Ankara accused of entering its airspace.

Ünlühisarcıkli said relations improved between the two NATO allies after Ankara offered to provide security at the Kabul airport in Afghanistan. “Before that, Turkey was characterized as ‘our so-called ally’ by the US State Department, but after that, the terminology changed to ‘our valuable ally.’”Ties with the US have been strained for years. In 2018, Washington placed limited sanctions on Turkey over its detention of an American pastor, leading to an exchange rate crisis for the lira.

The most contentious current issue between the countries is Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 anti-ballistic missile defense system. Ankara has been adamant that it will not return the Russian weapons and, in response,Washington kicked Turkey out of the F-35 stealth fighter program. Last year, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the US suggested selling Turkey F-16 fighter jets in lieu of the F-35s it would not be getting. With Turkey in economic crisis and slipping poll numbers for the ruling party, Erdogan has sought to warm ties with wealthier countries in the hopes of bringing in more investment ahead of national elections scheduled for June 2023. Biden’s response has been lukewarm.It took the US president more than three months after entering office last year to hold his first phone conversation with Erdogan. But the war in Ukraine highlighted Ankara’s value to NATO, with Turkey hosting talkswith top officials from Ukraine and Russia. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Biden told Erdogan in a phone call that he appreciated Turkey’s efforts to seek a diplomatic solution, according to the White House.

Ankara also has contributed to NATO interests, including by selling drones to Ukraine that have played an important role in fending off Russian attacks and using its authority under the 1936 Montreux Convention to limit Russia’s access to the Black Sea. At the same time, Russia’s invasion made clear the security risks the country poses to its neighbors.

Aaron Stein, director of research at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), told The Media Line the prospective arms deal would help maintain Turkey’s aging air force, which would advance NATO interests in the event of a war with Russia.

He said the F-16 program has been central to Turkey-US relations for decades, and that Ankara would have few options if it decided to approach other countries in hopes of securing a comparable fighter jet. “If it doesn’t go through, you’re severing basically the backbone of the modern US- Turkish relationship,” Stein said.

However, he warned that the deal faced major hurdles because there are some in Washington who are against it.US Senator Robert Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, has been vocal in his criticism of Turkey in the past, saying last year that the Anatolian nation has not been committed to the principles of democracy under Erdogan. “It all comes down to whether or not the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is going to sign off” on the arms sale, Stein said.

#### NATO arms are key

The Economist 20 – The Economist newspaper was founded by a Scottish hat manufacturer to further the cause of free trade, The Economist Group has evolved into a staunchly independent global media and information-services company with intelligent brands for an international audience. (The Economist, "Why NATO should grit its teeth and help Turkey in Idlib," Economist, 5-7-2020, https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/03/07/why-nato-should-grit-its-teeth-and-help-turkey-in-idlib, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

The crisis is an opportunity for the alliance to reinvigorate itself, while alleviating the suffering Few places on Earth are more miserable than Idlib province, the last big pocket of rebel-held territory in war-torn Syria. It is home to some 3m people, roughly half of whom are there only because they have fled fighting elsewhere. Along with the poor, huddled masses came jihadists, who now largely control the territory. Syria’s dictator, Bashar al-Assad, wants it back, even if that means reducing it to rubble. His months-long bombing campaign has destroyed schools, houses and hospitals, and pushed a million people towards Turkey’s sealed border. Many are trapped there, cold, hungry and exposed. The world is at last waking up to this humanitarian crisis—and to the fact that Turkey is the only country trying to stave it off. Fearing another flood of migrants, its president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has sent thousands of troops to Idlib in recent weeks to stop Mr Assad’s offensive. Dozens were killed in an attack by Syrian (and perhaps Russian) forces on February 27th, prompting retaliatory strikes from Turkey (see article). But what got the attention of European countries was Mr Erdogan’s decision to open Turkey’s borders and send refugees streaming their way (see article). Turkey is crying out for help in Idlib. Its nato partners should provide it, not only to stop the suffering of desperate Syrians, but also to reinvigorate their faltering alliance. Some nato members are reluctant to work with Mr Erdogan. This is understandable. He locks up dissidents, cosies up to Russia, uses refugees as bargaining chips, and is often at odds with nato. Look no further than Syria, where Turkey has pounded Kurdish fighters, whom it calls terrorists, but whom America regards as allies in the fight against Islamic State. Mr Erdogan sees Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, as the man to deal with in Syria—and elsewhere. Mr Putin, in turn, uses Mr Erdogan to divide and weaken nato. Russia’s sale to Turkey of an s-400 anti-aircraft system, which is incompatible with nato systems, has deepened the rift between Turkey and its allies. But Turkey is too important for nato to abandon. It has the alliance’s second-biggest army and sits at the crossroads between west and east. The situation in Idlib, dire as it is, provides an opportunity to reset relations. Turkey has renewed its call for nato to patrol a no-fly zone over the province and asked America for Patriot missiles to defend itself against attack. Western leaders are understandably reluctant to put troops on the ground or planes in the air around Idlib. nato, though, can do more than merely express solidarity. Promises of more ammunition, humanitarian aid and radar surveillance over Syria are a start. Spain already stations Patriot missiles in Turkey and other European allies should step in. nato should put its weight behind talks to reach a political settlement over Idlib. And Turkey should insist that some of its allies should be present at such talks, something Russia rejects. These moves will not completely heal the rift between Turkey and the West, nor will they solve the problem of Idlib, which has been festering for years. But they might restore some of Turkey’s faith in its allies and send a message to Mr Putin. The fact that such strategic considerations—and a fear of Syrian refugees—might motivate Western policymakers more than their concern over struggling Syrians is disheartening. Yet nato attention would look the same to the people of Idlib whatever its motive. Helping Turkey there would alleviate some of their suffering.

#### Otherwise, Russia escalates

Stavridis 20 – James Stavridis is a retired United States Navy admiral, currently Vice Chair, Global Affairs and Managing Director of the global investment firm the Carlyle Group, and Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation. (James Stavridis, "Turkey is a mediocre NATO ally, but Russia is enemy No. 1," Japan Times, 3-2-2020, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/03/02/commentary/world-commentary/turkey-mediocre-nato-ally-russia-enemy-no-1/#.Xue2G2pKiRt, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

I explained that there was more to it than Putin’s desire to show the world his loyalty to a long-term ally. He felt that engaging militarily would diminish U.S. influence in the region, ensure Russia’s access to warm-weather ports on the Mediterranean and enhance his sway with Iran (which also supports Assad). He also wanted to demonstrate to the Russian people that he was a decisive global player unafraid to stand up to the West. His strategy remains coherent, and it appears he will succeed in helping Assad crush the rebellion. Turkey has been opposed to Assad and aligned with some of the rebel forces for years; hence its deploying troops to Idlib. Like Putin, Erdogan is pursuing a larger strategy in the region. He wants to control the Syrian border to diminish attacks in Turkey by Kurdish terrorists from the south, and to exert Turkish influence across the former Ottoman Empire. He also aims to demonstrate to his political base in Turkey that, like Putin, he is an authoritarian man of action. He figures the ends are worth placing at risk the strong economic ties between the two nations, tourism from Russia, and a cordial personal relationship with Putin. Erdogan has hardly been an ideal ally recently: sending his troops to slaughter U.S.-allied rebels in Syria, purchasing an advanced missile-defense system from Russia, and threatening to shut down NATO installations on Turkish soil, among other provocations. Still, the potential of a military collision between Russia and Turkey is of far greater concern for the NATO alliance. If the two nations’ troops end up in direct combat, Erdogan could call on the rest of NATO for assistance against a military great power. We’ve been here before. During my time at NATO, we saw several incidents involving Russian and Turkish fighters and defense systems. Eventually we ended up deploying Patriot air-defense batteries to southern Turkey. That forced Assad and his Russian allies to concentrate on other parts of Syria to avoid an accidental clash with NATO. This time, with significant land forces in close proximity and active combat underway, the chances of a miscalculation are far higher. Last Wednesday, Erdogan insisted that Turkey would not take even the “smallest step back” in an escalating standoff with Russia. He also called for again sending Patriot batteries to his southern border. From an alliance perspective, there are a handful of actions that might ease tensions and avoid an open conflict triggering Article 5, the guarantee that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all. The top NATO brass and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg need to meet with their Turkish counterparts and make the case for doing everything to avoid Russian forces on the battlefield — which of course is easier said than done. NATO can provide what militaries call “deconfliction” between Russian and Turkish forces by providing high-level intelligence about Russian troop deployments and intentions. It can also technically assist Turkey with developing preventative protocols to avoid combat with Russia. The U.S. and Russia do this, for example, at sea, where we have very specific rules about approaching each other’s ships and aircraft, the so-called Incidents at Sea agreements. NATO can also provide logistical and humanitarian assistance to the refugee population. Most important perhaps, the U.S. must let Moscow know in no uncertain terms that the consequences of combat operations against Turkish troops would include further sanctions and greater military support for Turkey in accordance with the NATO treaty — to include, for example, the Patriot deployment Erdogan has requested. Clearly, there needs to be a global response to the violence in Idlib, and the United Nations Security Council must address this with more than calls to action. The idea of a negotiated “safe zone” between Turkey and Syria is still worth pursuing, although Assad and Putin feel they have all the momentum at the moment. It’s unlikely we can avert the tragedy facing three million Syrians civilians — many women and children — about to be crushed between Putin’s and Erdogan’s competing strategic plans. Still, things would get immeasurably worse for everyone in the case of a full-blown NATO-Russia confrontation. Without nuanced U.S. and NATO efforts to both rein in and protect the interests of their fractious Turkish ally, that isn’t an unthinkable result.

#### Extinction

Owen Cotton-Barratt et al. 17 - PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

#### The plan prevents escalation in multiple scenarios BUT collaboration with NATO is necessary for proper implementation

Hacker et al. 22 – Tyler Hacker is an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His work focuses on U.S. defense strategy, future warfare, and great power competition. (JAN VAN TOL, CHRISTOPHER BASSLER, KATHERINE KJELLSTRÖM ELGIN, TYLER HACKER, "DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE BALTIC REGION NEW REALITIES," Center for Strategic Budgetary Adjustments, 2022, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/CSBA8312\_(Deterrence\_Defense\_Baltic)\_web.pdf, Accessed 6-21-2022, LASA-SC)

Establish stocks of common-use munitions and equipment. NATO and the United States should preposition munitions in the Baltics for use by reinforcing units. These stocks could include anti-tank and anti-air missiles like Javelins and Stinger as well as similar munitions produced by European NATO states, loitering munitions, armed UAS, cannon and rocket artillery munitions, and small arms ammunition. Inventories could also be used to supply and restock the training expenditures of Baltic forces. The cost of a munitions sharing program would be a relatively minor expense for NATO but could save the Baltics valuable training funds to be allocated toward high-priority capabilities or to training facilities for Alliance use or NATO Center of Excellence operations. This would have the dual advantage of enhancing peacetime training while constituting important prepositioned stocks. Ramp up U.S. and European production capacity for G-RAMMs. NATO and other states donated tens of thousands of G-RAMMs such as Stingers, NLAWs, and Javelins to the Ukrainian military, with resultant heavy depletion of their own inventories. Consistent with historical experience, the expenditure rates of those weapons in Ukraine have reportedly been very high. There is currently little surge production capacity, both for replacement of older G-RAMM types such as those sent to Ukraine or for more advanced versions for reasons both of supply chain issues and certain required materials.134 Current estimates are that large replacement orders will not be filled until 2023 or even 2024. Given that such weapons will play an increasingly important role on future combat operations, expanding production capacity should become a high priority for both U.S. and European producers.135 Bolster NATO’s ability to reinforce its eastern front and the Baltic region. NATO and the European Union should further invest in defense infrastructure along the eastern front using programs such as the NATO Security Investment Program, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), and the Three Seas Initiative. The United States should continue to support improvements to European logistics and training infrastructure through European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding. These projects should focus on NATO’s ability to rapidly move and sustain forces in eastern and northern Europe and might include improvements to airbases, seaports, rail infrastructure, fuel distribution systems, command and control networks, expedient bridging equipment, and hardening of critical nodes. NATO should continue to stress-test reinforcement scenarios in annual exercises and rehearse securing sea lines of communication in the Baltic Sea. Several nations bordering the Baltics have ongoing technology and commercialization initiatives to develop and operate uncrewed cargo ships, which may prove vital in contested logistics scenarios. Finally, sealift capacity is a crucial aspect of any U.S. effort to reinforce and defend Europe. Recapitalizing the U.S. sealift force is long overdue and necessary for contingencies in both Europe and other theaters.13

### 1AC – Plan

#### Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of precision-guided munitions equipped with artificial intelligence.

Other options:

Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of artificial intelligence.

Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over artificially intelligent precision guided munitions.

Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization over artificially intelligence precision guided munitions.

Thus, the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the area of precision-guided weapons equipped with artificial intelligence.

### 1AC – DIB ADV

#### Contention two is the DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE.

#### Expanding the US industrial base is key to continue supporting American allies – only expanding cooperation can solve

Khalilzad 22 – Zalmay Khalilzad is an Opinion Contributor for The Hill. (Zalmay Khalilzad, Opinion Contributor, "Putin’s war sparked an urgent need to expand the US military-industrial base," Hill, 4-26-2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3463491-putins-war-sparked-an-urgent-need-to-expand-the-us-military-industrial-base/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

Senior Pentagon officials​ recently invited leaders of the U.S. defense industry to discuss the need for replenishing the stockpiles of weapons that have been sent to Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. This and the pacing threat of China are necessary for planning the production of weapons and services by our military industry. But they are not nearly enough for the new era ushered in by​ Vladimir Putin’s war.

True, the supplying of two particular weapon systems so far has put a significant dent in our stockpiles. We have sent Ukraine 33 percent of our Javelins — a portable anti-tank missile — and around 25 percent of our Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The Pentagon has quite rightly said these must be replenished — or better still, replaced by more capable newer models. And as there is no indication that the war will end any time soon, we must assume the requirement for resupply will continue and even increase.

The mix of weapons will likely also change over time. Already, the Ukrainian president is asking for HIMRAS (rocket launchers), helicopters and drones. For effective use of these weapons, the Ukrainians will need training and sustainment assistance. The United States and/or NATO will need to organize quickly for this mission, perhaps by establishing a Military Assistance Command to train and sustain the Ukrainian forces. Such a step will also assist with the coordination of resupply operations among allies.

But the message to our defense industrial complex must be to go beyond replenishment of what we are sending to Ukraine. We are in an unfortunate and stark global era after the Russian invasion. The unprovoked aggression represents a sea change in the international security environment. This change requires a major expansion of our defense industrial base that addresses four urgent needs:

First, resupply allies and partners. They too have expended significant percentages of their own weapon stockpiles and face the same exigent need to backfill those readiness depots. The Russian invasion has educated Europeans about their continent’s security environment and collective security. Astonishingly, Finland and Sweden are now leaning toward joining NATO, and many others — Germany, in particular — are willing to spend significantly more on defense. This is very positive. The willingness to upgrade defense spending will also mean purchasing new and more powerful weapons to replace old and ineffective systems. Our defense industrial base should prepare to help them meet this important goal.

Second, the poor performance of Russian armed forces in Ukraine will cause those who have been relying on Russian systems, such as India, to reconsider those investments and future purchases. Additionally, the G-7 sanctions on Russia will undermine its ability to provide weapons in the numbers that Moscow had anticipated or provide the spare parts needed for systems already provided. This presents an opportunity to decrease Indian dependence on Russian weapons in key areas. India’s dependence on Russia for fighter jets, missiles and air defense systems has precipitated its ambivalent response to Russia’s naked aggression. Reducing key countries’ — especially India’s — dependence on Russia should guide both our strategy and how we map the path our military industry policy follows.

Third, the conflict has substantially increased the importance of Saudi Arabia’s capacity for increased oil production. The Biden administration has had frosty relations with Riyadh. Unlike the previous administration, the White House has kept Riyadh at arm’s length diplomatically and even denied or delayed the sale of several weapon systems. Now the administration is in the process of urgently attempting to reset these relations. A key component of this reset will be the increase in arms sales to help Saudi Arabia deal with the threat from Iran and its proxies, especially the Houthis, who have launched more than 800 attacks against Saudi Arabia, including some attacks against its major cities.

Fourth, this war has impacted geopolitical and security calculations beyond Europe. Indo-Pacific countries are now faced with potential conflict in their region involving China or North Korea that could start with little notice. The result would be catastrophic. This illuminates an urgent need to pre-position appropriate weapons in Taiwan for its defense in case of Chinese aggression. Unlike Ukraine, Taiwan’s island disposition makes resupply immensely complex once hostilities are initiated. The administration has been lukewarm in its attitude towards the sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan. This must change. The supply of naval helicopters to Taiwan would ​be an important first step.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine requires a significant change in the tone, tenor and tempo of our foreign military sales. Ukraine demonstrates that our allies and partners need the military capability to defend themselves against aggression with little or no notice. This would act as a deterrent.

The U.S. military-industrial base is an essential instrument and bulwark against the multiple security threats that we and our allies and our partners face. Steadily rebuilding and upgrading the supply chain demands that we stay at the forefront of innovation and redouble our commitment and investment in research and development.

Creating new financing and contracting options, including public-private partnerships, will also support deeper investment in the manufacturing facilities of our key producers. Surging production must be accompanied by reducing foreign supplier dependence, which, unless addressed, can be an unintended problem for the global supply chain in a significant and prolonged regional crisis and conflict. These steps are fundamental components of preserving both our national security and our role as global leaders.

#### Security cooperation with NATO over arms is key –

#### First, military innovation lowers costs – NATO is the key forum to foster development

Lombardi 19 – Chris Lombardi is the vice president of European Business Development. (Chris, "Keeping NATO’s competitive edge through cooperation, not isolation," Euractiv, 12-2-2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/keeping-natos-competitive-edge-through-cooperation-not-isolation/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

An increasingly assertive Russia has conducted hybrid warfare against its adversaries on a global scale. China is building up its reach and ambition. Rogue state and non-state actors have growing access to capabilities – cyber, drones, or long-range missiles for instance – enabling them to threaten Europe’s strategic networks. The Alliance, its member states, and their defence industry partners have a long road ahead in arenas such as hypersonics, space, and artificial intelligence. However, one thing remains steadfast: we must maintain our competitive edge through coordinated investments, sharing of best practices – both successes and failures – and shaping policies that promote optimal innovation in timely cost-effective ways. Now is not the time for isolation among allied nations and industry partners, but for cooperation.

Competition and cooperation across the transatlantic supply chain are vital to foster a climate of innovation and keep our competitive edge over those who challenge our collective security. It is essential that these channels of cooperation remain free and open – not only for larger industry partners such as Raytheon – but also for our small and medium-sized industry partners in Europe. Isolating countries with a sophisticated industrial base – that could help realise the most advanced technologies – is detrimental to keeping NATO and its member states safe.

Recognising the need for complementary and niche capabilities to address this changing battlespace, Raytheon continues to proactively partner with companies across Europe. For example, we worked together with Saab to develop a new type of shoulder-launched, laser-guided munition for infantry troops. The munition flies at near-supersonic speeds and can penetrate multiple targets including fortified structures, bunkers and light armoured vehicles. Its augmented precision enables soldiers to use it in complex battle environments to reduce the risk of collateral damage. The U.S. Army and ground forces of more than 40 countries use this Carl-Gustaf weapon system.

The Patriot air and missile defence system provides another example of successful industrial and military cooperation with its supply chains crossing the Atlantic. It is the backbone of NATO’s air and missile defence and partners from Poland, Germany, and beyond contribute to the advancements of the systems. Further, Norway’s Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace have worked with us for 50 years most notably for the NASAMS air defence system, which protects the U.S. capital and five European nations (Norway, Spain, Finland, The Netherlands and Lithuania). NASAMS demonstrates key European technology imported into the U.S. – and a partnership that is economically beneficial on both sides of the Atlantic.

The list continues. The Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM) programme is a partnership among 12 allies (nine of which are European) and their respective industries to continue to enhance and sustain the most cutting-edge anti-ship missile in its class. ESSM remains the largest and most successful international cooperative weapon programme in NATO.

As NATO and its member state leaders look to address these advanced threats, the defence industry will need to meet their expectations and deliver technological innovation while maintaining secure top-quality manufacturing and trusted capabilities. Achieving this objective will require access to an open and fair transatlantic defence market. The intention by European members of the Alliance to increase their defence spending, either separately or through the EU, is welcome, but this cannot be carried out at the expense of open competition and cooperation that have underpinned the success of the Atlantic Alliance since its founding 70 years ago.

#### Second, allied sales and technology plug the gap

Greenwalt and Walker 22 – Bill Greenwalt, long the top Republican acquisition policy expert on the SASC, rose to become deputy defense undersecretary for industrial policy. A member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, he’s now a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Dustin Walker is a non-Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee. ("How Biden’s ‘Buy American’ is undermining the arsenal of democracy," Breaking Defense, 5-3-2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/how-bidens-buy-american-is-undermining-the-arsenal-of-democracy/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

The arsenal of democracy is making a comeback. As it did in past moments of global crisis, the United States is arming a sovereign nation in its struggle for survival against the depredations of a dictator. But it is not doing so alone.

In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US is coordinating with its allies and partners on the urgent production, modification, donation and delivery of military equipment from across the world to Ukraine. It is working to rapidly replace equipment donated from its own inventory as well as those of its allies and partners. As many European nations consider increasing defense spending in future years, the US is helping lead discussions on how best to bolster capabilities needed to deter and defend against Russian aggression. And it is attempting to glean lessons from the war in Ukraine to prepare itself, as well as allies and partners such as Taiwan, for the possibility of Chinese aggression. This new arsenal of democracy is a multinational effort.

Yet at a decisive moment in the war in Ukraine when defense industrial cooperation with America’s allies and partners has never been more vital, the Biden administration is moving in the opposite direction. The so-called “Buy American” regulations will harm relationships with America’s friends, risk American jobs and leave America’s military less prepared for the challenges posed by Russia and China.

With certain exceptions, the Buy American Act requires the federal government to buy domestic “articles, materials, and supplies,” when they are acquired for public use. In March, one week after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Biden administration finalized a new regulation requiring that 75% of the cost of products procured by the US government be made up of domestic components by 2029. That’s up from the 55% today.

In other words, despite its rhetoric, the Biden administration is cutting back defense industrial cooperation with allies and partners in the middle of a war in Europe. The concern is so great that allied nations have written a new letter [PDF] to the White House, pleading for more critical exemptions.

The primary impact of this new regulation will be on defense. While the Buy American Act theoretically applies to all federal government purchases, in practice it most directly affects defense purchases, which do not receive the same broad exemptions as commercial goods do under World Trade Organization agreements and US free trade agreements such as the United States-Canada-Mexico Agreement (USMCA).

The Biden administration and proponents of so-called “Buy American” regulations claim they will help grow America’s defense industrial base and create more defense jobs. They will do neither. The Biden administration’s new regulation will aggravate relations with allies and partners and, over the long term, shrink the global market for US defense products.

Last year, a group of military attaches representing 25 nations including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany wrote to lawmakers opposing an increased domestic content threshold under the Buy American Act. The Biden administration didn’t listen. As a result, just as many European nations are pledging significant annual increases in defense spending, Europe’s protectionists will need only parrot the Biden administration to argue that new resources should be spent to buy European products — not American products.

Supporters of so-called “Buy American” regulations point out that some allies and partners have negotiated Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreements, which provide some exemption from the Buy American Act. However, 10 NATO states do not have these agreements. Nor do key Indo-Pacific allies and partners such as South Korea, Taiwan, India and Singapore. For those that do, the impact of these agreements is limited. RDP agreements do not guarantee allied participation in US defense programs. The opportunity to do so is often stymied by an intricate web of laws and regulations, as well as by a cultural hubris that finds it hard to admit that allied technology could ever be any good.

Still, even what constrained value these agreements do provide is at risk. Congressional supporters of so-called “Buy American” policies have passed multiple bills, including the recent bipartisan infrastructure law, pushing the last two administrations to limit the application of RDP agreements and reduce waivers and exemptions. In an April 25 letter to OMB, the same group of allies that opposed the higher domestic content threshold in the first place are now pleading with the administration to preserve an “allied” exemption.

Beyond the risk to American jobs, so-called “Buy American” regulations will endanger national security by making it harder for the US military to access the capability and capacity it needs to stay ahead of Russia and China.

These regulations will shrink the number of defense suppliers willing to do business with the Pentagon, both at home and abroad, potentially choking off the US military’s access to critical technology. In order to prove they are meeting the Biden administration’s higher domestic content threshold, companies will be required to produce complex and expensive compliance documentation to the government. For those US companies that sell exclusively or primarily to the government, they will have no choice but to shoulder this enormous paperwork burden while passing the cost of compliance on to taxpayers.

But many other companies have a choice of whether to do business with the government, which is not their only or even primary customer. That’s especially true of innovative companies leading the way in emerging technologies in the commercial sector—technologies our warfighters need to stay ahead of Russia and China. These American companies may very well conclude that complying with so-called “Buy American regulations—not only through administrivia, but potentially by changing the content of their products—just isn’t worth the hassle.

America’s warfighters deserve the best technology in the world, some of which happens to come from allies and partners like the United Kingdom and Australia. Placing arbitrary limits on the US military’s ability to access that technology makes it less likely allies and partners will be willing to sell it to us in the first place.

Allies and partners also help reduce the cost of defense procurement for US taxpayers through purchases of US military equipment and co-funding of the development of certain weapons systems. But the Biden administration’s protectionist regulations will increase costs for taxpayers by reducing incentives for US allies and partners to buy US defense equipment, particularly countries with substantial defense industries of their own.

The US defense industrial base is currently too small to produce enough military equipment to meet the US military’s needs, particularly when it comes to ships and critical munitions. For example, it will take years to replace US Javelins and Stingers supplied to Ukraine. Allies and partners can help plug this gap, which is especially dangerous in light of China’s vast and growing defense production capacity.

How Biden Can Help The US Defense Industrial Base

To be clear, the Pentagon can and should buy American—not because of any statute or regulation, but for the very simple reason that most of the best technology in the world that our warfighters need is made in America. Moreover, the Biden administration and the Congress can and must do more to support the US defense industrial base.

In particular, it’s time to invest in growing the defense industrial base to meet the needs of the US military as well as those of its allies and partners. Legislation proposed by Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., to provide $25 billion to modernize and expand America’s public and private shipyards is a good start. Similar legislation will likely be needed for munitions production not only to replace munitions sent to Ukraine but to ensure sufficient munitions stocks for the Indo-Pacific.

Finally, instead of making it harder to work with allies, the Biden administration could focus on eliminating our adversaries from our defense supply chain. China, for example, sells commercial dual use component parts that often find their way into US military systems and will not be restricted under the new Biden “Buy American” thresholds. These Chinese semiconductors, electronics, IT services and telecommunications—even in small amounts—are rightful targets of regulatory scrutiny and should be replaced through a targeted “buy allied” strategy.

War unearths the past and reveals the future. The war in Ukraine is a reminder of the defense industrial base America once had and must build again—one with the scale, speed, responsiveness and flexibility that enables America and its allies and partners to deter and defend against great power adversaries willing to wage war to achieve political objectives.

China and Russia are no match for the combined technological and industrial might of the United States and its allies and partners. But we cannot marshal that collective power by indulging saccharine, populist schemes. Only in concert with allies and partners can America realize aspirations for a 21st century arsenal of democracy.

#### Otherwise, continued decline will cause the base to collapse BUT allied innovation solves competition with China and Russia

Gill 22 – Jaspreet Gill was the senior technology reporter for Inside the Army. (Jaspreet Gill, "The health of the Defense Industrial Base is failing, trade group says," Breaking Defense, 2-22-2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/the-health-of-the-defense-industrial-base-is-failing-trade-group-says/, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

The health of the defense industrial base has received a “failing” grade from a lead defense trade group for the first time, largely due to unprecedented and ongoing challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic and strategic competition from China and Russia.

That conclusion is part of the National Defense Industrial Association’s third annual Vital Signs 2022 report, which offers an analysis of the US’s defense industrial base. For this year’s report, NDIA and data firm Govini worked together to grade eight “vital signs” that shape the performance of defense contractors, on a 0 to 100 scale, where an average score of 70 is considered passing.

Of the eight categories — demand; production inputs; innovation; supply chain; competition; industrial security; political and regulatory; and productive capacity and surge readiness —five received a “failing” grade.

“This past year has witnessed significant deterioration in the signs including ‘supply chain’ as well as ‘production capacity and surge readiness,’ which almost certainly is a result of the impact of the pandemic,” according to the report. “Conversely, the only sign that significantly improved was ‘demand,’ reflecting recent growth in the defense budget.”

“Industrial security” continues to be the weakest sign in NDIA report, receiving an overall failing score of 50. The score reflects larger trends in shortcomings of industrial cybersecurity, despite increasing resources dedicated to combating the threat, the report states. The number of newly reported common IT cybersecurity vulnerabilities continued to increase.

“Data breaches, intellectual property theft, and state-sponsored industrial espionage in both private companies and university labs are on an unrelenting rise while the dynamic nature of attacks makes it a constantly moving target to address,” according to the report.

Industrial security has also been an area of active federal rulemaking, the report states, pointing to the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification as a prime example.

An Interim Rule for CMMC was released in 2020, “prohibiting executive agencies from entering into contracts with any entity that incorporates any equipment or service that uses telecommunication equipment made by Huawei, ZTE, and several other Chinese-made telecommunications equipment manufacturers,” according to the report. “CMMC is a DOD effort to improve the handling of sensitive information by and within the defense industrial base . . . These programs are still in interim stages and their impact on cybersecurity is yet to be determined.”

Innovation also remained stagnant last year, with a decline in investments and a lack of change in the status of scientific research and development services, according to the report. NDIA gave this area a score of 69 for 2021, the same score it received in 2020.

The need for US technological dominance is bolstered by the growing intensity of competition with China and Russia. According to the report, R&D investment has declined precipitously as a percentage of global expenditures. As of 1995 the US ranked fourth in terms of total R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP and by 2019, it dipped to tenth.

“Outside of the private sector, public sector investment in innovation also continued to deteriorate,” according to the report. “This is especially significant considering that public sector funding dominates the area of basic, experimental and theoretical research in the U.S. Between 2011 and 2016, U.S. government funding for R&D projects fell by 12% in absolute terms. Over the same timeframe, Russia and China grew public investment in R&D by 13% and 56%, respectively.”

The outlook for innovation continues to remain bleak: According to the report, companies this year will be required to amortize their R&D expenses over five years as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, amounting to a significant tax increase, negatively impacting innovation.

This year’s report includes a new section: emerging technologies. NDIA’s Emerging Technologies Institute says some uncertainty lies ahead for the future of emerging technologies and the US needs to prioritize defense modernization above all else.

“The 2018 National Defense Strategy placed a heavy emphasis on investing in high-end technologies to improve overall capability,” the report states. “The question now is whether the 2022 NDS will do the same. Though we are still in a transition period, indications are that the Biden administration will make relatively few changes in modernization priorities. DoD leaders have states that integrated deterrence will play a large part in the new defense strategy, which will require technological improvement across all agencies and services.”

Despite the negative scores, the report does point to a few areas of confidence. For example, the demand for defense goods and services remained robust in 2021 due to a rise in contract obligations issued by DoD.

Another area that NDIA considered passing was competition, with an analysis of the top 100 publicly-traded DoD contractors producing favorable outcomes.

“This high mark was driven by several high-scoring factors including a low level of market concentration for total contract awards, the low share of total contract awards received by foreign contractors, and a high level of capital expenditure in the DIB,” the report states. “Conversely, other factors within the ‘competition’ sign experienced decreases, including a significant 11-point decrease for liquidity. These decreases were anticipated, however, due to the impact of the pandemic on the economy.”

#### Unrestrained great power competition causes extinction

Robert S. Litwak 21, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies, Wilson Center. Dr. Litwak is also a consultant to the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He served on the National Security Council staff as director for nonproliferation in the first Clinton administration. He was an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and has held visiting fellowships at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Oxford University. "Geostrategic Competition and Climate Change: Avoiding the Unmanageable" September 15. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/geostrategic-competition-and-climate-change-avoiding-unmanageable> //pipk

Humanity faces two catastrophic, indeed existential, threats—climate change and nuclear war. These risks play out before us as if on split screen. On one side are the here-and-now impacts of climate change: wildfires from Siberia to California to southern Europe, scorching “heat domes” over the Pacific Northwest, and “once in a thousand years” flooding in China. On the other, heightened geostrategic competition carrying the greatest risk of war between nuclear powers since the depths of the Cold War: in the month of April 2021 alone, a Russian troop surge on the Ukraine border triggered an “imminent crisis” alert in NATO while Chinese naval vessels and bombers conducted a largescale war-game encircling Taiwan. Though ostensibly discrete, the events playing out on the split screen are linked. This new nexus between geostrategic competition and climate change must be understood and integrated in policy if the twin threats are to be averted.

In his landmark book, Hot, Flat, and Crowded, New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman stated that the central challenge of climate change to humanity is now “to manage what is already unavoidable and avoid what will truly be unmanageable.” To that compelling formulation can be added a corollary reflecting the new nexus: avoiding unconstrained geostrategic competition is a prerequisite for managing the climate threat.

The window for humanity to avoid unmanageable climate change is narrowing. The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that global temperatures will inexorably rise 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels by mid-century because of the projected level of atmospheric carbon. The IPCC starkly warns that the dire consequences arising from a temperature increase beyond that point can only be averted through prompt concerted global action to bend the curve and sharply reduce atmospheric carbon. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called the report a “code red for humanity.” China, the United States, and Russia are, respectively, the first, second, and fourth largest carbon emitters.

Yet at the precise historical juncture when unprecedented global cooperation is necessary to forestall catastrophe, the world is on the brink of unconstrained geostrategic competition. Indeed, U.S. relations with Russia and China are the worst they have been since the end of the Cold War, with a recent Department of Defense policy document warning of an “increased potential for regional conflicts involving nuclear-armed adversaries … and the potential for adversarial nuclear escalation in crisis or conflict."

One could logically argue against a linkage—that if the great powers have a mutual interest in averting a climate catastrophe then cooperation in that area could be compartmentalized from geostrategic tensions. But the onset of unconstrained geostrategic competition negates the possibility of compartmentalization. Contrasting positions on the nexus—the linkage between geopolitical competition and climate change—were evident in an exchange between Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi and former Secretary of State John Kerry, now the Biden administration’s Special Presidential Envoy for Climate during his visit to China in August 2021. Wang warned that cooperation on climate change “cannot possibly be divorced” from other geopolitical tensions, while Kerry countered that climate change is neither “a geostrategic weapon” nor “ideological”….but “a global, not bilateral, challenge.”

These contending perspectives divide along political theorist Arnold Wolfers’s classic dichotomy between “possession goals” and “milieu goals.” Possession goals relate to the preservation or enhancement of a state’s narrow national interest—for example, in relation to territory or trade relations. In contrast, milieu goals pursued by a state aim to shape and improve the international political environment beyond parochial national interest—which in this context relate to the fostering of favorable conditions for concerted action on climate change.

Applying this framework, the Chinese Foreign Minister’s comment suggests that climate change is viewed within the context of furthering conventional Chinese possession goals—that cooperation on climate change can be leveraged to gain advantage on another issue (such as Taiwan). Kerry’s rejection frames climate change as a milieu goal whose existential stakes transcend any one state’s national interests. Through Kerry, the Biden administration has signaled its aspiration to eschew efforts by other states to relegate climate change to just another issue in transactional diplomacy.

Yet on a macro level—elevating climate change to a milieu goal—the linkage between geostrategic competition and climate change is unavoidable. Even if unconstrained geostrategic competition does not lead to conflict that might itself trigger catastrophic global destruction, virulent relations between the United States and its great-power adversaries create a political environment in which close cooperation on climate change becomes difficult, if not impossible. For that reason the avoidance of unconstrained geostrategic competition is a prerequisite for addressing climate change. To be sure, avoidance does not mean the elimination of geostrategic competition, but rather, bounding it to mitigate the risks of conflict through effective management.

Avoiding Unconstrained Competition

New risk factors have brought the great powers to the verge of unconstrained geostrategic competition. An understanding of those risks provides insight into how they can be mitigated and thereby managed.

A New Calculus of Risk

Contemporary geopolitics is driven not by Cold War ideology, but by nationalism and expansive assertions of state sovereignty. Nuclear powers are engaged in strategic competition with the United States over the territorial status quo in areas of vital interest—for China, Taiwan and the South China Sea; for Russia, Ukraine and the periphery of the former Soviet Union. This contrasts with the Cold War era in which the superpowers engaged in competition in the regions of what was then called the Third World, which were clearly of peripheral interest. This geostrategic competition runs the risk of war through inadvertent escalation driven by miscalculation and misperception.

The territorial dimension, which could be the occasion for great-power conflict, is compounded by key developments affecting the nuclear deterrent relationship between the United States and its great-power adversaries. All the nuclear-weapon states have embarked on ambitious force modernization programs, and they are developing capabilities, such as low-yield nuclear weapons, which critics warn make them more usable in a crisis. The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review claimed that the Russians had adopted an “escalate to deescalate posture” involving the first use of tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, military escalation has traditionally been conceived as progressing from conventional to nuclear forces. With the advent of new technologies, however, escalation during a crisis would most likely occur in a non-traditional domain—cyber or space. Conflict escalation could plausibly take the form of a cyberattack to interfere with an adversary’s communications with its nuclear systems or an attack on reconnaissance satellites to blind an adversary. These developments could have the destabilizing consequence of creating an incentive for one side or the other to take preemptive action during a crisis.

Managed Competition

The contemporary pursuit of strategic stability is conditioned by the recasting of the traditional tension between two Cold War dynamics. The first is the so-called “stability-instability paradox,” which captures the dynamic in which a nuclear stalemate between adversaries may embolden lower-level aggression on the regional level. The second is what Cold War strategist Albert Wohlstetter described as the “delicate balance of terror” which emphasized the maintenance of a stable and robust deterrence, thereby removing any incentive for one power or another to strike first in a crisis.

As during the Cold War, this tension can be managed, but it cannot be resolved. Key elements—some aspirational, others operational, many surrounded by uncertainty—will affect the prospects for successful management:

Resolve/Manage regional flashpoints—The best way to avoid conflict among nuclear-weapon states is to redouble diplomatic efforts to address the territorial disputes that could precipitate it. To be sure, if these territorial issues were easy to resolve, they would have been. In some instances, domestic politics in one or both parties may be an impediment to resolution; in others, the discrete territorial issue may be a proxy for a more deeply rooted source of enmity or grievance. If resolution is not possible, conflict management may be. For example, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), to which both China and the United States are signatories, may be a mechanism for managing maritime tensions between their navies.

Maintain the residual arms control architecture—The new START treaty has been extended until 2026 and provides certainty and time for Russia and the United States to agree on a successor arrangement and outstanding issues (such as non-strategic nuclear weapons and engaging or taking Chinese capabilities into account).

Do not blur conventional and nuclear operations to prevent inadvertent escalation—Placing conventional warheads on ballistic missiles, such as that envisioned through the “Conventional Prompt Global Strike,” has utility (the ability to reach any target on the globe in under one hour), but runs the risk that Russia may perceive (and respond to) the launch of a ballistic missile that it associates with U.S. nuclear capabilities as the initiation of such an attack. Another potential driver of inadvertent escalation, with implications for both Russia and China, is the targeting of an adversary’s conventional capabilities that are co-located with its nuclear capabilities.

Mitigate risks through strategic dialogue—In the absence of an arms control architecture, each nuclear power in the multipolar system will have strategic autonomy to structure its offensive and defensive systems. All of the nuclear-weapon states have long been uncomfortably ambivalent with vulnerability captured in the acronym MAD—mutual assured destruction. But since the Cuban missile crisis, assured retaliation—eliminating incentives for a surprise first strike—has been the sine qua non of strategic stability. The risk now is that an unconstrained arms race (unregulated numbers of offensive and defensive systems, in tandem with new weapons technologies and cross-domain threats to space and cyber assets) could revive those incentives and undermine the deterrent relationships. In the past, arms control negotiations provided a forum for strategic discourse. “On a bilateral or a multilateral basis,” scholars Christopher Chyba and Robert Legvold argue, “the United States, Russia, and China should pursue discussions intended to improve understanding of one another’s strategic concerns and views on which actions by an adversary would be especially concerning or dangerous.” The focus should be on negotiated restraints (e.g., a ban on the deployment of anti-satellite weapons) to enhance stability and reduce incentives for one side or the other to act preemptively during a crisis.

Managing the Geopolitics of Climate Change

When George Kennan, the diplomatic architect of U.S. containment policy, declared the end of the Cold War, he explained that the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev had evolved from a revolutionary state into an orthodox great power—the country “should now be regarded essentially as another great power, like other great powers.” Kennan was essentially arguing that Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy, stripped of ideology, was a renationalized version of traditional Russian foreign policy with strategic priorities starting with the “near abroad” of the former Soviet republics abutting the West.

A “risen” China presents an analogous case of an orthodox great power making assertive claims of territorial sovereignty on its periphery. This new superpower is deeply integrated into the global economy and presents a variegated challenge in a way that Russia, a one-dimensional superpower, does not. War between the United States and China is not inevitable, but the world’s two dominant powers could mismanage their way into it.

That Russia and China are orthodox great powers, not revolutionary states seeking the overturn of the international order, creates political space for the United States to initiate strategic dialogues with them separately or together to lower tensions and reduce the risks of conflict—thereby fostering a favorable international milieu to address the exigencies of climate change.

#### Current ambiguity over US alliance commitments creates division within NATO – the affs military support overcomes those barriers

Anderson and Larson 13 (Justin V. Anderson and Jeffrey A. Larsen 13 {Justin V. Anderson is a Senior National Security Policy Analyst with SAIC in Arlington, VA, providing contract support to government clients on nuclear arms control, deterrence, and WMD proliferation issues. Jeffrey A. Larsen is a Senior Scientist with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Colorado Springs. September 2013. “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy.” https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP69.pdf)

Trading New York for Hamburg? The U.S. ability to defend Western Europe with nuclear forces capable of deterring a superior conventional opponent (and, in time, a nuclear peer) thus represented the cornerstone of NATO Cold War defense strategies. It was also vital to U.S. efforts to assure each of the alliance’s member states that they enjoyed the protection of a nuclear-armed superpower. With the United States representing far and away the most powerful member of NATO, the cohesion of the alliance depended on member states believing that U.S. political leaders were prepared to put their military forces – and perhaps even their homeland – at risk in order to defend allies on the other side of the Atlantic. As the Soviet Union began developing nuclear forces capable of ranging U.S. cities, however, not all U.S. allies were convinced this was the case. By the 1960s, President Charles de Gaulle of France was openly speculating the United States would never trade New York for Hamburg – i.e. it would never risk a Soviet nuclear strike against a major U.S. city in order to protect a vulnerable allied target from an attack by the Warsaw Pact.92 He also argued that NATO was dangerously dependent on the United States and its uncertain (in his mind) nuclear deterrent, effectively ceding sovereign decision-making and national security decisions to American policymakers in Washington. This, he asserted, was extremely dangerous given tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, holding NATO’s European members hostage to decisions in foreign capitals. De Gaulle’s doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to NATO led him to strongly support France’s development of an independent nuclear deterrent. Neither assured destruction nor flexible response appeared credible to him in light of the Soviet Union’s ability to directly threaten the United States with nuclear attack. These doubts and his broader concerns that France’s membership in the alliance hindered its national security and ability to independently engage in Cold War geopolitics informed his decision to withdraw France from the NATO’s military structure in 1966.93 The questions raised by de Gaulle posed a significant challenge to U.S. efforts to assure its European allies as the Soviet Union began to develop ICBMs and other long-range nuclear forces.94 By the late 1960s Moscow possessed a significant edge in conventional forces and appeared capable of credibly threatening the United States, even if its overall numbers of forces were still several years from catching up to the U.S. arsenal. Some allies wondered if an American president would engage in brinkmanship with the Kremlin over Hamburg, Berlin, or other vulnerable areas of the alliance. U.S. domestic politics also contributed to allied unease in the 1960s, with a number of members of Congress voicing their displeasure over what they viewed as a failure of other NATO states to shoulder what they considered a fair share of the burden of defending Europe.95 The loss of one of its strongest members was a blow to NATO, but it remained intact through the end of the Cold War because U.S. leaders clearly demonstrated their willingness to risk blood and treasure on behalf of Germany and other members of NATO. When France’s exit from NATO threatened to leave the alliance homeless and deprive it of a number of key military facilities, the Johnson administration worked to quickly and seamlessly transition NATO’s headquarters from Paris to Brussels and U.S. forces stationed in France to the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Germany. President Lyndon Johnson also used his skills in domestic politicking to head off efforts in the Congress to halve the number of U.S. forces in Europe, and ensured the provision of continued military and economic support to key NATO members.96 Furthermore, for many European allies de Gaulle’s argument that nuclear weapons represented the only true guarantee of national security in the superpower era ultimately solidified their commitment to NATO. Like de Gaulle, they had become convinced of the importance of nuclear deterrence to the defense of their home countries. They differed from de Gaulle, however, in their assessment of the U.S. commitment to their defense. For most NATO states during the Cold War, U.S. conventional and nuclear forces posted to bases on or near their home territory provided a visible demonstration of Washington’s preparedness to fight for Western Europe. In addition, the support of U.S. leaders, beginning with President Eisenhower, for NATO “nuclear sharing” arrangements (which would make certain types of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe available to allies in the event of a major Warsaw Pact attack) also addressed concerns the United States would reserve nuclear forces for use only in defense of its narrow national interests.97 As aptly summarized by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his study The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, most NATO allies during the Cold War “prefer[ed] to live with the known uncertainties of the US nuclear guarantee than with the political and strategic uncertainties of nuclear independence.”98 Despite significant stresses upon the alliance later in the Cold War, after 1966 no other states would defect from NATO, and U.S. nuclear forces would remain the linchpin of NATO defense strategies and plans until the fall of the Berlin Wall. De Gaulle’s defection also raised questions about the role of U.S. extended deterrence strategies within the broader geopolitics of the Cold War. The French president charged that these strategies could actually interfere with the development of stable, productive relations between European states and the Soviet Union. While disagreeing with de Gaulle’s decision to break away from the alliance, other members of NATO agreed the alliance needed to determine its views on the relationship between deterrence and diplomacy during an era of competition between two superpowers and their respective blocs. Recognizing the importance of this relationship to assuring its NATO allies, the Johnson administration supported Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel’s suggestion in late 1966 that the members of the alliance conduct a comprehensive study of its first 20 years and use the results to assess its future military and diplomatic goals. The initiative was recognized as a key effort to rally the alliance in the wake of France’s withdrawal and internal disagreements over whether and how to diplomatically engage the Soviet Union. The report found that the alliance could exercise deterrence and conduct diplomacy at the same time, concluding that “military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary.”99 While the Johnson administration would have preferred stronger language in support of deterrence, the report’s findings generally aligned with the president’s conviction that the alliance’s bargaining power was directly linked with its military strength: [a] strong NATO remains essential if we are to reach a solid agreement with the Soviet Union that reflects the common interests of each of the allied nations in peace and security.100 The United States’ endorsement of the report and its unanimous acceptance by the other members of NATO in late 1967 effectively ended questions about the alliance’s viability in the wake of France’s departure. It also addressed allied concerns regarding the superpower relationship. NATO members believed the U.S. nuclear umbrella over the alliance was important to their national security. However, they also wanted the United States to leave the door open for diplomacy with the Soviet Union, arguing that a cold peace with the Soviet bloc was better than a hot war that would destroy Europe. As a result, the willingness of U.S. leaders in the late 1960s and beyond to stake political capital on both the defense of NATO and on diplomacy with the Kremlin was an important component of U.S. assurance strategies during the remainder of the Cold War.

#### NATO cohesion is key to prevent Russian miscalc and extinction

Farmer 15 (Ben Farmer, Defense Correspondent at The Daily Telegraph, citing General Sir Adrian Bradshaw, Deputy Commander of NATO Forces in Europe, and former Director of British Special Forces, and Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, member of the National Security Council, and Member of Parliament, United Kingdom and Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “NATO general: Russia tensions could escalate into all-out war,” Business Insider, 2-20-2015, <http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-general-russia-tensions-could-escalate-to-war-2015-2>)

Tensions with Russia could blow up into all-out conflict, posing “an existential threat to our whole being”, Britain’s top general in Nato has warned. Gen Sir Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander of Nato forces in Europe, said there was a danger Vladimir Putin could try to use his armies to invade and seize Nato territory, after calculating the alliance would be too afraid of escalating violence to respond. His comments follow a clash between London and Moscow after the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, said there was a "real and present danger" Mr Putin could try to destabilize the Baltic states with a campaign of subversion and irregular warfare. The Kremlin called those comments “absolutely unacceptable". Sir Adrian told the Royal United Services’ Institute there was a danger such a campaign of undercover attacks could paralyze Nato decision making, as members disagreed over how much Russia was responsible, and how to respond. Nato commanders fear a campaign of skilfully disguised, irregular military action by Russia, which is carefully designed not to trigger the alliance's mutual defence pact. He said the "resulting ambiguity" would make "collective decisions relating to the appropriate responses more difficult". But Sir Adrian, one of the most senior generals in the British Army and a former director of special forces, went further and said there was also danger that Russia could use conventional forces and Soviet-era brinkmanship to seize Nato territory. He said Russia had shown last year it could generate large conventional forces at short notice for snap exercises along its borders. There was a danger these could be used “not only for intimidation and coercion but potentially to seize Nato territory, after which the threat of escalation might be used to prevent re-establishment of territorial integrity. This use of so called escalation dominance was of course a classic Soviet technique.” He went on to say that “the threat from Russia, together with the risk it brings of a miscalculation resulting in a strategic conflict, however unlikely we see it as being right now, represents an existential threat to our whole being.” Nato has agreed to set up a rapid reaction force of around 5,000 troops ready to move at 48 hours notice, in case of Russian aggression in Eastern Europe. Supplies, equipment and ammunition will be stockpiled in bases in the region. Alliance leaders hope the force will deter any incursion. David Cameron warned Vladimir Putin there will be more sanctions and "more consequences" for Russia if the ceasefire in Ukraine does not hold. The Prime Minister vowed that the West would be "staunch" in its response to Russia and was prepared to maintain pressure on Moscow "for the long term". He rejected the findings of a scathing parliamentary committee report that the UK found itself "sleep-walking" into the crisis over Ukraine. The EU Committee of the House of Lords found there had been a "catastrophic misreading" of mood by European diplomats in the run-up to the crisis. Earlier this week, Mr Fallon said the Russian president might try to test Nato’s resolve with the same Kremlin-backed subversion used in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A murky campaign of infiltration, propaganda, undercover forces and cyber attack such as that used in the early stages of the Ukraine conflict could be used to inflame ethnic tensions in Estonia, Lithuania or Latvia, he said. The military alliance must be prepared to repel Russian aggression “whatever form it takes”, Mr Fallon said, as he warned that tensions between the two were “warming up”. His comments were dismissed in Moscow. Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman said the country does not pose a threat to Baltic countries and accused Mr Fallon of going beyond “diplomatic ethics” . Alexander Lukashevich said: "His absolutely unacceptable characteristics of the Russian Federation remind me of last year's speech of US president Barack Obama before the UN general assembly, in which he mentioned Russia among the three most serious challenges his country was facing.” "I believe we will find a way to react to Mr Secretary's statements."

#### Cooperation with NATO over defense base is key to collective security

Low 22 – Thomas Low is a junior fellow at NDIA. (Thomas, “U.S. Must Ready Defense Industrial Base to Aid NATO,” National Defense, 3-25-2022, <https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/3/25/us-must-ready-defense-industrial-base-to-aid-nato>, Accessed 6-20-2022, LASA-SC)

People across the globe have witnessed first-hand Russia’s renewed aggression towards Ukraine, a conflict resulting in the largest land war in Europe since World War II.

If the United States and its NATO allies cannot deter such action, it could be possible for similar scenes to occur in other countries bordering Russia. A prime example are the Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Though now tied to the West through economic cooperation, as well as military alliances such as NATO, these nations previously existed as part of the Russian sphere of influence. They have sizable Russian minorities who speak Russian and consume Russian news.

Recent events have put paired action to what has up to now been mere verbal antagonism toward NATO’s eastern expansion. While a conflict with NATO members would result in a wholly different set of ramifications, member countries should not fail to take the steps required to deter wider regional conflict.

In order to adequately remain vigilant against any possible scenario, the United States in its own right needs to take the steps necessary to prepare its defense industrial base.

Yet an important question remains: What is the current state of this vital economic sector? To answer this, one should examine the National Defense Industrial Association’s annual report, “Vital Signs 2022: The Health and Readiness of the Defense Industrial Base.” While the report does not assess individual defense companies, it does analyze the environment in which they are asked to operate. This year’s report assigned the industrial base an overall “unsatisfactory, failing” grade of 69. While this score is obviously disappointing, for the purposes of this analysis, two particular sections are particularly relevant.

First, “Production Capacity and Surge Readiness” capabilities dropped a significant 15 points compared to the previous year. This can partly be attributed to the evolving effects of the COVID-19 pandemic but is nonetheless a cause for serious concern. When coupled with the current status of NATO’s Eastern European members, the problems are only compounded.

In the Baltic region, for example, NATO lacks a significant military presence. In January of this year alone, there were only 4,000 NATO troops stationed in the Baltic states, without any accompanying tanks or warplanes. It would be difficult and time-consuming to try and surge much-needed personnel into the Baltic region should it prove necessary.

The lack of current personnel and infrastructure, coupled with existing capacity challenges in the United States, would place NATO in an unenviable position if an industrial and deployment surge became necessary. A massive effort would be required as the industrial base maneuvers to produce countless weapon systems and munitions.

There is also another factor that must be considered when addressing the build-up of deterrence forces in NATO member territories. This is the development of new and evolving technologies. In the “Emerging Technologies” section, the report details several modernization priorities that can deliver technical capabilities needed to cope with an evolving security environment. Of those areas, hypersonics stand out as one technology particularly crucial to keeping pace with other emerging great powers.

By definition, hypersonic weapons are those which can travel more than five times the speed of sound, or Mach 5. For numerous nations, including the United States, they represent the next frontier in missile technology. However, for far too long, research and development necessary to cultivate this technology have been lacking. In “Vital Signs 2022,” Congressional interest in these capabilities expressed in committee hearings decreased six percent. This is a troubling trend, especially when considering the significant resources near-peer adversaries are devoting to developing this technology.

Hypersonic systems, which could be utilized for a variety of deterrence purposes, remain a crucial element within NATO’s security apparatus.

Yet as previously mentioned, efforts have been neglected for far too long. Development has accelerated and then been halted while developmental testing has happened at a painfully slow rate if at all, resulting in years of slow progress allowing other nations to leap ahead.

Russia recognizes this, as their Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu recently confirmed hypersonic missiles will make up the core of his nation’s non-nuclear deterrence. Russia’s key strategic partner, China, is also cognizant of these developments, having accelerated its own hypersonic program through extensive investments and testing—over 10 times the rate of U.S. testing.

Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, there has been a relative peace in Europe. Gone were thought to be the days of vast European land wars that displaced populaces and reduced cities to rubble. This collective idea has been shattered by the recent actions of Russia in the Ukraine. At the same time, competition continues to heat up in the Western Pacific as China notes the Western response to aggression.

When NATO was established in 1949, its purpose was to provide a collective security measure in the event of future conflict with the Soviet Union and later its Warsaw Pact allies. It sought not to conquer or provoke additional tension. The same principles exist today, as NATO members seek to secure their future and establish a peaceful existence.

To achieve this goal, especially in more geographically sensitive regions, the U.S. and its NATO allies should closely examine current capabilities in order to deter future costly confrontations. A renewed priority must be placed on industrial capacity and capabilities, investments in emerging technologies, and force posture.

## Case

### 2AC – AT: Say No

#### NATO coop with Ukraine proves countries say yes to collaboration

Gotkowska 22 – she graduated from University of Warsaw and RWTH Aachen University. Since 2008 she has been working at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), at the beginning as an expert in German foreign and security policy. (OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, "NATO member states on arms deliveries to Ukraine," 2-23-2022, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2022-02-03/nato-member-states-arms-deliveries-to-ukraine, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)

Commercial sales and armaments cooperation

After 2017 commercial sales of armaments and military equipment to Kyiv increased; this was partly accompanied by broader arms cooperation.

The purchase of weapons and military equipment from NATO's eastern flank countries, mainly Poland and the Czech Republic, played a significant role in strengthening the Ukrainian ground forces. Kyiv purchased both new and post-Soviet military equipment which met the current needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Polish companies supplied loitering munitions and mini reconnaissance drones,[18] Oncilla wheeled armoured vehicles,[19] 54 MT-LB armoured personnel carriers, grenade launchers and mortars, pistols and rifles and ammunition.[20] The value of export of Polish armaments and military equipment to Ukraine between 2014 and 2020 amounted to €122 million.[21] Partially modernised post-Soviet equipment was also delivered. Some of the transfers (from the stocks of the Czech army) were carried out in cooperation between Czech and Polish firms. After 2017, 46 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles[22] and 33 used 2S1 Goździk self-propelled howitzers were sold to Ukraine.[23] The Czech company sent additional 37 infantry fighting vehicles[24] and 16 howitzers[25] of the type mentioned, and in 2020 signed a contract to sell 26 Dana-M2 self-propelled howitzers with ammunition. Czech Tatra Trucks chassis for Ukrainian Neptun ground-based anti-ship missile systems[26] have also been delivered. Overall, the Czech arms exports to Ukraine between 2014 and 2020 were worth €48 million.[27] Weapons and ammunition (including grenade launchers, rifles) were also sold to Kyiv by companies from Bulgaria and Slovakia, but the scale of these operations is difficult to estimate.

In recent years, Turkey has intensified armaments cooperation with Ukraine. This collaboration developed in line with Turkish ambitions to pursue a multi-vector policy, to strengthen its presence in the Black Sea region and to modernise its own arms industry and armed forces. The possibility of improving Turkey’s position in NATO and as regards Russia (with Ukraine being a part of a complex Turkish-Russian relationship based on strategic competition and cooperation) was an additional factor.[28] In effect, Ukraine became a supplier of engines for Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles (etc.) and in return received the opportunity to acquire Turkish armed drones. In 2019 Kyiv signed a contract to purchase 12 Bayraktar TB2s along with ammunition for $69 million.[29] Drones were used in Donbass last autumn, which caused Russia to protest.[30] Further agreements on military-technical cooperation were concluded in 2020. On the basis of these, a Turkish-Ukrainian joint venture will produce an additional 24–48 drones[31] for Kyiv. The bilateral programme also foresees the construction of two Ada-class corvettes for the Ukrainian navy (construction of the first began in September 2021).[32]

Broader arms cooperation with Kyiv is also being developed by the United Kingdom. If the bilateral agreement ratified at the end of January 2022 by Ukraine’s parliament is implemented,[33] the UK will become the main partner in rebuilding and modernising the Ukrainian navy. Kyiv plans to acquire 8 missile boats, 6 of which will be built locally, and 2 Sandown-type mine destroyers (the first to be delivered by the end of this year). For this purpose, Ukraine received a ten-year loan of £1.7 billion guaranteed by UK Export Finance.[34] With British support, Ukraine will also build two new naval bases. The cooperation programme is envisaged as long-term and will not quickly strengthen Ukrainian maritime capabilities. Kyiv is grateful, even if the UK is not ready to sell Ukraine naval weapon systems that would significantly strengthen the Ukrainian navy's combat potential.

Some other NATO countries that have been wary of commercial military sales to Kyiv, are equipping services subordinated to the Ukrainian interior ministry. France signed a contract in 2018 for the sale of 55 helicopters for the police, border guards and emergency services[35] and, in 2019, for the delivery of 20 patrol boats, five of which will be built locally.[36] Denmark wants to develop a similar cooperation – in December 2021 a memorandum was signed envisioning the construction of search and rescue vessels for the Ukrainian coast guard[37] with the participation of Ukrainian shipyards.

#### Cooperation over arms lowers the cost for everyone and ensures states agree.

DoD 20 – The United States Department of Defense is an executive branch department of the federal government charged with coordinating and supervising all agencies and functions of the government directly related to national security and the United States Armed Forces. (U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Alliances, Partnerships Strengthened Through Defense Strategy Execution," 8-5-2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2300352/military-alliances-partnerships-strengthened-through-defense-strategy-execution/, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)

In a rapidly changing world, the United States must defend its interests and values against new threats and new competitors, especially from China and Russia. But it can't do it alone. Instead, the U.S. must strengthen relationships with existing partners and allies while also building new partnerships.

Strengthening alliances and attracting new partners is one of three lines of effort central to the National Defense Strategy laid out in 2018. It's something Defense Secretary Dr. Mark T. Esper has been focused on since he took office last year. The secretary said developing a coordinated strategy for American allies and partners is among his top priorities.

"These like-minded nations are an unmatched advantage that China and Russia do not have," Esper said.

Over the past year, with encouragement from the United States, NATO has enhanced its readiness by continuing to secure pledges from alliance members to increase their defense spending. About two-thirds of NATO nations have pledged to increase defense spending to 2% of their gross domestic product by 2021, but all have increased spending to some degree already.

In the Indo-Pacific region, the department has strengthened alliances and partnerships by deepening interoperability, expanding deterrent networks, and executing maritime security and awareness operations.

Also in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. conducted a record number of freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea over the past year, more than any other year since 2015, to deter China's malign behavior. For example, in July 2019, the USS Nimitz conducted exercises with the Indian navy in the Indian Ocean. That exercise, Esper said, demonstrates a shared commitment between the two nations to support a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

In November 2019, the United States also participated in its first joint military exercise with India — a partnership Esper called "one of the all-important defense relationships of the 21st century."

In the Middle East, the United States has led a coalition of more than 80 partners to ensure the enduring defeat of the ISIS physical caliphate. And in September, the United States joined a group of nations to establish the International Maritime Security Construct, in which the U.S. partners with eight countries, Lithuania being the most recent. The goal of the group is to maintain order and security in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

When it comes to foreign military sales, the department has improved policy and practices by lowering costs and introducing competitive financing opportunities, which have increased U.S. competitiveness and improved interoperability among partners.

## More Thumpers

### 2AC---AT: Say No

#### Say yes---the current political climate in NATO member states is one that’s very willing to increase burden sharing. NATO’s supreme commander agrees.

David Vergun 3-29-2022, Associate Writer at Department of Defense, "General Says NATO Is Stepping Up Defense Investments", U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2981576/general-says-nato-is-stepping-up-defense-investments/, DL

"We are witnessing a generational moment, a historic demonstration of unity in will and an unprecedented effort by allies to strengthen defense while simultaneously helping those in need," said Wolters, commander of U.S. European Command and NATO supreme commander in Europe.

For instance, NATO ally Germany has committed to meeting the alliance's 2% benchmark for military spending, he said. "We expect other allies will follow and redouble efforts to adequately invest in defense to generate peace — from Turkey in the southeast, to Norway, Sweden and Finland."

Wolters said U.S. investments in military-to-military relationships, training, and readiness help to build unity, resolve and combat-credible deterrence.

### 2AC – AT: France, Germany, Britain Says No

#### France, Germany, and Britain are dedicated to allied innovation

Aronsson 18 – Lisa Aronsson is a Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University. (Lisa A., "Transatlantic Perspectives on Defense Innovation: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Services, 4-24-2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45177/4, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)

Russia, China, and others are modernizing their militaries, investing in new and emerging technologies, and exploring their applications for defense. In addition, NATO faces rising operating costs, and both conventional and hybrid challenges in operating domains that have expanded to include cyberspace as well as land, sea, and air. NATO must also contend with a growing group of nonstate challengers empowered by the pace of technological change and the global diffusion of technology. Increasingly dependent on ubiquitous technology, NATO is adapting to a world in which commercial investments in research and development (R&D) outpace those of governments, innovation cycles are shortening, and there is more international competition for technology and innovation. Since 2014, the United States has promoted defense innovation as a strategy to integrate new technologies into military capabilities and strengthen U.S. technological superiority over its potential adversaries. Today, many European allies acknowledge the importance of technology and innovation in defense, and they are beginning to respond to the changing environment by committing more resources to defense, and a few have national defense innovation strategies of their own. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany—NATO’s largest European defense spenders—are investing more in R&D and reforming their defense ministries to take more risk, procure technology faster, develop innovative concepts, and strengthen their links with commercial industry. Generally speaking, however, European governments are still in the early stages of developing what are predominantly national strategies. NATO seeks to harmonize the allies’ national strategies and defense investments, promote collaboration, and build a shared vision for the future. Its member states have sophisticated militaries, institutional frameworks for collaboration, and dynamic economies that attract talent, and support innovation. Innovation challenges persist, however, such as those related to NATO’s limited budgets and its bureaucratic processes, which make it difficult for NATO to attract the attention of commercial industry and global technology companies. NATO is also working to balance its member states’ concerns over national sovereignty with the need for more multinational cooperation, both from a cost and from an interoperability point of view. NATO also seeks to enhance interoperability among allied militaries and balance short-term priorities with preparations for future warfare. In the future, NATO might have to rely as much on its agility and on its capacity for innovation as it has relied on its military technological advantage in the past. Congress may consider what role the United States can play to support NATO’s adaptation, and what channels Congress could pursue to exert influence over NATO’s direction. There are both risks and opportunities associated with sharing technology or developing it jointly with NATO allies, and there are questions about what the United States and its allies expect from one another in terms of technology and innovation. Technology has the potential to enhance NATO’s effectiveness, but it also has the potential to undermine interoperability or political cohesion if the United States develops a technology-driven strategy and its NATO allies either do not keep pace, or do not adapt to strategic, political, and technological change.

### 2AC – AT: Arms Escalate Ukraine

#### Arms key to deterrence

Mahshie 22 – Abraham Mahshie is the Pentagon Editor for Air Force Magazine. As a journalist with two decades of experience, he has covered national security and political affairs across the United States and Latin America for a variety of media. (Abraham, "Past NATO Commander: US Can Deter Russia in Ukraine By Taking These 3 Steps," Air Force Magazine, 2-16-2022, https://www.airforcemag.com/past-nato-commander-us-can-deter-russia-in-ukraine-by-taking-these-3-steps/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

It matters that “NATO gets its skin in the game with NATO forces, not individually offered NATO contributions, bilaterally to the effort, which is what’s going on now,” Breedlove said.

Breedlove applauded German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s announcement, in response to Russia’s entering the Donbas region, that Germany would rescind certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to bring natural gas from Russia to Germany. It will be harder, Breedlove said, for European states dependent on Russian petroleum and gas to make similar decisions.

But Breedlove believes a unified NATO reaction, in addition to military signaling, are the only effective responses to deter Putin from further invasion.

Putin, in moving his “peacekeeping” forces into the region, indicated they may go beyond demarcation lines in the Minsk protocol of 2014 that quelled the conflict between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk.

“If we bring it ‘weak’ now, then we might see him expand those pockets,” Breedlove said. “I am a bit optimistic that we’re going to get a better NATO reply here than not.”

#### Russia threats have no backing – squo thumps the link and proves only a risk deterrence is true

Burns 22 - Robert Burns is a reporter for the Associated Press. (Robert Burns, "Russia has yet to slow a Western arms express into Ukraine," AP NEWS, 4-13-2022, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-nato-europe-e335d774954f6403c38e88a3a6bfbcff, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

“It’s not as easy to stop this assistance flow as it might seem,” said Stephen Biddle, a professor of international and public affairs at Columbia University. “Things like ammunition and shoulder-fired missiles can be transported in trucks that look just like any other commercial truck. And the trucks carrying the munitions the Russians want to interdict are just a small part of a much larger flow of goods and commerce moving around in Poland and Ukraine and across the border.

“So the Russians have to find the needle in this very big haystack to destroy the weapons and ammo they’re after and not waste scarce munitions on trucks full of printer paper or baby diapers or who knows what.”

Even with this Western assistance it’s uncertain whether Ukraine will ultimately prevail against a bigger Russian force. The Biden administration has drawn the line at committing U.S. troops to the fight. It has opted instead to orchestrate international condemnation and economic sanctions, provide intelligence information, bolster NATO’s eastern flank to deter a wider war with Russia and donate weapons.

In mid-March, a Russian deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, said arms shipments would be targeted.

“We warned the United States that pumping weapons into Ukraine from a number of countries as it has orchestrated isn’t just a dangerous move but an action that turns the respective convoys into legitimate targets,” he said in televised remarks.

But thus far the Russians appear not to have put a high priority on arms interdiction, perhaps because their air force is leery of flying into Ukraine’s air defenses to search out and attack supply convoys on the move. They have struck fixed sites like arms depots and fuel storage locations, but to limited effect.

On Monday, the Russians said they destroyed four S-300 surface-to-air missile launchers that had been given to Ukraine by an unspecified European country. Slovakia, a NATO member that shares a border with Ukraine, donated just such a system last week but denied it had been destroyed. On Tuesday, the Russian Ministry of Defense said long-range missiles were used to hit two Ukrainian ammo depots.

As the fighting intensifies in the Donbas and perhaps along the coastal corridor to the Russian-annexed Crimean Peninsula, Putin may feel compelled to strike harder at the arms pipeline, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called vital to his nation’s survival.

In the meantime, a staggering volume and range of war materiel is arriving almost daily.

“The scope and speed of our support to meeting Ukraine’s defense needs are unprecedented in modern times,” said John Kirby, the Pentagon press secretary. He said the approximately $2.6 billion in weapons and other material that has been offered to Ukraine since the beginning of the Biden administration is equivalent to more than half of Ukraine’s normal defense budget.

One example: The Pentagon says it has provided more than 5,000 Javelin missiles, which are among the world’s most effective weapons against tanks and other armored vehicles — and can even take down a low-flying helicopter. The missile, shaped like a clunky dumb bell and weighing 50 pounds (23 kilograms), is fired by an individual soldier; from its launch tube it flies up at a steep angle and descends directly onto its target in what its known as a curveball shot — hitting the top of a tank where its armor is weakest.

The Pentagon said Wednesday that an unspecified number of additional Javelins are to be delivered by Thursday, and the U.S. will complete the delivery of 100 armed Switchblade “kamikaze” drones this week.

The specific routes used to move the U.S. and other Western materials into Ukraine are secret for security reasons, but the basic process is not. Just this week, two U.S. military cargo planes arrived in Eastern Europe with items ranging from machine guns and small arms ammunition to body armor and grenades, the Pentagon said.

#### More arms are key to continued deterrence

The Economist 22 – The Economist newspaper was founded by a Scottish hat manufacturer to further the cause of free trade, The Economist Group has evolved into a staunchly independent global media and information-services company with intelligent brands for an international audience. (Listening To, "Is the West supplying Ukraine with enough weapons?" Economist, 6-19-2022, https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/06/19/is-the-west-supplying-ukraine-with-enough-weapons, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

When the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania visited Kyiv on June 16th, they came bearing gifts. They endorsed Ukraine’s bid to become a candidate for membership of the European Union, a position echoed the following day by Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission. They also offered full-throated support for Ukraine’s military effort. “We are doing everything so that Ukraine wins this war,” declared Emmanuel Macron, France’s president. And they pledged more of the weapons that Ukraine says it desperately needs to make that happen. Mr Macron vowed to send six more state-of-the-art caesar artillery pieces “in the coming weeks”, on top of the dozen delivered so far. Unwilling to be outshone, Boris Johnson, Britain’s prime minister, turned up to Kyiv a day later and promised a big new military-training programme.

Such help is desperately needed. In recent weeks Ukraine has made some gains in southern Kherson province, and on June 17th it claimed to have sunk a Russian vessel reinforcing Snake Island, a small Russian-occupied fortress in the Black Sea. But these are small consolations next to the steady gains that Russia’s army has made in the eastern Donbas region, where fighting is concentrated. Russia now controls two-thirds of Severodonetsk, a town that lies deep in a Ukrainian salient under attack from three sides, with resistance confined to an industrial zone in the west. Russian forces are also making gains west of Severodonetsk around Slovyansk, attacking the same salient from the north.

Rochan Consulting, a firm that tracks the war, says that the settlements of Bohorodychne, Dolyna and Krasnopillya, to the north-west of Slovyansk, are crucial (see map). “It is possible that the Ukrainian defence in this area could collapse if the Russians maintain their pace of ground and artillery attacks,” a recent update stated. Even north-east of Kharkiv, where in May Ukrainian counter-attacks had pushed Russian troops almost back over the border, Vladimir Putin’s troops are on the offensive once again.

One reason for these setbacks is that Russia’s army is concentrating its forces and using them more methodically than it did in the first stage of the conflict—when it attacked along several different axes at the same time, dispensing with some of the rudimentary principles of warfare. Russia also has a big advantage in raw firepower. On June 14th Anna Malyar, Ukraine’s deputy defence minister, said that Ukraine was firing 5,000-6,000 shells a day, one-tenth of Russia’s barrage. Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, adds that in some places Ukraine’s artillery is outnumbered ten to one.

Russia is also using long-range rockets, which allow it to strike Ukrainian positions while remaining safe from retaliatory fire. Ukraine is largely out of ammunition for its own Soviet-era Smerch and Uragan rocket-launchers, which can fire much further than conventional artillery. It has also run out of Tochka ballistic missiles. A recent video showed Ukrainian soldiers operating a diy rocket-launcher—an aircraft rocket pod strapped to a truck-towed trailer—revealing both ingenuity and scarcity.

Ukrainian casualties have reached shocking levels. On June 9th Mr Podolyak said that 100-200 Ukrainian soldiers were dying a day, a figure that Mark Milley, America’s top general, described as “in the ballpark” of the Pentagon’s assessments. Ukraine’s call for more arms has thus reached a new intensity. “Today we have about 10% of what Ukraine has stated that we need,” complained Ms Malyar.

On June 15th an American-led group of nearly 50 countries met on the sidelines of a meeting of nato defence ministers in Brussels to co-ordinate assistance to Ukraine (see chart). General Milley and Lloyd Austin, America’s defence secretary, tried to allay Ukraine’s concerns. The country’s appetite was, in one sense, insatiable, suggested Mr Austin, pointing to his own experience in the field: “General Milley and I have been in a number of fights, and when you’re in a fight you can never get enough. You always want more.” Some Western officials hint that what Ukraine demands in public is not the same as what it asks for in private.

In fact Ukraine has got what it wanted—and then some, claimed General Milley. It had asked for ten battalions of artillery and received a dozen, along with half a million rounds of ammunition. It wanted 200 tanks and got 237. The 97,000 anti-tank weapons Ukraine had received were “more…than there are tanks in the world”, he pointed out, though neglecting to mention that they are used against other targets. The speed of support had been “without comparison”—often mere days would elapse between the authorisation of a Ukrainian request and the delivery of a weapon into Ukrainian hands. On the same day as the gathering in Brussels the White House promised $1bn of new weapons, on top of almost $6bn in military aid already supplied.

Further weapons are in the pipeline. Around ten rocket-launchers—American himars and British mlrs—are due to arrive shortly, and the Biden administration is considering whether to send four more. These fire-guided missiles have a range of up to 84km. Some Ukrainian crews have already been trained in Germany, and more are being taught. General Milley said that the quality of these weapons would eventually show on the battlefield: “The Russians are just doing mass fires without necessarily achieving military effect…The Ukrainians, on the other hand, are using much better artillery techniques.” Germany, which has been criticised for its reluctance to send heavy weapons, is also sending mlrs and said on June 14th that it had nearly finished training Ukrainian troops to use the Panzerhaubitze 2000, a potent self-propelled howitzer with a range of 40km.

In public, at least, American and European leaders sound hawkish about sustaining this flow of arms. “We will stay focused on this for as long as it takes,” insisted Mr Austin in Brussels. “As long as necessary, until peace returns to a free and independent Ukraine, we will remain committed,” tweeted Mr Macron. In private, there are doubts. nato countries are clean out of the sort of ammunition needed by Ukraine’s Soviet-era weapons: “It’s gone already in three months,” says one European defence official. “It doesn’t exist anymore.” The plan, to be formalised at a nato summit starting on June 27th, is to help Ukraine’s armed forces switch more fully to nato kit. That is a huge undertaking, and will take time.

Europe’s own stocks of munitions are low, and finding extra workers and components for complex weapons, like the Javelin or Stinger anti-aircraft missile, takes time. Moreover, as countries like Germany and Poland rearm at breakneck pace, demand will outstrip defence manufacturers’ capacity to produce. Shortly before his trip to Kyiv, Mr Macron warned that France had entered a “war economy in which I believe we will find ourselves for a long time”. The 18 caesars that France has sent or promised to Ukraine comprise almost a quarter of the country’s entire stock.

There are other anxieties, too. Insiders say that the fear of escalation among Ukraine’s partners is still constraining the flow of arms. American officials are carefully watching how Ukraine uses its powerful new himars launchers—it has promised not to target Russian soil—and how Russia responds, a policy that risks giving the Kremlin undue influence over future arms supplies. On June 16th Mr Macron repeated his claim, originally made in March, that nato had informally agreed not to provide Ukraine with “certain weapons, such as planes or tanks”—a red line that must presumably refer to Western-made tanks, rather than the ex-Soviet ones given to Ukraine by the Czech Republic and Poland.

America and its European allies have demonstrated extraordinary unity over nearly four months of war. Almost all want to see Ukraine emerge as a secure and sovereign state. But what that means in practice is not always clear, and seems to be shifting over time. In April Mr Austin said that America’s goal was to sap Russia’s strength: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” At a gathering of defence ministers the next day he added, “Ukraine clearly believes that it can win, and so does everyone here.” Last week he was more circumspect, saying cryptically that America’s aim was a “democratic, independent, sovereign and prosperous Ukraine”. Twice America’s defence secretary was asked whether he still wanted Ukraine to win. Twice he ducked the question.

### 2AC – AT: Current Arms Solve Ukraine

#### Only unified defense strategy solves Ukraine – current promises are empty.

Erlanger 22 – Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017. He is based in Brussels. (Steven Erlanger, "U.S. and Allies Pledge Additional Arms for Ukraine, but Kyiv Wants More," New York Times, 6-15-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/15/world/europe/biden-ukraine-weapons.html, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

“I think the international community has done a pretty good job of providing that capability. But it’s never enough,” Mr. Austin said. “And so we’re going to continue to work hard to move as much capability as we can as fast as we can.”

But promising weapons and delivering them are two different things.

It’s one thing to get a large howitzer or tank or thousands of artillery shells to Ukraine’s western borders. But given that NATO countries do not want to risk direct confrontation with Russian forces, transport from there must be done by Ukrainians or private contractors.

Simply getting the weapons across Ukraine to the eastern battlegrounds depends on railroads and transport networks that are being bombed and shelled by Russian forces to disrupt supply.

Ukraine’s military is running very low on shells for its artillery based on Soviet designs, some of it dating to the Soviet era, and Western countries do not make compatible ammunition. Former Soviet bloc countries like Poland have only so many munitions that are familiar to Ukrainian soldiers and work with their guns.

More modern Western equipment requires training, done in other countries, with those Ukrainians trained sent back to operate equipment or train others.

Modern weapons also require sophisticated maintenance, which takes further training, and American weapons generally do not use the metric system, which means different tools and wrenches.

And different NATO member countries have varying equipment requiring varying training and tools. The French have provided Ukraine some of the most sophisticated artillery in the world, the Caesar self-propelled howitzer. Like the American M777, it fires 155-mm shells, but operating the two guns is not the same.

And not only are sophisticated weapons systems expensive, but the supply is limited and production is often slow. Some countries sending arms to Ukraine have expressed fears of depleting their own stocks and weakening their national security, and some have secured commitments from the United States and others to provide replacements.

### 2AC – AT: Illicit Arms Turn

#### Russia makes the impact inevitable

Hudson 22 – John Hudson is a national security reporter focusing on the State Department and diplomacy. (John Hudson, "Flood of weapons to Ukraine raises fear of arms smuggling," Washington Post, 5-14-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/14/ukraine-weapons-trafficking/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

There are additional concerns among watchdog groups about arms proliferation stemming from Moscow amid reports it has enlisted mercenaries from Libya, Syria and Chechnya, as well as the Wagner Group, a Russian contractor.

During a televised meeting of Russia’s Security Council in March, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 16,000 volunteers in the Middle East stood ready to fight alongside Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine.

In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his approval, saying, “We need to give them what they want and help them get to the conflict zone.”

At the same meeting, Shoigu proposed handing over captured U.S. Javelin and Stinger missiles to pro-Russian separatists in Donbas region. “Please do this,” Putin told Shoigu.

The introduction of foreign fighters to a conflict runs the risks of weapons returning to those individuals’ countries of origin when the fighting in Ukraine ends. There are conflicting reports about the presence of foreign fighters there, however, and it’s unclear precisely how many have in fact traveled to Ukraine.

#### End use monitoring solves the weapons the aff increases – everything else is thumped by the squo

Cohen 22 – Jordan Cohen is a policy analyst in defense and foreign policy at the Cato Institute. His research interests include arms sales, alliances, foreign policy entanglements, and Middle East politics. (Jordan Cohen, "Sending Weapons to Ukraine Could Have Unintended Consequences," Cato Institute, 3-1-2022, https://www.cato.org/commentary/sending-weapons-ukraine-could-have-unintended-consequences, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

DOD has been able to monitor just three types of weapons: Javelin missiles, Javelin launch units, and night vision devices. This is because these are the three types of weapons transferred under DOD’s purview that qualify for Enhanced End Use Monitoring, which is a black box. The DOD, however, notes that this is due to the “sensitivity of the technology associated with the article.” According to international watchdogs, the following have gone unmonitored: Patrol aircraft, mobile radar systems communication devices, counter‐​IED equipment, military vehicles, weapons storage facilities, and other physical equipment.

#### Their ev is about small arms – complicated weaponry solves their offense

Yousif 22 – Elias Yousif is a Research Analyst with the Stimson Center’s Conventional Defense Program. His research focuses on the global arms trade and arms control, issues related to remote warfare and use of force, and international security cooperation and child soldiers prevention. (Elias Yousif, "Under Caution: Assessing Arms Transfer Risk in Ukraine," Stimson Center, 3-7-2022, https://www.stimson.org/2022/under-caution-assessing-arms-transfer-risk-in-ukraine/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Of course, there is a tremendous difference between small arms that have been handed out to civilians as compared to more sophisticated weaponry provided to government forces. But the risks are real and the potential negative legacy of arms transfers need to be acknowledged and addressed. We’ve seen time and time again how arms aimed at aiding an ally in one conflict have found their way to the frontlines of unforeseen battlefields, often in the hands of groups at odds with U.S. interests or those of civilians. This is especially true for small arms and light weapons, which hold some of the highest risks of loss, diversion into the illicit market, or misuse. From Afghanistan to Iraq to Colombia, well-intentioned transfers have a habit of outliving their political contexts, and risk fueling new conflicts, being captured by illicit groups, or contributing to enduring ecosystems of insecurity. In the end, it may well be the case that a thoughtful, and dispassionate assessment of the risks and rewards of arms transfers to Ukraine offers a strategically sound case for sending more weapons to combat the Russian invasion. But the risks of these arms transfers must be considered, and, where possible, mitigated. Any weapons transfers – particularly small arms and light weapons – need to have appropriate end-use monitoring mechanisms attached. Moreover, the conduct of use stipulations must also be put in place to ensure that these weapons are not used indiscriminately or harm civilians. While the defense of Ukraine is paramount, no one is better off when arms flow with disregard for the real risks associated with arms transfers. The people of Ukraine deserve assistance, and it is the responsibility of those making arms transfer decisions to ensure that assistance is thoughtful, responsible, and strategically sound in the short and long term.

### 2AC – AT: Heg Bad

#### Heg is good – retrenchment causes Russia and China war

Lowry 22 – Rich Lowry is editor of National Review and a contributing editor with Politico Magazine. ("The Isolationists Are Wrong: The Pax Americana Is Worth Defending," 2-24-2022, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/02/24/isolationists-are-wrong-pax-americana-worth-defending-00011448, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine doesn’t just herald a new era in European security, it underlines a growing threat to the American-led international order.

Pax Americana, the post-World War II system that has created the conditions for peace and prosperity in Europe and elsewhere, is entering a great period of testing, with the revanchist powers of Russia and China seeking to overturn it.

It is imperative that the United States, as the leader of the West and the only nation capable of maintaining what it has built over the last seven decades, rises to the challenge, even though its leadership role is increasingly contested at home. The left has long argued that the U.S. is not the benign influence abroad that it likes to believe, and the order that it created is a corrupt scam, not worth the cost of preserving.

Now elements of the right say much the same thing. This sentiment ranges from Senate candidate J.D. Vance pointedly declaring that he doesn’t care what happens in Ukraine to right-wing commentator Candace Owens saying we are at fault for the conflict. Undergirding it all is a sense that the U.S. needs to mind its own business, and perhaps even treat China as a “civilizational equal.”

But Pax Americana isn’t an act of charity. It holds distinct advantages for the United States. We’d be less safe, prosperous, and free without it.

What we are witnessing is, in broad brush, a civilizational challenge. China and Russia don’t have a formal alliance and their current cooperative arrangement may well break down over time, but they share the same interest in ending the long era of Western preeminence.

Russia can punch above its weight, but fundamentally represents a regional threat, in particular to a NATO alliance that has been a keystone of Western security. Moscow seeks to divide European countries from one another and diminish U.S. influence in Europe, toward the end of reversing the post-Cold War settlement that was the fruit of the West’s triumph over the Soviet Union.

What Putin seeks is consequential, but not nearly as sweeping as Beijing’s goal of supplanting the United States at the top of the hierarchy of nations. China wants nothing less than to restore itself as the Middle Kingdom, owed the respect and obeisance of the rest of the world.

What unites Russia and China is that they are two civilizations that feel they were humiliated and trampled by the West (Russia at the end of the Cold War, China from the middle of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th) and need to regain their rightful place in the sun. There is an ideological element to the growing challenge, as these two authoritarian regimes confront the democratic world, but the crux of the matter is cultural—neither Russia nor China has ever been a liberal democracy and each country is reacting against international norms they’ve never embraced.

Can’t we just make way for a more ambitious Russia and China? Within limits, but their maximal demands are an obvious threat to our interests.

Through our system of alliances, we have been, in effect, sponsoring international peace. Should, say, NATO unravel, there is no reason that Europe would not eventually once again become red in tooth and claw, as it has been through much of its history. Even if we could ignore or at least stay out of any future conflict, the loss of a vast zone of free, prosperous and allied counties would be a blow.

If it is expensive and burdensome to underwrite the security of countries around the world, it would be even more expensive and burdensome if a global U.S. exit or diminishment created the conditions for a major war, or if some other power—i.e., China—replaced us at the apex of world power.

There are so many advantages to our preeminent position that we take for granted. In an essay titled “After Hegemony,” former Trump official Elbridge Colby notes some of them: “Think how the American-born internet supported Silicon Valley, and vice versa, leading to a World Wide Web governed by formal laws and informal norms almost entirely of American design. Think how the desire for access to American capital markets gives American regulators de facto control over global accounting standards, or how the need to transact with American institutions allows U.S. Treasury officials to freeze the assets of designated targets anywhere in the world. Think how Americans take for granted that English is the universal language and that everyone accepts dollars. Think how the American university degree has become the preeminent global academic credential, with searching implications for everything from global educational standards to measures of professional success.”

The American order has also been, in the main, just. It is based on the sovereignty of borders and democracy as a norm, and hence has been a boon to self-governing peoples around the world. We can be overbearing and even bullying—as well as greedy, shortsighted, and wrong-headed—but U.S. leadership hasn’t been based on coercion. By and large, our allies trust us, and find our model more congenial than anything else on offer.

The previous hegemonic power, Britain, had a soft landing because Pax Britannica was replaced by Pax Americana, run by a partner that shared similar values and mindsets. The same wouldn’t be true if we hand the baton over to China.

Consider the seas. As the navalist Jerry Hendrix notes, the U.S. Navy has made the seas safe and free over the last 70 years in a way they never had been before. It’s no accident that there’s been a surge of global trade over the course of these decades that has made countries around the world more prosperous. Russia and especially China are a threat to this system, seeking greater control of the seas for their own purposes.

China wants to define a swath of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as its territorial waters. If the U.S. lacks the resources or will to resist this Chinese aggrandizement, the rules of the road of international commerce will change drastically in China’s favor. An enormous proportion of global trade flows through the South China Sea and East China Sea. With control of the key choke points, China would be in a position to create restrictions and fees for everyone else’s trade and privileged status for its own. Imagine a kind of perpetual supply-chain crisis imposed by China as a matter of policy.

Indeed, China doesn’t want to be a leading country among other leading countries. It wants to have its system of government considered superior to liberal democracy. It wants free access to markets, while constraining everyone else. It wants to dominate the setting of technical standards, and so influence how new technologies are developed to suit its own interests. The Belt and Road Initiative is a reflection of its vision, with China at the center and other countries in a subsidiary role.

If China achieves mastery in Asia and a position of global predominance, it won’t leave us alone to enjoy tending our garden at home. “Building upon such economic advantages,” Colby writes, “it could intrude into and shape our national life, using its position to coerce, bribe, and cajole companies, individuals, and governments to do its will, diminishing our economic vitality and, through that, our freedoms.”

Resisting these growing civilizational challenges will require continued engagement around the world and the return in certain respects to a Cold War footing, especially when it comes to the chronically underfunded defense budget. Ducking our leadership role will, eventually, mean inevitable decline and the creation of a more hostile world. Countries don’t become more prosperous and secure on their way down.

### 2AC – Taiwan I/L

#### Supplying Taiwan with more PGMs is key to deter China. These munitions provide vital shore- and sea-denial capabilities, which thwarts Chinese landings.

Erickson and Collins 4-18-2022, Andrew Erickson, professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute, Gabriel Collins, Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute, "Eight New Points on the Porcupine: More Ukrainian Lessons for Taiwan", War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/eight-new-points-on-the-porcupine-more-ukrainian-lessons-for-taiwan/, DL

Sea-Denial Fires

Taiwanese forces should pursue a three-layered approach to defending Taiwan’s coastline from amphibious attack. The outermost layer would involve munitions capable of striking Chinese staging areas and ports, as well as petroleum, oil, and lubricants tanks to disrupt an invasion force and potential follow-on waves. Taiwan has for more than a decade fielded a 600km-range land-attack cruise missile (the Hsiung Feng IIE) capable of such interdiction missions as well as an air-launched cruise missile (the Wan Chien) with a 240km-range, but only small numbers of rounds.

American assistance should thus be structured to rapidly augment existing Taiwanese indigenous systems and amplify their deterrent effect through the prospect of expanding them. Taiwan plans to double advanced missile production to a total of nearly 500 per year in 2022. But as Ukraine’s example shows, that may only amount to days of supply during a high-end war, making imported weapons an important component of pre-conflict preparation. In 2020, the United States approved the sale of 135 AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response units to Taiwan for approximately $1 billion. These high-precision, 300km-range weapons are air-launched, combat-proven, carry an 800lb warhead, and offer Taipei the ability to interdict Chinese military support infrastructure and vessels in port.

To ensure second-strike capability, Taiwan likely needs several times its current inventory of these missiles, dispersed to highways and other forward-operating points that could survive a surprise ballistic and cruise missile strike by China. Taiwan should attempt to obtain Harop-type long-range loitering munitions as well. U.S. defense contractors could potentially produce the latter under license from Israeli Aircraft Industries to blunt potential Chinese pressure — sales of Spike missiles and other hardware to Taiwan could provide an incentive for the deal.

The second layer entails stockpiling and deploying anti-ship missiles and precision-guided munitions to deny China the ability to reach Taiwanese ports. Again, the intent would be for American-origin systems to amplify Taiwan’s indigenous capabilities, such as the 120–150km-ranged Hsiung Feng III supersonic anti-ship cruise missile. The United States has already approved the sale of 100 Harpoon land-based coastal defense cruise missile launchers, 400 missiles, and 25 associated radars to Taiwan. With a range of 124km, Harpoon Block II missiles could engage Chinese vessels soon after they leave port. If China begins posturing for an invasion, Washington should facilitate Taipei purchasing even more launchers and missile rounds, perhaps even through a lend-lease arrangement.

On April 13, 2022, two Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles struck the cruiser Moskva, Russia’s Black Sea flagship, causing it to catch fire and sink. Moskva’s sundering shows how coastal anti-ship cruise missiles can be hard to see coming in sufficient time to defend against if ships are operating close to land. Losses inflicted on the British Royal Navy by Argentine Exocet missiles during the Falklands War and the near-loss of USS Stark after two Exocet strikes in 1987 suggest that rapidly maximizing the quantity and survivability of Taiwan’s long-range anti-ship missile inventory could seriously challenge People’s Liberation Army Navy operations near the island.

Shore-Denial Fires

The third layer of coastline defense should rely on precision fires to turn Taiwan’s nearshore waters and beaches into kill zones. Taiwanese forces need multiple-launch rocket artillery with submunitions (for example High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems) to target any landing force close to Taiwan’s coast. Furthermore, the High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems platform could employ Saab’s Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb, whose 150km-range and high precision would allow rocket systems dispersed throughout Taiwan to target a Chinese landing force. The United States has already agreed to deliver at least 11 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems by 2027 — a number that should be substantially increased to accommodate combat attrition and ensure sufficient mass of fire against a potential invasion attempt.

Taiwanese forces should also stockpile relatively high-volume, lower-cost precision-guided munitions to overwhelm invaders near or on its beaches. AGM-114 Ground-Launched Hellfire-Light missiles deployed in anti-ship mode from mobile platforms (such as a modified Humvee chassis) offer one option. This Littoral Combat Ship surface module concept could also be fitted to commercial fishing vessels to threaten and destroy small boats, such as amphibious assault craft.

The United States should also help Taiwan to acquire substantial numbers of Javelin missiles and additional advanced versions of the BGM-71 Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided anti-tank missile, with rounds pre-positioned in hardened locations near likely landing areas. Ukraine’s fight thus far suggests that repelling an intense multi-vector invasion attempt can realistically require thousands of anti-armor munitions.

The war in Ukraine has already absorbed a significant portion of U.S. Javelin and Stinger stockpiles. This means supplying Taiwan would require investing in the American munitions industrial base to substantially increase production capacity. Incoming Undersecretary for Acquisition and Sustainment William LaPlante’s recent Senate confirmation hearing testimony suggests that such investments could be forthcoming soon. The White House and Congress should also consider license-manufacturing of certain systems in Taiwan to bolster domestic support on the island and allow U.S. plants to more rapidly replenish America’s own stocks.

### 2AC – Turkey

#### Drones are becoming less effective in Ukraine now. PGM cooperation with Turkey gives drones teeth.

Tanmay Kadam 4-8-2022, Geopolitical Researcher, "Washington To Arm Ukraine's Bayraktar TB2 Drones With Laser-Guided Rockets To Target Russian Tanks With Pinpoint Accuracy", Eurasian Times, https://eurasiantimes.com/us-to-arm-turkish-bayraktar-drones-with-laser-rockets/, DL

Traditionally, any rocket with a guidance system is called a missile however in the US military ‘guided rocket’ refers to the stock of 70 mm/2.75-inch Hydra 70 unguided rockets that have been turned into precision-guided munitions (PGMs) using laser guidance kit.

So far, the Ukrainian resistance has impressively employed its small fleet of TB2 drones against the invading Russian military which happens to be one of the world’s largest armed forces.

The Turkish-made drones have become a sort of legend in Ukraine’s guerrilla force making headlines every day and social media is proliferated with posts of numerous video footage from Bayraktar drones either itself striking or guiding the artillery strikes against Russian military targets.

The Ukrainian military has used TB2 for reconnaissance, surveillance, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations, and battlefield destruction.

TB2s have destroyed Russian Buk medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers enabling the Ukrainian air force to continue operating for more than a month into the war; struck Russian convoys, thereby hindering the much-needed supplies to the frontlines; and neutralized Russian tanks and various other types of armored vehicles, etc.

Meanwhile, Russia has claimed that its armed forces have destroyed 37 of the Ukrainian Bayraktars, the evidence so far exists only for three of these and the TB2s still appear to be operating.

However, of late, fewer videos have appeared of TB2 strikes as more of them are seen identifying targets and directing the artillery fire towards them, suggesting a date shortage of laser-guided MAM missiles also supplied by Turkey.

While the US and European countries have been actively providing Ukraine with weapons since the beginning of the Russian invasion, Turkey has refrained from supplying arms possibly because of Russian pressure.

Turkey supplied an extra consignment of Bayraktars shortly before the invasion but the country finds itself in a difficult position between supporting Ukraine and opposing Russia because of its dependence on the latter for its energy needs.

Turkish officials have maintained that the drone sale was a private deal between a Turkish company and Ukraine and not military assistance from the government.

In such a situation, the US seems to have come up with a solution to give the teeth to Ukraine’s fleet of TB2s by arming them with its lightweight, laser-guided Advanced Precision Kill Weapon, or APKWS which is an upgrade for the US military’s vast stocks of old Hydra 70 rockets.

These 25-pound 70 mm rockets were developed way back in the 1940s, carried in pods of seven or nineteen by attack aircraft and helicopters, and fired in volleys to cover an entire area. The US used them extensively in Vietnam and Russian helicopters are still firing pods of similar unguided rockets in Ukraine.

In 2005, the US Army started a new development program called APKWS II and BAE Systems was selected as the prime contractor for the program, while other contractors included General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman.

The BAE systems fitted the APKWS with its distributed aperture semi-active laser seeker (DASALS) guidance and control system to convert the unguided Hydra 70 rocket into precision munitions which enables them to engage soft and lightly armored targets in restricted areas with minimal collateral damage.

The semi-active laser-guided rocket system consists of 3 main components which include M151 / MK152 and M282 warheads, M423 / MK435 fuse, and a standard MK66 rocket motor.

The rocket system has wing assemblies and folding fins with a low-cost laser seeker located on the leading edge of these folding fins working in unison as a single seeker which allows existing warheads from the Hydra 70 system to be used without the need for a laser seeker in the nose of the missile.

The weapon system is also fitted with a MEMS inertial measurement unit and advanced digital signal processing technique for improved communication.

The system works with standard laser designators which involve the operator highlighting the target for the rocket to home in on it. It is known to have a range of over 4.83 km from a helicopter or 11.27 km from a fixed-wing aircraft which has been increased by 30% after a software upgrade by BAE Systems in 2021.

The rocket system can be deployed against ground, air, and sea-based threats and can also be used for close air support operations.

The Bayraktar drones have never fired an APKWS before but it is said to be able to fire the CİRİT missile made by Turkish company Roketsan which is also a 70mm laser-guided rocket compatible with NATO standard laser designators and can be launched from existing aircraft-mounted rails and pods.

CİRİT missile made by Turkish company Roketsan (Turkish Media)

Also, the APKSW is light in weight as compared to the current MAM missiles used by Ukrainian TB2s that can allow the drone to carry 6 or more APKWS instead of 4 MAM.

### 2AC – NATO I/L -> Taiwan

#### Increased NATO cooperation deters Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Philip Anstrén 6-30-2021, fellow in the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The case for greater US-EU collaboration on Taiwan", Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-case-for-greater-us-eu-collaboration-on-taiwan/, DL

NATO should prepare contingency plans in the event of Chinese aggression against Taiwan. Because they don’t have even the ambiguous security commitments toward Taiwan that the United States does, European members of NATO would be loath to send military assets to assist a US intervention in the Taiwan Strait. However, European members of NATO could commit to stepping up their military responsibilities in the North Atlantic should the United States have to come to the defense of Taiwan. The goal would be to backfill Washington, freeing it up to act in the Taiwan Strait and maximizing its capacity to deter China. A similar effect could be achieved by having European countries step up their security role in the Indo-Pacific, as countries like Germany, France, and the UK are increasingly trying to do.

All these moves would risk antagonizing China. But Beijing, faced with the united strength of the EU and the United States, would have little room to retaliate except rhetorically. That would be especially true if the EU and United States limit themselves, as recommended, to deterrent moves showing what they would do in the event of a cross-strait crisis. After all, China would inflict great harm on itself as well by, for instance, imposing trade sanctions against the United States and the EU—its largest trade partners.

The dawn of the Biden administration has created new hope for greater EU-US cooperation. Both sides should make sure that this revival extends to Taiwan.

### 2AC – AT: PGMs Bad For Taiwan

#### Taiwan needs more precision guided munitions to deter China. Ukraine proves the efficacy of asymmetric warfare that PGMs provide.

Yu 3-11-2022, Matt Yu and William Yen citing Su Tzu-yun, an associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, "Cost-effective, guided missiles 'key to asymmetric warfare in Taiwan'", Focus Taiwan, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202203110018, DL

Taipei, March 11 (CNA) Taiwan should leverage cost-effective precision-guided munitions to bolster its counter-invasion asymmetric warfare capabilities, a researcher from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research said Friday.

Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲), an associate research fellow at the Taipei-based think tank, told CNA that affordable precision-guided air defense and anti-ship missiles would be key to giving Taiwan an advantage over an invading military force.

Su's comments come after Mara Karlin, United States assistant secretary of defense for strategy, plans, and capabilities, said in a Senate hearing Thursday that Taiwan should strengthen its asymmetric capabilities, as a preparatory measure, in the event of an attack by China.

"I think the situation we're seeing in Ukraine right now is a very worthwhile case study ... about why Taiwan needs to do all it can to build asymmetric capabilities, to get its population ready, so that it can be ready as quickly as possible should China choose to violate its sovereignty," Mara said in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing.

Asymmetric warfare, which has been used to varying degrees of success throughout history, has been put to use again during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Su said.

However, Su noted that while Ukraine has mainly been a land war, an invasion of Taiwan would likely include sea and air engagement, necessitating a different approach to asymmetric warfare.

Despite the differences, the logic remains the same, Su said, in that "the key to asymmetric warfare is the difference in cost."

Using cheaper but precise munitions to destroy enemy forces would follow the example set by Ukrainian forces, which have employed Javelin missiles to take out armored vehicles, and Stinger missiles to shoot down helicopters, Su said.

Because of the differences in terrain between Taiwan and Ukraine, it would be possible to use anti-ship missiles to offset enemy naval power and anti-aircraft missiles to take down enemy fighter planes, Su said.

Ukraine has claimed 12,000 Russian soldiers have died since the beginning of hostilities on Feb. 24, along with the loss of 49 fighter jets, 81 helicopters, and 335 tanks, figures that have been disputed by Moscow.

Even though U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have continued throughout both the Donald Trump and Joe Biden administrations, including precision-guided weapons, acquisition of material needs to accelerate as the threats are also growing, Su said.

### 2AC – Thumper

#### The US recently approved the sale of PGMs to NATO. Thumps every DA AND proves say yes.

DSCA 6-22-2022, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, "NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) – Precision Guided Munitions", https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/nato-support-and-procurement-agency-nspa-precision-guided-munitions, DL

WASHINGTON, June 22, 2022 - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency of Precision Guided Munitions and related equipment for an estimated cost of $22.7 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

NATO Support and Procurement Agency as Lead Nation has requested the possible sale of two hundred thirtynine (239) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, Increment I; two hundred four (204) FMU-152 fuzes; two hundred four (204) MK-82 500LB General Purpose Bombs; and fifty (50) BLU-109 2000LB Hard Target Penetrator Bombs, that will be added to a previously implemented case. The original FMS case, valued at $1.87 million, included forty (40) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, Increment I. Therefore, this notification is for a total of two hundred seventy-nine (279) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs, Increment I; two hundred four (204) FMU-152 fuzes; two hundred four (204) MK-82 500LB General Purpose Bombs; and fifty (50) BLU-109 2000LB Hard Target Penetrator Bombs. Also included are smoke signal cartridges; engineering and technical support and assistance; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $22.7 million.

This proposed sale supports the foreign policy and national security of the United States by increasing the flexibility of Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, twelve NATO nations and one NATO enhanced opportunity partner nation, to contribute to overseas contingency operations. This sale increases the quantity of precisionguided munitions within NATO and allows for their pre-coordinated transfer in support of national and NATO requirements.

The proposed sale will improve NATO's capability to meet current and future ground threats with precision. NATO will use the enhanced capability as a deterrent to regional threats, and to increase interoperability within contingency operations. Many of the purchasing nations already have precision-guided munitions in their inventories and will all have no difficulty absorbing these munitions into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors for production are the Boeing Corporation, St Louis, MO; and Raytheon Missile Systems, Tucson, AZ. The principal contractor for integration is unknown and will be determined during contract negotiations. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to NATO.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

## T

### 2AC – AT: PGMs Not AI

#### C/I: Artificial intelligence is what DoDD 3000.09 regulates

Defense Innovation Board 19 – The Defense Innovation Board is an independent advisory board set up in 2016 to bring the technological innovation and best practice of Silicon Valley to the U.S. Military. It is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act and provides independent recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. (“AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” October 2019, <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204459/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_SUPPORTING_DOCUMENT.PDF>, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)

DoD’s policy regarding autonomy in weapons systems comes from the 2012 DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.09. There, DoD defines an autonomous weapons system (AWS) as: “a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-supervised autonomous weapons systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation.”15 Here autonomy is limited to the ability of a system to act without direction and intervention by a human during target engagement. A human may watch or supervise a system, but that system can carry out a commander’s intent and its task without any further guidance. How it does so is not specified; it is the behavior that is autonomous. Thus, DoDD 3000.09 does not explicitly address AI as such, but the Directive is broad enough to cover autonomous systems run on AI.16

#### That’s the aff

Insinna 22 – Valerie Insinna was Defense News' air warfare reporter. Beforehand, she worked the Navy and congressional beats for Defense Daily, which followed almost three years as a staff writer for National Defense Magazine. Prior to that, she worked as an editorial assistant for the Tokyo Shimbun’s Washington bureau. (Valerie, “Updated autonomous weapons rules coming for the Pentagon: Exclusive details,” 5-26-2022, Breaking Defense, Lexis, Accessed 6-23-2022, LASA-SC)

DoD directive 3000.09 [PDF], signed by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on Nov. 21, 2012, established policy, responsibilities and review processes for the “design, development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that can independently select and discriminate targets.”

But in the decade since its release, artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have made a massive leap forward, and it’s “entirely plausible” there may need to be revisions that reflect the Pentagon’s “responsible AI” initiative and other ethical principles adopted by the department, said Michael Horowitz, DoD director of emerging capabilities policy.

“Autonomy and AI are not the exact same thing,” Horowitz told Breaking Defense on May 24. “But given the growing importance that AI plays, and thinking about the future of war and the way the department has been thinking about AI, I think ensuring that’s reflected in the directive seems to make sense.”

### 2AC – AI – General

#### Security cooperation with NATO over AI is expanding tech that performs tasks that typically require human intelligence

Lockman and Christie 21 – Zoe Stanley-Lockman is an Innovation Officer in the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff, and focuses particularly on Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. Edward Hunter Christie is the owner and founder of AI Policy Consulting and served as lead consultant to NATO in the preparation of NATO’s AI Strategy. He was formerly Deputy Head of Innovation in NATO’s International Staff and the author of NATO’s Artificial Intelligence White Paper. (“An Artificial Intelligence Strategy for NATO," NATO Review, 10-25-2021, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/10/25/an-artificial-intelligence-strategy-for-nato/index.html, Accessed 6-19-2022, LASA-SC)

One does not have to look far to see how Artificial Intelligence (AI) – the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence – is transforming the international security environment in which NATO operates. Due to its cross-cutting nature, AI will pose a broad set of international security challenges, affecting both traditional military capabilities and the realm of hybrid threats, and will likewise provide new opportunities to respond to them. AI will have an impact on all of NATO’s core tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.

With new opportunities, risks, and threats to prosperity and security at stake, the promise and peril associated with this foundational technology are too vast for any single actor to manage alone. As a result, cooperation is inherently needed to equally mitigate international security risks, as well as to capitalise on the technology’s potential to transform enterprise functions, mission support, and operations.

The continued ability of the Alliance to deter and defend against any potential adversary and to respond effectively to emerging crises will hinge on its ability to maintain its technological edge. Militarily, futureproofing the comparative advantage of Allied forces will depend on a common policy basis and digital backbone to ensure interoperability and accordance with international law. With the fusion of human, information, and physical elements increasingly determining decisive advantage in the battlespace, interoperability becomes all the more essential. Further, as competitors and potential adversaries invest in AI for military purposes, ensuring that Allies develop common responses to ensure their collective security will only become more urgent.

With the formal adoption of the NATO AI Strategy, Allies have committed to the necessary cooperation and collaboration to meet these very challenges in both defence and security, naming NATO as the primary transatlantic forum. The aim of NATO’s AI Strategy is to accelerate AI adoption by enhancing key AI enablers and adapting policy, including by adopting Principles of Responsible Use for AI and by safeguarding against threats from malicious use of AI by state and non-state actors.

By acting collectively through NATO, Allied governments also ensure a continued focus on interoperability and the development of common standards. Overall, with innovation ecosystems implicating different actors and faster technology lifecycles than typically included in traditional capability development systems, the NATO AI Strategy is also a recognition that exploitation of AI will require new efforts to foster and leverage the Alliance’s innovation potential, including through new partnerships and mechanisms. Taken together, these efforts will in turn strengthen the Alliance’s ability to pursue cooperative security efforts and to engage with international partners and other international organisations on matters of international security.

#### AI is the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence. Military applications of AI include tracking and engaging targets.

Edward Hunter Christie 3-31-2022, former Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit, Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Founder of AI Policy Consulting, and author of NATO’s Artificial Intelligence White Paper, "Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe", SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/17816858221089372, DL

Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence—for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions or taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems (Reding and Eaton 2020, 14).

The range of potential military applications is at least as vast as the range of tasks that require human cognition, for example analysing and classifying visual data, organising logistics, operating support vehicles, or tracking and engaging hostile targets (Christie 2021b, 84). States are racing to achieve superiority in the AI domain (Lin-Greenberg 2020). Furthermore, like other digital technologies, AI diffuses rapidly and cheaply across areas of human activity and across borders. Nevertheless, as with other technological transformations, states with greater resources and levels of effort, and better policies, will reap the benefits of technology adoption more rapidly than others.

In an alliance context, matters pertaining to cooperation and interoperability take centre stage. The good news is that Europeans are not starting from scratch. European states that are members of NATO can rely on decades of experience with the Alliance’s mechanisms of consultation and collaboration. In addition, European states that are members of the EU can pursue collaborative activities through the European Defence Agency (EDA). Furthermore, EU funding is available through the European Defence Fund for defence research and capability-development activities.

### 2AC – AT: Not Semi-Autonomous

#### AI includes semi-autonomous systems.

Rieder et al April 2020, Travis Rieder, Director of the Master of Bioethics degree program and Assistant Director for Education Initiatives at Johns Hopkins, Brian Hutler, political philosopher and legal theorist and Hecht-Levi fellow, Debra J H Mathews, Assistant Director for Science Programs for the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics, "Artificial Intelligence in Service of Human Needs: Pragmatic First Steps Toward an Ethics for Semi-Autonomous Agents", PubMed, https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32228385/, DL

The ethics of robots and artificial intelligence (AI) typically centers on "giving ethics" to as-yet imaginary AI with human-levels of autonomy in order to protect us from their potentially destructive power. It is often assumed that to do that, we should program AI with the true moral theory (whatever that might be), much as we teach morality to our children. This paper argues that the focus on AI with human-level autonomy is misguided. The robots and AI that we have now and in the near future are "semi-autonomous" in that their ability to make choices and to act is limited across a number of dimensions. Further, it may be morally problematic to create AI with human-level autonomy, even if it becomes possible. As such, any useful approach to AI ethics should begin with a theory of giving ethics to semi-autonomous agents (SAAs). In this paper, we work toward such a theory by evaluating our obligations to and for "natural" SAAs, including nonhuman animals and humans with developing and diminished capacities. Drawing on research in neuroscience, bioethics, and philosophy, we identify the ways in which AI semi-autonomy differs from semi-autonomy in humans and nonhuman animals. We conclude on the basis of these comparisons that when giving ethics to SAAs, we should focus on principles and restrictions that protect human interests, but that we can only permissibly maintain this approach so long as we do not aim at developing technology with human-level autonomy.

#### AI enables both autonomous engagement/semi-autonomous weapons and fully autonomous weapons. PGMs fall under autonomous engagement.

BAE Systems, international defense, aerospace and security company, "What is Autonomous Engagement?", https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/definition/autonomous-engagement, DL

Autonomous Engagement is a weapons system’s technological ability to identify, engage, and destroy an identified target without human intervention, based on specific targets or aim designations chosen by human operators.

This is often referred to as “fire and forget,” a capability that has been continuously evolving for more than 70 years. U.S. weapon systems have been flying with autonomous functionality since the 1940s, with levels of self-governed capabilities, including target identification, target cueing, target prioritization, and terminal guidance increasing over time. To be clear, however, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has long classified these weapons systems as semi-autonomous or not autonomous, because they require human involvement in identifying and choosing their intended target or group of targets.

Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have paved the way for more accurate target detection, recognition, and discrimination, leading to improved and more autonomous weapons system targeting effectiveness. Completely autonomous capability removes the technological need for human-in-the-loop (HITL) and human-on-the-loop (HOTL) decision-making, which makes sense because human decision-making and communication cannot match the short time scales – measured in seconds – required for terminal homing. Weapons equipped with autonomous engagement capabilities become even more valuable when employed in collaborative weapons operations, enabling target sharing, target attack prioritization, and coordinated strike capabilities to overwhelm enemy defenses. While there are still ethical considerations about pushing human decision-making further out of “the loop,” the DoD and allies also must consider that against significant pushes into AI-directed autonomous weapons by near-peer potential rivals of the U.S., including China and Russia.

Why is Autonomous Engagement important?

When activated, munitions and guided-weapon systems progress through an orchestrated sequence of actions from launch to target engagement, including navigation, target acquisition, target identification and tracking, target prioritization, and terminal homing to target impact. This set of actions is often called the “detect to engage” sequence or the “kill chain.” With deployment in increasingly contested operational settings, including anti-access/aerial denial (A2AD) regions and degraded communication environments, weapons systems must be able to execute their missions with limited in-flight communication. Recent technological advances in sensors, processing hardware, and data processing, including automated target detection and AI have enabled weapons systems to be more capable, more autonomous, and more precise than ever before.

Who uses Autonomous Engagement?

Various levels of autonomous engagement capabilities are built into weapons systems deployed by every major country in the world, and many smaller countries, even if only for defensive purposes. Modern weapons systems are computer controlled, so especially considering today’s smaller and smaller digital systems, combat control systems using autonomous engagement can be on the ground, in the air, at sea, and basically anywhere a country needs them to be. The bigger question lies in what levels of sophistication a force’s autonomous engagement system is using. Out-of-date autonomous engagement systems can make a pilot, a captain, or even an entire fighting force vulnerable to threats if its sensors cannot detect, identify, and track targets accurately or quickly enough. Since they are also likely to fire less accurately, they may not only miss targets, but also may inflict unintended collateral damage such as on a civilian aircraft or urban streetscape. With that in mind, dramatic advances in the accuracy of recent autonomous systems make it inexplicable for countries to not update their autonomous engagement technologies.

What systems are Autonomous Engagement used on?

Weapons systems using Autonomous Engagement vary by country, platform, and reach, but include:

Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs)

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)

Networked Collaborative Weapons

Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPFs)

Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS)

Brilliant Anti-Armor Technology (BAT) submunitions

Wind-Corrected Munition Dispenser (WCMD)

Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS)

## CP

### 2AC – AT: DoS CP

#### Arms sales are security cooperation – if they’re right that they’re also security assistance, permutation do the counterplan.

DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, <https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-customer-guide/security-cooperation-overview>, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

The U.S. conducts Security Cooperation business with over 200 countries and international organizations around the world. We typically refer to specific Security Cooperation activities, such as sales of defense articles and services, as “programs” and conduct them under two primary U.S. legislative authorities: The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C 2151 et seq.). Under these authorities, there are several methods available to provide foreign partners with U.S. defense articles and services. The most commonly used method is Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - but other alternatives might also be available to meet your country’s requirements. For any given purchase your country may be considering, there are benefits, limitations, and trade-offs associated with each of these methods.

#### DoD is key to technical expertise, pricing, and delivery.

DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, <https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-customer-guide/security-cooperation-overview>, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

The U.S. conducts Security Cooperation business with over 200 countries and international organizations around the world. We typically refer to specific Security Cooperation activities, such as sales of defense articles and services, as “programs” and conduct them under two primary U.S. legislative authorities: The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.), as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C 2151 et seq.). Under these authorities, there are several methods available to provide foreign partners with U.S. defense articles and services. The most commonly used method is Foreign Military Sales (FMS) - but other alternatives might also be available to meet your country’s requirements. For any given purchase your country may be considering, there are benefits, limitations, and trade-offs associated with each of these methods.

FMS is a program that allows your government to purchase defense articles and services as well as design and construction services, from the U.S. Government (USG). This program is operated on a “no-profit” and “no-loss” basis to the USG and requires an authorized representative from your government to submit a Letter of Request (LOR) to the USG for the desired defense articles and services.

Under FMS, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) procures defense articles and services for your country using the same acquisition process used to procure for its own military needs. This acquisition process is governed by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). You, the foreign purchaser, benefit from U.S. DoD technical and operational expertise, procurement infrastructure, and purchasing practices. Your country also benefits from the lower unit costs that result when the U.S. DoD is able to combine your purchase with one of its own to achieve greater economy of scale. In addition, the U.S. DoD ensures your purchase takes into consideration all of the necessary training, support, and sustainment to give you the lasting operational capability you seek, known as the “Total Package Approach”. Finally, a major FMS program increases your country’s interoperability with U.S. military forces, creating potential opportunities for joint training, joint exercises, cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations.

FMS requires a government-to-government agreement, known as a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) and also referred to as an “FMS case”. When your U.S. counterparts speak of “writing a case”, they are talking about drafting an LOA. The LOA is written by the USG and must be formally accepted by your government. The LOA specifies the items and services to be provided to your country and an estimated cost and timeframe for doing so. The USG may supply items from its own stocks or it may enter into a contract with a defense contractor to obtain the items on your behalf. Any contracts with U.S. defense contractors, if needed, will be written by the USG using standard USG competitive contracting procedures, to include robust oversight and auditing. The contract will be between the USG and the U.S. defense contractor. The USG then provides the equipment or service to your country as agreed in the government-to-government LOA. FMS customers are not legal participants in the procurement contract.

#### DoD key to training.

DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, <https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-customer-guide/security-cooperation-overview>, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

Training is a key element of successfully operating and maintaining today’s high technology military equipment. The DoD has established training resources to support its own training needs. Under FMS, customers can access many of these training resources. Although the DoD does acquire contractor training in certain circumstances, some types of military training are simply not available through commercial sources, such as access to the DoD’s unique training ranges. On the other hand, the customer may require some form of tailored training that is not available from the DoD.

#### That’s key

Gibbons-Neff 22 – Thomas Gibbons-Neff is the Kabul bureau chief and a former Marine infantryman. (Thomas Gibbons-Neff, "Potent Weapons Reach Ukraine Faster Than the Know-How to Use Them," New York Times, 6-6-2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-advanced-weapons-training.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Since Russia invaded, NATO nations have upgraded Ukraine’s arsenal with increasingly sophisticated tools, with more promised, like the advanced multiple-launch rocket systems pledged by the United States and Britain.

But training soldiers how to use the equipment has become a significant and growing obstacle — one encountered daily by Junior Sgt. Dmytro Pysanka and his crew, operating an aged antitank gun camouflaged in netting and green underbrush in southern Ukraine.

Peering through the sight attached to the gun, Sergeant Pysanka is greeted with a kaleidoscope of numbers and lines that, if read correctly, should give him the calculations needed to fire at Russian forces. However, errors are common in the chaos of battle.

More than a month ago, the commanders of his frontline artillery unit secured a far more advanced tool: a high-tech, Western-supplied laser range finder to help with targeting.

But there’s a hitch: Nobody knows how to use it.

“It’s like being given an iPhone 13 and only being able to make phone calls,” said Sergeant Pysanka, clearly exasperated.

### 2AC – AT: DCS CP

#### DCS can’t solve government relations and it gets struck down.

DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, <https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-customer-guide/security-cooperation-overview>, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

DCS involves commercial contracts negotiated directly between your country and a U.S. defense contractor. DCS agreements are not administered by the USG and do not involve a government-to-government agreement. Instead, you deal with the U.S. contractor and that contractor is responsible for obtaining an export license from the Office of Defense Trade Controls, within the U.S. Department of State, to conduct each sale. The regulations for DCS are contained in the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

DCS is sometimes selected as an alternative to FMS when: a purchasing government's military requirements are significantly different from standard U.S. configurations; a purchasing government has a sufficiently sophisticated procurement staff with experience in defense systems; or when a purchasing government is seeking to establish a relationship between a U.S. manufacturer and its own domestic industry.

An extensive comparison of the advantages of FMS and DCS has been compiled and published by the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS – formerly known as DISAM) in Chapter 15 of its textbook, “The Management of Security Cooperation” - also referred to as “The Green Book”.

The U.S. DoD is generally neutral as to whether a sale should be accomplished using the FMS or the DCS process. However, as a matter of policy, the USG will not engage a potential FMS case with your country if you are already engaged in DCS discussions with a U.S. contractor. Please refer to the DSCA Policy Letter on concurrent FMS and Commercial Negotiations

There are times when the DoD requires that a purchase be accomplished through the FMS system. For example, the DoD requires all U.S. military training to be obtained through FMS. The DoD may also require defense articles to be sold “FMS-only.” Two common reasons for this are to ensure the security of sensitive technologies and the control of weapons and munitions to prevent proliferation. The cognizant U.S. MILDEP (Army, Navy, Air Force), or the U.S. manufacturer, will tell you whether or not a particular item is FMS-only.

#### DCS sales send no signal of government involvement and are more expensive – ensures smaller allies can’t afford

Kaidanow 17 – ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS. (Tina, United States Department of State, "Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy," 1-20-2017, https://2017-2021.state.gov/foreign-military-sales-process-and-policy/index.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Beyond being a government-to-government process, FMS differs from DCS in several key ways. The first is in economy-of-scale buying power. When buying through the U.S. military, a country may be able to leverage a purchase that a particular Military Service is already buying for its own use to get a cheaper unit price than they would otherwise. Alternatively, the country may be able to pool with the purchase of another country that is also working within the FMS process. This provides benefit to our Military Services and promotes our ability to build meaningful partner capacity overseas.

Another reason a country might choose to use FMS is that it may not have the capability or capacity within its government to effectively oversee the acquisition, so they are paying DoD to do it for them. DoD provides contracting support, requirements evaluation, logistics support, and works directly with the U.S. supplier. As the exporting party in a Foreign Military Sales case is the United States Government, FMS sales are exempt from the requirement for export licenses.

FMS provides what is called “the total package approach,” which includes the aforementioned services as well as sustainment, technical support, training, and software/hardware updates. The total package approach may make an FMS purchase more appear more expensive on the front end, but the country is receiving much more than a defense article.

Finally, there are many countries that appreciate the transparency that comes with the U.S. system. For them, demonstrating to its public that the acquisition is free of corruption is a significant selling point of the FMS system.

#### FMF funding requires using the FMS program

DSCU 21 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency opened the Defense Security Cooperation University in September 2019 as part of an effort to professionalize the SC workforce and to serve as the Department of Defense's Center of Excellence for the SC community. ("A Comparison of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales," 7-29-2021, https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/v41\_0/15\_Chapter.pdf?id=1, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

In instances where the USG is neutral regarding purchase by FMS or DCS, SAMM C4.3.6 permits U.S. defense firms to designate a preference that a sale of their products or services be on a DCS basis. When a company receives a request for proposal from a country and prefers a direct commercial sale, the company may request DSCA issue a DCS preference for that particular sale. Approved DCS preferences are valid for one year and are held within security cooperation offices (SCOs) and at the item-manager level to allow screening of future letters of request. If the applicable implementing agency (IA) receives a request from the purchaser for a DCS preference item, the IA notifies the purchaser of the DCS preference and advises the purchaser to contact the applicable company directly. Support of a DCS preference is a “best effort” commitment by the DoD. This means that any failure on the part of the IA to comply with the DCS preference will not invalidate any resultant FMS transaction. Items provided on blanket order lines and those required in conjunction with a system sale’s total package approach (TPA) do not normally qualify for DCS preference. Customers funding a purchase using Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds may be required to purchase by FMS. The Director, DSCA, may also recommend to the DoS that it mandate FMS for a specific sale.

#### DCS cannot send the deterrence signal

DSCU 21 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency opened the Defense Security Cooperation University in September 2019 as part of an effort to professionalize the SC workforce and to serve as the Department of Defense's Center of Excellence for the SC community. ("A Comparison of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales," 7-29-2021, https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/v41\_0/15\_Chapter.pdf?id=1, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

Under FMS, the customer is entering a direct government-to-government relationship with the USG. In fact, the customer is purchasing directly from the USG. Depending on the political climate, this arrangement can be viewed as either an advantage or a disadvantage. Some nations and international organizations desire the association implied by the FMS interaction. Other governments, where the popular view of the United States is not as positive, may desire to distance themselves from the USG and enter into a DCS arrangement with a U.S. contractor. In this situation, public opinion may view a relationship with U.S. industry more favorably than the direct government-to-government relationship inherent in FMS.

#### The aff’s arms are FMS-only – we inserted the chart

DSCU 21 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency opened the Defense Security Cooperation University in September 2019 as part of an effort to professionalize the SC workforce and to serve as the Department of Defense's Center of Excellence for the SC community. ("A Comparison of Foreign Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales," 7-29-2021, https://www.dscu.edu/documents/publications/greenbook/v41\_0/15\_Chapter.pdf?id=1, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through [https://httpstatus.io/Table

Description automatically generated](https://httpstatus.io/)

### 2AC – AT: Hotlines CP

**Hotlines fail**

**Pape, 14** — Robert A., Pape Professor of Political Science Director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism University of Chicago, 2014 (“Establishing a Workable US-China Hotline (CHILINK),” *University of Chicago*, April 30th, Available Online at <http://d3qi0qp55mx5f5.cloudfront.net/cpost/i/docs/Pape_Policy_Memo.pdf>)

In 1989, after the Tiananmen Square protests, President George Bush attempted to contact Deng Xiaoping via phone. There was no hotline in place, and the President’s call was unanswered. This incident highlighted the need for such a hotline to be established. In 1997, President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin announced an agreement to establish a presidential hotline, so that, as President Clinton said, they “may confer on a moment’s notice.” In May 1999, the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Clinton attempted to contact Chinese President Jiang Zemin, but the call was not answered, despite the fact that their presidential hotline had been made operational in 1998. This underscores the difficulty in communicating via any hotline in direct crisis situations. As a further insult to the United States, President Jiang spoke directly with Russian President Boris Yeltsin later that day on the China-Russia hotline. In February 2008 the United States and China signed a formal agreement to establish a new hotline, called the Defense Phone Link, but the agreement was negotiated and signed following 4 talks between David Sedney, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, and Chinese defense ministry official Qian Lihua. It has only been used four times. The inadequacies of these hotlines offer key insights into the construction a new hotline proposal. The 2008 hotline agreement with China arranges for a call to be routed through the Zhongnanhai telecommunications directorate, which then chooses to forward the call to the foreign affairs office within of Department of Defense, or the PLA’s command headquarters in West Beijing. The internal Chinese disconnect between the military and civilian personnel makes crisis management very difficult Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that President Hu was unaware that the PLA was carrying out a test flight of a new jet fighter in 2011, an action that could easily be misinterpreted by American foreign policy officials. The new Chinese National Security Council attempts to remedy this disconnect in authority. Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party rules dictate that the Standing Committee vote prior to conveying information to the Americans, making rapid communication between US and Chinese presidents in times of crisis very difficult. China also has a history of cutting communication during times of crisis to demonstrate anger.

### 2AC – AT: Negotiate CP

#### Negotiations fail – other allies don’t want them, Putin says no, and it greenlights further aggression

WaPo 22 – The board highlights issues it thinks are important and responds to news events, mindful of stands it has taken in previous editorials is. (Washington Post Editorial Board, "Now is not the time to seek a deal with Putin," Washington Post, 5-26-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05/26/now-is-not-time-seek-deal-with-putin/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Wars end. Many, if not most, end with negotiation. That might be what happens with the war Russia launched against Ukraine on Feb. 24, too, though one former Moscow regime member warns against urging Ukraine to negotiate while President Vladimir Putin is still bent on more conquest. “You just can’t make peace now,” Boris Bondarev, who recently resigned from his mid-level Russian Foreign Ministry post to protest the war, said in an interview with Puck. “If you do, it will be seen as a Russian victory.” That would just encourage the Putin regime to exploit a cease-fire to rearm, then resume the war, Mr. Bondarev argued: “Only a total and clear defeat that is obvious to everyone will teach them.”

Mr. Bondarev makes a compelling point. It would be a disaster — both moral and strategic — if Mr. Putin were invited to talks before his major war objectives had been thwarted. Clear enough to a junior practitioner of international affairs, this wisdom seems to escape ostensibly more seasoned figures. Former U.S. secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, that Western governments should push Ukraine into talks with Mr. Putin in the next 60 days, as well as support permanent Ukrainian territorial concessions, lest the conflict turn into a destabilizing “new war against Russia itself.” Similar thinking seems to be at work in Italy and Hungary, which are reportedly urging the European Union to advocate a cease-fire and peace talks at its summit next week. Our colleagues on the New York Times editorial board have called on President Biden to counsel Kyiv not to “chase after an illusory ‘win.’”

This remains a minority view within the Western alliance, and it should be. As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made clear at Davos: “Ukraine must win this war, and Putin’s aggression must be a strategic failure.” To be sure, the war is terribly costly — for the whole world. It must end as soon as reasonably possible. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has indicated that he will talk with Mr. Putin — as soon as Russia withdraws to the prewar lines, under which it held Crimea and a swath of additional territory. Mr. Zelensky also insists, appropriately, that a false peace would be worse than useless and that premature talk of a settlement must not undercut Ukraine’s military efforts.

As Mr. Kissinger and others rightly note, Moscow has ample means to escalate the war — not least by using nuclear weapons. Yet what’s remarkable about the past three months of war is how little appetite Mr. Putin has actually shown for confrontation with the West. NATO’s red lines, public and private, seem to be holding. Nor does Mr. Putin show signs of interest in a deal such as the one Mr. Kissinger seems to assume he would accept, as opposed to the outright seizure of all Ukraine that Mr. Putin has repeatedly openly pursued.

#### **Putin will not negotiate**

RFE 22 – RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service is dedicated to covering all of Ukraine, including the conflict zones and Crimea, and sets a standard for balanced reporting and high-impact investigative journalism. (RFE, "Putin Tells Guterres He Still Has Hope For Negotiated Agreement With Ukraine," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 4-26-2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-kreminna-russian-losses/31821314.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Putin has shown no seriousness about diplomacy to end the war despite a series of international efforts.

"We've seen no sign to date that President Putin is serious about meaningful negotiations," Blinken told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 26.

He noted that in talks with Russia ahead of the February 24 invasion it became clear that Putin's complaints about Ukraine entering NATO were only a pretext for the invasion.

"It is abundantly clear -- in President Putin's own words -- that this was never about Ukraine being potentially part of NATO and it was always about his belief that Ukraine does not deserve to be a sovereign, independent country," Blinken said.

#### Putin doesn’t care about sanctions

Simmons 22 – Anne Simmons is the Wall Street Journal's Moscow Bureau Chief. She has spent more than 25 years reporting from Europe, Africa, the Middle East and North America, and most recently was a writer/editor covering global development at the Los Angeles Times. ("Putin Blasts the West, Says Sanctions on Russia Over Ukraine Are Backfiring," WSJ, 6-17-2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctions-so-far-fail-to-dent-russias-war-effort-11655383912, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

ST. PETERSBURG, Russia—In a combative speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized the West for failing to recognize the rise of new power blocs since the end of the Cold War, and warned that its sanctions on Moscow had backfired, creating a growing economic crisis in Europe.

“The idea was clear: crush the Russian economy violently,” Mr. Putin said at the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which Russia pitches as an alternative to the World Economic Forum in Davos to drum up investment in its economy. “They did not succeed. Obviously, that didn’t happen.”

The Kremlin leader acknowledged that Russia’s economy had been buffeted since the U.S. and Europe introduced sweeping sanctions in response to its invasion of Ukraine in February. Hundreds of Western companies suspended operations or withdrew from the Russian market, while high-level political, religious and business figures were all targeted, with the goal of isolating Russia from the global financial system. Mr. Putin noted how inflation had risen to over 16%.

The sanctions have so far failed to dent Moscow’s war effort, and its economy has been bolstered by a windfall through the rising value of its energy exports, providing less of an incentive for Russia to negotiate an end to the conflict, though poverty is spreading and inflation is eroding the spending power of ordinary Russians. Mr. Putin said that Europe, in contrast, was seeing worsening economic distress from what he said were the West’s misguided policies, warning that the crisis could ultimately lead to famine in some of the world’s poorest countries.

“European countries have already served a serious blow to their own economies,” he said, pointing to what he said was an increase in food and fuel prices and the degradation of living standards in Europe. “Direct losses of the [European Union] from sanctions fever could exceed $400 billion a year…Eurozone countries aren’t conducting any special military operations and their inflation is high.”

The EU has repeatedly dismissed Russia’s claims that the West is responsible for the grain crisis, saying it is Russia that is blockading Ukraine’s ports and has destroyed grain storage sites in Ukraine. Brussels has also said its choice of economic sanctions has been guided by the principle that the measure should hurt Russia more than Europe.

Some EU leaders, like Viktor Orban, have echoed Mr. Putin’s comments. The Hungarian leader, who held up the bloc’s oil embargo decision against Russia for a month, argued that six rounds of EU sanctions on Russia have imposed equal pain on the European economy as on Russia.

Mr. Putin also accused the West of intentionally trying to undermine Russia and that the U.S., having declared victory in the Cold War, was now proclaiming itself “to be the messenger of God on Earth” and that its interests are sacred.

“They do not seem to notice that new powerful centers have formed on the planet,” the Russian leader said. “We are talking about revolutionary changes in the entire system of international relations. These changes are fundamental and pivotal.”

Mr. Putin’s remarks were delayed for almost two hours after being struck by what the Kremlin said was a cyberattack on its accreditation system. Members of the Russian business community who were attending said isolation from the West could present opportunities for collaboration with other former Soviet states, along with countries in the Middle East and China. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was present, while Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi and China’s President Xi Jinping addressed the gathering by video link.

Mr. Xi told the plenary that cooperation between China and Russia was growing, and that trade between the two countries in the first five months of the year had passed $65 billion. By the end of the year, Mr. Xi said, trade between the two countries would hit new records, demonstrating the resilience of ties between Beijing and Moscow.

Earlier in the week, the Chinese leader again offered his support for Moscow’s security concerns in his second phone call with Mr. Putin since the invasion of Ukraine.

Mr. Putin was speaking a day after the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania met with Ukrainian President

## DA

### 2AC – AT: DoD Tradeoff DA

#### Arms don’t cost money – only a net gain – at worst comes from the supercharge fund.

DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, <https://www.dsca.mil/foreign-customer-guide/security-cooperation-overview>, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) \*\*date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

By Policy, the USG does not conduct FMS for profit. By U.S. law, the USG may not incur debt on an FMS sale to your country. The LOA will require that your country pay the full cost associated with the FMS sale - which includes the cost of the defense equipment/services and any costs incurred by the USG while providing you with the defense equipment/services. We must ensure that, when the equipment or service is delivered and the case is closed, the USG has neither made a profit nor passed a debt to the U.S. taxpayer.

To build and re-build the administrative infrastructure necessary to support individual FMS cases would be a slow process and very costly to our foreign partners. Therefore, the USG maintains a standing infrastructure at the DoD level, within each of the Military Departments (MILDEPs), and within select other DoD organizations that conduct FMS. That standing infrastructure - skilled employees, information technology systems, offices, etc. - is funded by an administrative surcharge applied to every FMS case. The FMS administrative surcharge fund is managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the oversight of the DoD Comptroller.

#### More arms lower costs

Kaidanow 17 – ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS. (Tina, United States Department of State, "Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy," 1-20-2017, https://2017-2021.state.gov/foreign-military-sales-process-and-policy/index.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Arms transfers also support the U.S. defense industrial base and DoD procurement. Purchases made through the foreign military sales (FMS) system often can be combined with DoD orders to reduce unit costs for our own military; beyond this, the U.S. defense industry employs over 1.7 million people across our nation or about 3.5 million including indirect employment. These individuals and the companies they work for represent a key part of American entrepreneurship and innovation, maintaining the United States as the world leader in the defense and aerospace sectors and helping ensure our armed forces sustain their military edge.

### 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

#### Even if it’s unintended, allowing the Ukraine War to rage on risks WWIII the longer it continues

Powell 22 – Alvin Powell is a Harvard Staff Writer. (Alvin Powell, "What does Russia really want?" Harvard Gazette, 2-24-2022, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/02/what-does-russia-really-want/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

With Russian troops in full-scale assault against Ukraine, a key step for the U.S. and its NATO allies should be tripling combat-ready troops in the Baltics and NATO-allied eastern Europe to deter any thought of a Ukraine-style incursion there.

Retired Brigadier Gen. Kevin Ryan, a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, said even though it is unlikely that Russia would invade Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, their NATO membership, Lithuania’s borders with Russia-friendly Belarus, and Estonia and Latvia’s with Russia raise the stakes of a broader conflict. He said concrete steps to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin should be taken.

Ryan and other Russia experts at Harvard say that it’s difficult to predict exactly what Putin’s next move will be. But it seems likely that he will avoid taking on NATO directly as that could lead to a nuclear standoff, and so will avoid member states. Much will depend, however, on how much resistance he meets in Ukraine and how unified NATO remains through the crisis.

“Putin is not about messaging as much as he is about doing something, and we should focus more on deeds than words,” Ryan said. “It sends a message to Putin if we increase troop presence in the Baltics and Poland and so on. But more than that, the important thing would be to have those troops be combat-ready, have ammunition in a storage site nearby, have them be integrated into war plans and the defenses of those NATO countries. So, they’re not going to visit schoolchildren and have training on the weekends, they’re going there to be a valid reinforcement to the defenses that are already there.”

For the short term, however, the experts agreed, Russia is going to have its hands full with Ukraine. Russia’s larger and far superior military would likely overwhelm Ukraine’s in head-to-head combat, but it seems likely the Ukrainians will continue to offer armed resistance. Beyond that, it’s still unclear what Putin’s ultimate objectives are. Does he want to carve out territory, like the Russian-speaking eastern regions, which border Russia? He has said that he has no plans to occupy Ukraine, but will he at least try to install a Russia-friendly government?

“Ukrainians are doing the best that they can, but you can’t stop the larger, better-equipped, probably better-trained Russian army moving in on three sides from basically getting to its objective,” said Alexandra Vacroux, executive director of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. “But what are they going to do after that? We can say that there’s no way the Ukrainian army can stop them, but we can also say that there’s no way an army of even 200,000 Russian troops is going to be able to hold a country of 43 million people.”

The large cities may prove a particular problem, Vacroux said.

“The Russians learned in Chechnya the same lesson that we learned in Mosul, which is it’s extremely difficult to hold cities,” Vacroux said. “It’s gruesome and bloody and requires a huge amount of human force. I just don’t see the ‘day after’ strategy, from the Russian point of view.”

Experts said in the days and weeks to come, they’d be looking for things like how much of a fight the Ukrainian army puts up and whether they can drag the battle out and increase the Russian body count. Can the Russians take the capital of Kiev, and, if so, what happens there, both to the city itself and to the government?

Another key is the final package of sanctions from Western nations that get passed and their effect on Russia. And how well do NATO nations opposing Putin hang together? Putin, Vacroux said, has long said that the West has become weak and fractured.

“In many ways, the administration learned the lessons of the mistakes we made after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, where we impose some sanctions and nothing much happened,” Vacroux said. “The Russians concluded that they could basically do this again if they wanted. The West wasn’t going to be spending money and personnel and materiel defending Ukraine.”

Vacroux said releasing intelligence about Russia’s moves and motives, which Russia first denied and then confirmed once they were executed, removed the element of surprise and seemed to unsettle Putin. She said she was stunned how much events unspooled as predicted.

“Even if you’re expecting something, you can still be surprised by it,” Vacroux said. “I think we’re all surprised at how overwhelming the Russian invasion has been. It’s a little bit like watching a car crash happen. You can’t do anything to stop it, and you still feel terrible watching it happen.”

Experts said it is too early to know Putin’s long-range plans, but if he has designs on other nations, Moldova, which borders Ukraine to the west, and Georgia, which once also flirted with NATO membership, are possible targets. Most other countries that might otherwise be candidates — Poland and the Baltics — are already NATO members.

“If he threatens those countries, he’s threatening NATO, and he’s declaring World War III,” said Thomas Nichols, University Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an instructor at Harvard Extension School. “As reckless as Putin has become, he’s not that reckless.”

That said, once shooting starts, the threat of the crisis escalating into nuclear war, while remote, nonetheless exists. Both the U.S. and Russia have a history of signaling with their nuclear-capable forces, as Putin did in the days leading up to the invasion by conducting nuclear force drills. The message, Nichols said, was don’t send NATO forces into Ukraine, or Russia, for that matter.

Though the U.S. has the more powerful military overall, Nichols said it’s something like comparing apples and oranges, since the Russian military is a large, mostly land-based force, while the U.S. military is designed to project force far from home. The danger of a nuclear war between the two nations — Russian nukes could obliterate the Northern Hemisphere if it came to that — almost makes the differences in their conventional forces beside the point.

Historically, experts said there are similar examples of heading to the brink from the past: the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when it was the U.S. that ran nuclear drills to keep the Soviet Union from intervening in the Middle East; the Cuban Missile Crisis, which this conflict, from a nuclear confrontation standpoint, doesn’t yet approach; even the Korean War, which began when Stalin gave the North Koreans permission to try to take the whole country. It was only a few years ago when Turkey shot down a Russian jet over the Syrian border, which both countries decided not to escalate. Nichols asked: What happens now, however, amid heightened tensions, if Russia shoots down a German or Dutch jet on Ukraine’s border?

“We’re not there yet,” Nichols said of comparisons to the Cuban Missile Crisis. “But I also admit to having kind of a pit, a lump in my stomach. We’re talking about the biggest war in Europe since World War II and anytime you put this many troops in motion, bad things, unintended things can happen. That’s what really worries me, is that this becomes a bigger crisis by accident.”

#### Assume the worst, hope for the best – Putin wants more than Ukraine

Palacio 22 – Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a visiting professor at the Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors. (Ana Palacio, "Not just Ukraine: Putin wants to remake the world," Atlantic Council, 2-25-2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/not-just-ukraine-putin-wants-to-remake-the-world/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his reasoning for the “special military operation” in a Monday speech littered with contrived grievances and a self-serving perversion of history. Putin’s address can only be characterized as unhinged and reminiscent of the worst Soviet-era propaganda in which white is black and the aggressor is a victim. He proclaimed the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, regions in eastern Ukraine held by Kremlin-backed rebels. He negated Ukraine’s sovereignty, culture, and identity.

Then on Thursday, announcing the start of the invasion, he described Ukraine’s government as an illegitimate junta and the country’s turn away from Moscow since the Maidan square protests of 2014 as the outcome of a coup orchestrated by the West. If the world wasn’t staring at a great tragedy, Putin’s bizarre tone and awkward efforts to project (forced) consensus through a televised meeting of the country’s security council would have been stunning political theater.

Experts have been cautioning of a new Cold War for months. Russia’s military offensive marks the launch of an era vastly different from the security landscape of the second half of the twentieth century. The West must confront the ways in which it will be impacted.

Beyond Ukraine and NATO, Europe must be vigilant about the Kremlin’s growing influence in the Sahel and Latin America; and its use of cyberspace for interference, disinformation, and the manipulation of Western public opinion. Apart from the severe tremors already being felt across energy and financial markets and in international trade, Western Europe should brace itself for an inevitable rush of refugees.

For the most part, concerns about Moscow’s intentions (that are now confirmed) have until now fallen on deaf ears in Southern Europe, where Russia has traditionally enjoyed empathy. Without a history of direct confrontation with Russia, it has been easy for the region to hold onto romantic notions. This, despite a series of close historical parallels to the current crisis: the July Crisis of 1914 that led to World War I, Hitler’s occupation of the Sudetenland, the spheres of influence created by the Yalta Conference, the Cold War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Most analyses of Russia’s behavior focus exclusively on Putin—what he thinks or wants, his temperament and personality. What’s missing is a more profound assessment of broader Russian society that decodes the social contract between citizens and the country’s autocratic leadership. Regardless of whether they agree with Putin’s description of the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century,” Russians share a nostalgia for their nation’s past greatness and global power.

So we must recognize the alternative reality that has come to characterize a significant percentage of Russian society, from its litany of grievances to the twisted perspective on historic events that guides Moscow’s willingness to disregard international law. It’s a feeling of being slighted that goes back all the way to Catherine the Great. As evidence, Russians point to the “inadequate” recognition of their role in defeating Nazi Germany. More recently, Russians often blame the country’s economic chaos of the 1990s to the West’s determination to “bring Moscow to its knees.” These views are, of course, not unanimous, and there is evidence of opposition to the current conflict—as seen in the antiwar protests that reportedly led to nearly 1,400 arrests across Russia on Thursday.

But this biased—when not totally false—retelling of history now has a foreign audience too, as Russia adeptly leverages tools like its gas and the bot armies that we see marching through social networks beyond its borders. Russia Today (RT), the country’s key, government-sponsored foreign (televised) weapon, is central to those goals, and its importance is unlikely to diminish as the Kremlin seeks to consolidate its malicious presence in other theaters, such as Africa and Latin America. Russia’s diplomatic advances in countries like Nicaragua, Venezuela, Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina—many of which have had complicated relations with the United States and, consequently, are particularly susceptible—has allowed it to embed military technical advisors there.

As for cyber warfare, the United States has long been worried about attacks on its critical infrastructure: US President Joe Biden and Putin even held a bilateral summit including discussions on this subject last June. We in Europe should take note. The virtual world bears the imprint of our free societies and holds the potential to empower people. However, it can also serve as the West’s Achilles’ heel. Too often, our cyber defense is woefully inadequate. Individual countries and the European Union (EU) need to shore up the security of companies and other organizations—especially those involved with critical infrastructure. The cyber defense of NATO—and of the West in general—is also paramount.

The Kremlin routinely cites the Iraq War and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to counter questions about its violations of international law. Even though there’s no legitimate comparison between Kosovo and the Donbas (and Putin’s claims of a genocide in Donetsk and Luhansk are fabricated), “whataboutism” continues to define Russia’s official narrative and shape public opinion.

Amid what threatens to become an extended conflict in Ukraine, the West must be clear-eyed about its approach to Russia. Putin has attacked the very foundations of the European security order with an intent to demolish it. He aims to recreate a sphere of influence by turning Ukraine and Belarus into buffer states. There’s a real risk that the Baltic states, which are members of both NATO and the EU, could also get pulled into this crisis. We would be mistaken to follow in British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s footsteps of appeasement from the 1930s, hoping that Putin’s ambition is limited to Europe. Ultimately, it is the international liberal order and its norms that he is after.

With recent attempts to constructively engage with Moscow failing, the West’s priority should be to strengthen its deterrence and defense, while building its resilience. It’s going to be needed.

#### Ukraine loses now but the aff solves it

DePetris 22 – Daniel DePetris is a foreign affairs columnist for Newsweek and a fellow at Defense Priorities, a thinktank that advocates for restraint in foreign interventions. ("The war in Ukraine has entered a new, and more difficult, phase," 6-23-2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/23/the-war-in-ukraine-has-entered-a-new-and-more-difficult-phase, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Wars are a series of twists and turns. Momentum can shift and quickly alter fortunes on the battlefield, and intangible elements like leadership and motivation can shred the assessments of the most seasoned military analysts. Military campaigns that look promising initially can, over time, turn into quagmire, as mistakes accumulate, terrain changes and the adversary alters its tactics. The war in Ukraine is a textbook case in point.

During the war’s first two months, the Ukrainian army proved to be formidable, courageous and highly innovative against a better-armed Russian foe, which military experts had almost unanimously expected would prevail. A day after Russia’s invasion began, the US intelligence community was concerned that Russian forces would capture Kyiv in a matter of days. Vladimir Putin probably assumed a quick and relatively painless operation.

As it turned out, the Russian army, which had not conducted a major ground invasion since the calamitous war in Afghanistan four decades ago, resembled a disorganized horde of amateurs. Supply lines, stretched to the breaking point, doomed Russia’s attempt to overrun Kyiv; miles-wide Russian armored columns were stalled on the road, empty of fuel. There were reports of low morale, unforced surrenders, even desertion in the Russian ranks. Ukrainian troops, by contrast, proved to be fierce, committed fighters who deftly used the urban terrain to ambush Russian tanks, turning them into burnt-out husks. As many as 15,000 Russian soldiers may have been killed in the first month of the war.

Yet not only have the Russians persisted despite embarrassing defeats, they’ve adapted to these setbacks. While some commentators suggested that Russia’s withdrawal from the Kyiv, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Sumy regions in early April illustrated the systemic weaknesses of the Russian army, those retreats turned out to be just another phase in the war – one that has turned out to be far less favorable, and much more brutal, to the Ukrainians.

Since the slow, grueling and methodical Russian capture of Mariupol in May, the war’s momentum has, unevenly and incrementally, shifted in Russia’s favor. While Russian forces continue to sustain severe casualties and losses of equipment, including more than 760 tanks and 185 artillery pieces, unrelenting Russian artillery fire is gradually grinding down Ukrainian forces and reportedly even eroding morale.

How has Russia learned from its errors in the initial stage of the war? First, instead of trying to attack all of Ukraine from multiple angles, a gambit that strained supply lines and left troops exposed to attacks from the rear, it has focused its campaign on Ukraine’s east, using long-range artillery, air and missile strikes on a massive scale against a smaller range of targets. The Russians have also been willing to destroy large parts of towns in order to seize or surround them. The agile urban fighting that the Ukrainian army excelled at is minimized in the Donbas, whose relatively flat terrain favors armored warfare, airpower and missiles. These weapons, as well as the ratio of soldiers there, favor Russia by a wide margin.

In Sievierodonetsk, Russian tactics – which often destroy entire urban districts before sending in ground troops – have presented Ukrainian commanders with a conundrum: retreat and live to fight another day, or stand their ground and possibly see some of their best troops killed or captured. The outlook for Ukraine in Sievierodonetsk looks grim at best and preordained at worst. About 70% of the city is now under Russian control, and US defense officials assess that Russia could take all of Luhansk within weeks.

Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his advisers seem to believe that with enough time, heavy weaponry, economic aid and political commitment from Ukraine’s western partners, its army can turn the tide and nullify the Russian military’s recent gains. While Kyiv insists that diplomacy is the only way the war can end, Zelenskiy himself has declared that any peace talks with Moscow will have to wait until after Russian forces withdraw to pre-24 February lines.

Yet at a time when Russia has captured as much as a fifth of Ukraine’s territory, Zelenskiy’s stance may become less and less tenable. Russian forces will not voluntarily vacate territory they have captured at such great cost simply to begin a negotiation on ending the war, not least because Putin now sees the momentum favoring his forces. In fact, the Kremlin seems to be digging in for a long-term presence. In parts of Russian-occupied territory, like the Kherson oblast, rumors of a referendum incorporating the area into Russia are prevalent. In the cities of Kherson and Melitopol, Russian passports are being handed out to residents, hardly a sign that Russia is thinking about pulling out.

If Russian troops hunker down behind heavily fortified lines and Putin, in an effort to sow disunity among Ukraine’s western backers, declares an end to his “special military operation”, Ukrainian forces will face the much harder task of evicting Russian troops from territories in which they are well ensconced.

To do that, Ukraine will require the sorts of weapons it lacks in significant numbers. Ukraine’s military will, in short, have to build up the capacity for a large-scale offensive – and at a time when it is losing many of its most battle-tested soldiers. As many as 200 Ukrainian troops are dying in combat every day – that’s 6,000 a month. These casualty numbers would be difficult to sustain for any army, let alone one engaged in a high-intensity, bloody war of attrition against a foe with an advantage in firepower.

Ukraine must also reckon with the prospect that Putin will respond to its efforts to claw back lost land with air and missile attacks intended to add to the colossal economic damage Ukraine has already sustained – as much as $600bn and, as early as March, $100bn in damaged or destroyed infrastructure alone, according to the UN.

Ukraine’s military success is inextricably linked to continued US and European arms shipments. Washington alone has sent more than $5bn in military equipment to Kyiv since the war began and is on track to ship four Himars long-range rocket systems, 15,000 artillery shells, 1,00 more Javelin anti-tank missiles and five counter-battery radars as part of the latest tranche of weaponry.

But the longer the war proceeds, the greater the likelihood the west will lose some of its unity against Russia, especially as soaring energy prices, rising inflation, and worries about a recession lead western politicians to focus on the home front. Even today, there is some dissension in the west about what the objectives in Ukraine should be. In contrast to the leaders of the Baltic states, Poland, and the United Kingdom, the French president, Emmanuel Macron, and German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, are not committed to ensuring that Russia is defeated militarily, and the Italian prime minister, Mario Draghi, has proposed a peace framework, with an immediate ceasefire at the top of the agenda.

Will this divide, deepened by Ukraine fatigue, grow as the war proceeds, Ukraine’s victories become fewer and less frequent, and the economies of Europe and the United States face increasing economic headwinds? None of this is foreordained. But it would be foolish not to recognize that the war in Ukraine has entered a new, more difficult phase – not just because of events on the battlefield but also due to economic and political trends in countries that have been Ukraine’s biggest supporters.

#### Letting Ukraine lose will NOT solve Russia

Stanovaya 22 – Tatiana Stanovaya is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Tatiana Stanovaya, "What The West (Still) Gets Wrong About Putin," Foreign Policy, 6-1-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/01/putin-war-ukraine-west-misconceptions/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Imagine a situation where Ukraine accepts most of Russia’s demands: It recognizes Crimea as Russian and the Donbas as independent, commits to a slimmed-down army, and promises to never join NATO. Will that end the conflict? Even if, to many, the answer appears to be an obvious “yes,” they are incorrect. Russia may be locked in a battle with Ukraine, but geopolitically, it sees itself as waging war against the West on Ukrainian territory. In the Kremlin, Ukraine is seen as an anti-Russian weapon in Western hands—and destroying it will not automatically lead to Russia’s victory in this anti-Western geopolitical game. For Putin, this war is not between Russia and Ukraine—and Ukrainian leadership is not an independent actor but a Western tool that must be neutralized.

So, whatever concessions Ukraine could make (regardless of how politically realistic they may be), Putin will continue escalating the war until the West changes its approach to the so-called Russian problem and admits that—as Putin sees it—the roots of Russian aggression are the result of Washington ignoring Russian geopolitical concerns for 30 years. This has been Putin’s real objective for a long time, and it remains unchanged. Unrealistic Russian demands rejected by Kyiv are even a way for the Kremlin to increase the stakes in a Russia-West confrontation, testing the West’s ability to stay united and consistent. The West today is looking at the problem in the wrong light: In seeking to stop Russia’s war, it focuses on Moscow’s artificial pretexts for its invasion of Ukraine and overlooks Putin’s obsession with the so-called Western threat as well as his readiness to use escalation to coerce the West into a dialogue on Russian terms. Ukraine is only a hostage.

#### Backing down enables more Russian aggression NOT the other way around – endless war

Applebaum 22 – Anne Applebaum is a staff writer at The Atlantic. (Anne Applebaum, "The War Won’t End Until Putin Loses," Atlantic, 5-23-2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/why-ukraine-must-defeat-putin-russia/629940/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

The third assumption is that this Ukrainian government, or any Ukrainian government, is politically able to swap territory for peace. To do so would be to reward Russia for invading, and to accept that Russia has the right to kidnap leaders, murder civilians, rape women, and deport anybody it chooses from Ukrainian territory. What Ukrainian president or prime minister can agree to that deal and expect to stay in office? Russian cruelty also means that any territory that is temporarily ceded will, sooner or later, become the source of an insurgency, because no Ukrainian population can promise to endure that kind of torture indefinitely. Already, guerrillas in the city of Melitopol, occupied since the first days of the war, claim to have killed several Russian officers and carried out acts of sabotage. An underground is emerging in occupied Kherson and will appear in other places too. To concede territory for a deal now will simply set up another conflict later on. The end of one kind of violence will lead to other kinds of violence.

This does not mean that the war can or should go on forever, or that diplomacy has no place at all. Nor does it mean that Americans and Europeans should be blind to the real challenges that a long conflict will pose to Ukraine. The Western coalition backing Kyiv could certainly fray; the wave of adrenaline that has so far propelled the Ukrainian army and leadership could crash. Ukraine’s economy could grow worse, making the fight much harder or even impossible to sustain.

But even so, off-ramp remains the wrong metaphor and the wrong goal. The West should not aim to offer Putin an off-ramp; our goal, our endgame, should be defeat. In fact, the only solution that offers some hope of long-term stability in Europe is rapid defeat, or even, to borrow Macron’s phrase, humiliation. In truth, the Russian president not only has to stop fighting the war; he has to conclude that the war was a terrible mistake, one that can never be repeated. More to the point, the people around him—leaders of the army, the security services, the business community—have to conclude exactly the same thing. The Russian public must eventually come to agree too.

Defeat could take several forms. It might be military: The White House should now increase not just the level but the speed of its assistance to Ukraine; it should provide the long-range weapons needed to take back occupied territory and perhaps also assistance with quicker distribution of those weapons. Defeat could be economic, taking the form of a temporary gas-and-oil embargo that finally cuts Russia off from the source of its income, lasting at least until the war ends. Defeat could involve the creation of a new security architecture, one based on new kinds of security guarantees for Ukraine, or even some type of NATO membership for Ukraine. Whatever form that takes, it has to be substantially different from the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine was offered security “assurances” that meant nothing at all.

Defeat could also include broader sanctions, not just on a few select billionaires but on the entire Russian political class. The Anti-Corruption Foundation led by the jailed Russian dissident Alexei Navalny has drawn up a list of 6,000 “bribe-takers and warmongers”—that is, politicians and bureaucrats who have enabled the war and the regime. The European Parliament has already called for sanctions on that group. If others follow, maybe some in the ruling elite will finally be persuaded to start looking for new jobs, or at least start talking about how to make changes.

Although saying so is considered undiplomatic, the American administration clearly knows that the defeat, sidelining, or removal of Putin is the only outcome that offers any long-term stability in Ukraine and the rest of Europe. “Putin,” said Joe Biden in March, “cannot remain in power.” In April, Lloyd Austin said that he hoped “to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” Both of these statements by the American president and his defense secretary were treated as gaffes or as policy mistakes—thoughtless remarks that might irritate the Russians. In truth, they were half-articulated acknowledgments of an ugly reality that no one wants to confront: Any cease-fire that allows Putin to experience any kind of victory will be inherently unstable, because it will encourage him to try again. Victory in Crimea did not satisfy the Kremlin. Victory in Kherson will not satisfy the Kremlin either.

I understand those who fear that, confronted with an impending loss, Putin will seek to use chemical or nuclear weapons; I worried the same at the start of the war. But the retreats from Kyiv and Kharkiv indicate that Putin is not irrational after all. He understands perfectly well that NATO is a defensive alliance, because he has accepted the Swedish and Finnish applications without quibbling. His generals make calculations and weigh costs. They were perfectly capable of understanding that the price of Russia’s early advances was too high. The price of using tactical nuclear weapons would be far higher: They would achieve no military impact but would destroy all of Russia’s remaining relationships with India, China, and the rest of the world. There is no indication right now that the nuclear threats so frequently mentioned by Russian propagandists, going back many years, are real.

By contrast, a true defeat could force the reckoning that should have happened in the 1990s, the moment when the Soviet Union broke up but Russia retained all of the trappings and baubles of the Soviet empire—its UN seat, embassies, diplomatic service—at the expense of the other ex-Soviet republics. The year 1991 was the moment when Russians should have realized the folly of Moscow’s imperial overreach, when they should have figured out why so many of their neighbors hate and fear them. But the Russian public learned no such lesson. Within a decade, Putin, brimming with grievances, had convinced many of them that the West and the rest of the world owed them something, and that further conquests were justified.

Military loss could create a real opening for national self-examination or for a major change, as it so often has done in Russia’s past. Only failure can persuade the Russians themselves to question the sense and purpose of a colonial ideology that has repeatedly impoverished and ruined their own economy and society, as well as those of their neighbors, for decades. Yet another frozen conflict, yet another temporary holding pattern, yet another face-saving compromise will not end the pattern of Russian aggression or bring permanent peace.

#### Status quo is enabling further Russian expansion

Zagorodnyuk 22 – Andriy Zagorodnyuk is a former Ukrainian defence minister and chair of thinktank the Centre for Defense Strategies in Kyiv. (Guardian, "Ukraine is desperate for peace, but we won’t sign up to a bogus Russian deal," 6-3-2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/03/ukraine-peace-bogus-russian-deal-surrendering-territory-russia-terrible, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Many armed conflicts do end with a compromise, but it would be illogical to assume all of them should. The only reason for this invasion was Putin’s obsession with subjugating Ukraine. What compromise is possible when your adversary’s goal is that you should not exist? The unspeakably brutal way in which Russians treat our occupied towns and villages is known throughout the world. True peace can only be secured when the invader leaves our country.

As the old saying has it, the night is darkest just before the dawn. Russia is now applying maximum available force, but the evidence of 1960s tanks being dusted off for battle, use of conscripts and the patching up of new military units without collective training demonstrate that it has exhausted its options. That is why Russia is pushing the idea of a compromise. It needs a pause to show gains to the Russian public and to give itself time to recover before moving on further with its attempt to subjugate Ukraine.

Ukraine’s forces are more efficient than Russia’s. With more equipment and ammunition, pushing Russia back and out of the country is a realistic prospect. The flow of western help is only beginning and will increase. Putin’s desperate attempts to intercept the supplies from the west by bombing rail lines and fuel depots are strikingly similar to Hitler’s attempts to attack allied convoys in the Atlantic. But they are failing to affect the overall situation, and equipment is successfully getting to the frontline. US weapons from the unprecedented $40bn aid package, which we expect will include much-needed multiple rocket launch systems, will start arriving soon.

The free world has decided to stop accepting Russia’s bullying behaviour, but it must be consistent in its application of that approach. For many years, western leaders tolerated Russian aggression: invading Georgia; invading Ukraine; occupying Crimea; occupying the Black Sea; carrying out targeted assassinations in the UK; carrying out cyber-attacks; allegedly meddling with elections; abusing human rights. Every time it was said: “It is Russia. It has always been like that.”

Ukraine must negotiate from a position of strength. But the world’s attention is fading

It is time to stop accepting such injustices. How often have people been told to tolerate something because “it has always been like this”? Racial discrimination, sexual abuse, domestic violence, corruption, social inequality and organised crime have been endemic in societies. The only time things have changed is when people have challenged the old ways and refused to accept them any more.

#### Russia is a revisionist power using NATO as an excuse for expansion

Chupryna 22 – Oleg Chupryna is PhD student at the Centre for European and Eurasian Studies. (Oleg Chupryna, "The Truth behind the Myth of Russia ‘Threatened’ by NATO," Balkan Insight, 4-1-2022, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/06/22/the-truth-behind-the-myth-of-russia-threatened-by-nato/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

So what’s the real reason for Russia’s aggressive anti-Western politics?

It sits in plain view, if one takes the time to read the speeches, interviews or articles of Putin and other public figures in Russia.

Russia’s revanchist rhetoric takes in not just the former Soviet Union’s subjects but those of the Tsarist Russian empire too; It seeks to drag into Russia’s sphere of dominance Central and Eastern Europe and Finland too, while weakening or breaking up the EU and NATO.

In this context, one must not forget the centuries of Russian expansion, starting when the tiny Duchy of Moskovy devoured lands around it to become an enormous empire that at its height occupied a fifth part of the planet’s dry land.

It is also worth remembering that the Kremlin’s actions speak louder than its words.

Ukraine is not the first of Russia’s neighbours to be invaded. The Kremlin has repeatedly demonstrated its neo-imperialists intentions since the early 1990s, whether directly, as it in the cases of Transnistria in the 1990s, Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, or indirectly such as in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 1990s and Ukraine’s Donbas since 2014.

In Ukraine, Russia is committing atrocities similar to those it perpetrated in the 1990s in Chechnya – wide-scale, indiscriminate bombing of residential areas in Ukraine’s predominantly Russian-speaking cities of Mariupol, Kharkiv and others and the torture, rape, and mass murder of hundreds of Ukrainian civilians again reveal the true nature of the contemporary Russian regime and society.

This alone and without doubt debunks all of Russia’s false allegations regarding NATO’s alleged threat to its security. Russia itself remains an ‘evil empire’. Constantly threatening to use weapons of mass destruction, it remains a deadly threat to its neighbours, to freedom, and to the whole of humanity.

#### Ukraine is the tip of the iceberg – Russia is on something

Kapetas 22 – Anastasia Kapetas is the National Security Editor at The Strategist. (Anastasia Kapetas, "Why Putin might be pleased with the results of his war in Ukraine," Strategist, 6-9-2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-putin-might-be-pleased-with-the-results-of-his-war-in-ukraine/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

As we reflect on the 100-day mark of the Russo-Ukrainian war and what we’ve learned, we need to understand that the West has fundamentally misunderstood Russia and continues to do so, argues Kyle Wilson, visiting fellow at the Centre for European Studies and former Australian diplomat who had postings in Russia, China and Poland.

This is why many in the commentariat are failing to appreciate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is probably happy with how his invasion of Ukraine is turning out, he says.

The Western foreign policy community has assumed for a long time that Russia under Putin had similar notions of what it means to be a world power, had more or less accepted the rules of the post–World War II international order, and was moving—albeit with setbacks—on a similar neo-liberal economic trajectory.

But, argues Wilson, something completely different has been going on in Putin’s mind. He has only been marginally interested in building stability and prosperity as the West would understand it. Rather, his entire project has been about building Russia’s ability to be a coercive, expansionist and undeniably great power, with control concentrated in the hands of one person.

The Russian translation of ‘great power’ is velikaya derzhava, the second part of which is a cognate of a verb that means to seize or to hold, and Putin’s worldview represents a continuum of Russia’s imperial mythos.

Wilson points to the work of historian Stephen Kotkin, who has calculated that, over a period of about 450 years, Russia expanded outwards at a rate of 100 to 150 square kilometres a day, in the process engulfing 184 different nationalities or ethnic groups.

And that expansion continues, Wilson says: Russia now claims roughly half of the Arctic.

This imperial worldview has always been in evidence, he says.

For example, in 2005, Putin established a commission to rewrite Russian history textbooks. ‘It produced a textbook for history teachers. In that book was the remarkable paragraph that said most of the Russian politically conscious class rejects the present boundaries of the Russian Federation. They are inadequate to protect Russia’s security.’

Then, in 2008, Putin invaded Georgia and seized territory. And the Russians continue to ‘gradually move their barbed wire further and further into Georgia,’ says Wilson.

Six years later, in 2014, Putin invaded Ukraine for the first time, and Russian forces shot down a Malaysian commercial passenger jet, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, in the process.

‘Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was then the secretary-general of NATO, goes to Moscow, and says to Mr Putin, “I’ve come with a package of proposals to reform Russian NATO relations.” And Putin says to him on camera, “I don’t want to reform Russian NATO relations. I want NATO abolished.”’

Also in that year, Wilson notes, a senior Russian official came to Chatham House in London. The official said, ‘Putin is not so silly as to think that he can recreate the Soviet Union, but there is a core of the former Soviet Union that is properly ours—Belarus, Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan. And it would be nice to have it back.’

In 2018, Putin unveiled what Wilson describes as a ‘rather frightening array of new doomsday weapons, including a nuclear-armed torpedo that says, “You didn’t listen to us. Look at these weapons and listen to us now.”’

All of this was accompanied by ‘lurid and strident propaganda 24/7 on Russian television, pushing anti-Western messages,’ explains Wilson. An important part of this propaganda campaign was the idea that Ukraine is not a country or a people. ‘Putin said that very early on to George Bush. Again, we didn’t listen,’ he says.

During the past decade, Putin also accelerated the remilitarisation of Russia.

‘Under Putin, the military receives one in five roubles of revenue, but the security services and the national guard—a 350,000-strong riot police—also receive the same. So essentially three out of every five roubles of state revenue is going to control: an army to smite your foreign enemies and a domestic army to smite the traitors, the fifth column within.’

It’s therefore likely that Russia believes it is now demonstrating strength on its own terms by being able to wage what Wilson refers to as the ‘Russian way of war’.

‘There’s an expression in Russian that translates as “To be tender-hearted does not become a sword”,’ says Wilson. What this means in practice is the exercise of extreme brutality towards civilians, combined with an indifference to Russia’s own casualties.

Putin is likely to be equally indifferent, at least in the medium term, to Russia’s sanctions-induced economic suffering. Wilson argues that we shouldn’t be defining the health of the Russian economy in GDP terms.

‘Russia occupies about a fifth or a sixth of the world’s land surface. According to BHP Billiton, Russia sits on between 5% and 25% of almost everything on the planet, with exceptions like uranium and rare earths. Lake Baikal contains one-sixth of the world’s fresh water.

‘Oil and gas will remain important sources of revenue for the next 30 years. And the decline in Russia’s labour force is compensated for by Central Asian migration.’

On the economic front, while Russia has two big weaknesses—corruption and the brain drain of the best and brightest—Wilson says it is dangerously self-delusionary to argue that Russia has a weak economy.

Putin will also be encouraged by cracks in European support for Ukraine, as well as by the distinct lack of enthusiasm for Kyiv’s struggle among much of the developing world.

This will be feeding into the perception, endlessly peddled by Russian propaganda, that democratic nations don’t have the stomach for the Russian way of war and that Russia, as part of its exceptionalism, has an ability to suffer in a prolonged way that Western countries simply don’t have, Wilson says.

So right now, Putin may not be feeling dissatisfied with the way things are going, despite all the assertions that the invasion is a disaster for him.

### 2AC---Israel Thumper

#### Israel thumps.

Jacqueline Alemany 5-17-2021, Congressional Investigations reporter at the Washington Post, "Power Up: Biden administration approves $735 million weapons sale to Israel, raising red flags for some House Democrats", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/17/power-up-biden-administration-approves-735-million-weapons-sale-israel-raising-red-flags-some-house-democrats/, DL

FIRST IN POWER UP: The Biden administration has approved the sale of $735 million in precision-guided weapons to Israel, raising red flags for some House Democrats who are part of the shifting debate over the U.S. government’s support for the Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

### 2AC---Korea Thumper

#### Korean thumps.

Chris Martin 8-25-2021, "US approves $258 million arms sale to South Korea", Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/08/25/us-approves-258-million-arms-sale-to-south-korea/, DL

WASHINGTON — The U.S. State Department has OK’d a sale of precision-guided weapons worth about $258 million to South Korea.